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ABSTRACT
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by Issam Souilah
We aim to develop a formal framework to reason about provenance in distributed sys-
tems. We take as our starting point an extension of the asynchronous -calculus where
processes are explicitly assigned principal identities. We enrich this basic setting with
provenance annotated data, dynamic provenance tracking and dynamically checked trust
policies. We give several examples to illustrate the use of the calculus in modelling
systems where principals base their trust in the quality of data on the provenance infor-
mation associated with it.
We consider the role of provenance in the calculus by relating the provenance tracking
semantics to a plain one in which no provenance tracking or checking takes place. We
further substantiate this by studying bisimulation-based behavioural equivalences for the
plain and annotated versions of the calculus and contrasting the discriminating power
of the equivalences obtained in each case. We also give a more denotational take on
the semantics of the provenance calculus and look at notions of well-formedness and
soundness for the provenance tracking semantics.
We consider two dierent extensions of the basic calculus. The ﬁrst aims to alleviate
the cost of run time provenance tracking and checking by deﬁning a static type system
which guarantees that in well-typed systems principals always receive data with prove-
nance that matches their requirements. The second extension looks at the ramiﬁcations
of provenance tracking on privacy and security policies and consists of extending the
calculus with a notion we call ﬁlters. This gives principals the ability to assign dierent
views of the provenance of a given value to dierent principals, thus allowing for the se-
lective disclosure of provenance information. We study behavioural equivalences forthis
extension of the calculus, paying particular attention to the set of principals composing
the observer and its role in discriminating between systems.Contents
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Ubiquitous (or Pervasive) Computing is a vision of a future, that is drawing ever so
closer, where computational entities, both software and hardware, become an integral
partofthe environmentin whichwe conductourdailyactivities. In this vision, ﬁrstmade
popular by Mark Weiser [70], computers move from the desktop to public spaces, as they
once moved from the mainframe to the desktop, and become embedded in everyday life,
almost vanishing completely as they blend in with their background. The entities that
will inhabit the ubiquitous computing space are envisioned to be autonomous, mobile
and context-aware. The smartphones and tablets of today, beneﬁting from a multitude of
connectivity options and equipped with a wide range of sensors, can already be seen to
exhibit a higher degree of these characteristics than has ever before been associated with
electronic devices. They are computers that have eschewed the rigidity of our desktops,
choosing instead to be a companion in the journey rather than a stop along the itinerary.
Their most important contribution is in making the world’s information, still largely
unorganised and not universally accessible and useful, at least constantly available. Not
only that, but in their simplicity they turned every reader into a writer, and blurred the
lines between the reporter, the photographer, the ﬁlm maker, and their audiences. The
world’s information is increasing at an unprecedented rate. The platform is a bazaar.
There was a time when people complained about lack of information; that time has long
gone. The challenge today is that of choice. Faced with a plethora of information, and
of information sources, what do we choose? The answer used to be in the information
itself; choose information that is accurate, current, relevant, and in general information
that exhibits a myriad of other properties deemed essential for a particular purpose. That
answer is still correct. However, what has changed, and what is an intrinsic feature of
ubiquitous computing, is the high level of uncertainty. In all but the simplest cases, it
is dicult, expensive, or outright impossible to tell how accurate, current or relevant
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a piece of information is. In these settings, computational trust has been proposed
as an alternative, or more realistically a complementary, method of judging the quality
of information. Inspired by the principles of trust that govern human interaction, com-
putational trust moves the answer from the information to its sources, its provenance.
The premise is as follows, coupled with an underlying web of trust, the provenance of
information should give us a fairly good indication of its quality. It is a simple premise.
Good sources produce good information.
The ubiquitous computing vision has been a major aspiration, responsible for driving
research in computer science and related ﬁelds for the last two decades. The challenges
it poses, scientiﬁc, engineering and social, reﬂect the huge scale of ubiquitous comput-
ing. Tackling these challenges would allow us to understand the entities of ubiquitous
computing, build them to meet our ever more complex requirements, and study their
impact on society. The scientiﬁc challenge, being arguably the most fundamental of
the three, constitutes the basis for the UK Grand Challenge on Science for Global Ubiq-
uitous Computing [41]. Its aim is to obtain a theory on which to ground the analysis
and understanding of computational entities built in the ubiquitous computing setting.
Ultimately, such a theory would give us the tools we need to be able to build ubiquitous
computing systems whose behaviour we can rigorously prove to be correct. We expect
this theory to have a number of facets [47], each corresponding to a dierent feature of
ubiquitous computing and addressing the problems stemming from it. In this thesis, we
concern ourselves with one such feature, distribution, and one such problem, provenance.
In this thesis, we concern ourselves with provenance-based trust in distributed systems.
In this introductory chapter, we give an overview of the thesis and explain its context,
scope and main contributions. We split the chapter into ﬁve sections, entitled what,
why, how, who and where. The choice of these section titles is an allusion to names of
provenance notions commonly used by the provenance community. However, more than
serving just as an allusion, these section titles do in fact reﬂect fundamental questions
about the work presented in this thesis. In a way, these sections give the provenance
of the thesis. In Section 1.1, what, we deﬁne the main topic and context of the thesis
and proceed to describe the research problems that our work attempts to tackle. Then,
in Section 1.2, entitled why, we give our motivations for studying provenance and the
reasons we think this work is worthwhile. After that, in Section 1.3, we describe our
approach for studying provenance and review the main tools and techniques we plan to
use to answer our questions. The aim of Section 1.4, who, is to deﬁne the target audience
of the thesis, which it does by making explicit our assumptions about what the reader
is expected to already know and describing the prerequisite background knowledge.
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overview of the dierent versions of the calculus and outline the structure of the thesis,
listing where each of the main research items is discussed.
1.1 What
1.1.1 Provenance
As a concept, provenance is synonymous with source, origin and derivation and may
also mean the history of the ownership of a work of art or an antique, used as a guide
to authenticity or quality [59]. More concretely, provenance refers to a documented
record of such source or history, and depending on the particular setting, this record
may include information about the inﬂuences, contributions as well as other historical
or contextual information which may be deemed relevant and useful. Motivated by its
potential uses in various computing settings, provenance of data and other digital arte-
facts is garnering increased interest and is emerging as an important research topic [17].
Indeed, provenance is valuable for many applications such as auditing, detecting errors
and ensuring reproducibility of results of experiments. It is also central to the trust one
places in data, since it can be used as an indicator of quality, especially in settings where
the veriﬁcation of other attributes of data may not be possible.
1.1.2 Provenance tracking
Provenance tracking is the problem of recording provenance information, and has been
studied in a wide range of settings, including databases [8, 9, 15, 19, 28], scientiﬁc com-
puting [30, 31, 60, 67] and ﬁle systems [56]. Initially, most of the work on provenance
deﬁned what provenance means based on intuitive and informal concepts such as inﬂu-
ences, contributes to, and depends on. These notions were then used to provide mostly
ad hoc implementations, with no formal guarantees as to their correctness or adequacy.
However, lately there has been a surge of interest in underpinning the more theoretical
principles of provenance [8, 15, 28]. These theoretical works aim to establish a math-
ematical and semantic basis for provenance, which is important if we are to compare
dierent notions of provenance or assess the correctness of their implementations. The
present work falls in this latter line of research and aims to provide a formal study of
provenance-based trust in concurrent and distributed systems.4 Chapter 1 Introduction
1.1.3 Distributed systems
We aim to study provenance in settings similar to those of ubiquitous computing. We
believe the distributed nature of those systems is one of their most deﬁning features.
Therefore, we concern ourselves in this work with provenance in distributed systems.
We model these latter as sets of principals or agents, possibly belonging to dierent
trust domains, that communicate by message passing. As information may cross the
boundaries of trust domains, principals need a way of judging its quality. We advocate
the use of provenance for this, and hence, the notions of provenance we are interested
in studying are those that could form the basis for trust in the quality of information in
these systems.
1.1.4 Research questions
The aim of the previous three sections, and indeed of all of the chapter so far, was to
deﬁne the basic concepts behind our work and to give a general idea of its context and
scope. We now give a more thorough description of the research questions we aim to
tackle in the rest of this thesis.
At a high level, we aim to deﬁne notions of provenance suitable foruse as a basis fortrust
in distributed systems. We think of trust as primarily a relationship between principals
and of provenance as a means of extending this relationship to data. More speciﬁcally,
the provenance of data should allow a principal to use its beliefs about the trustworthi-
ness of other principals to determine the trustworthiness of data produced, transmitted or
otherwise aected by these principals. Trust beliefs between principals and how they are
used to determine trust in data are local to each principal and are likely to depend on the
domain being modelled and on the intended use of data. Therefore, it is not the role of
provenance, and therefore neither of this work, to prescribe any particular way of deriv-
ing the trust associated with data from the trust associated with the principals appearing
in its provenance. Instead, provenance should be merely informative, documenting the
role of each principal in transmitting a piece of data from its original producer to its
current owner, and therefore enabling each principal to judge the trustworthiness of data
according to its own trust policies. We aim to look at dierent approaches for tracking
such provenance information and to study the properties of both the provenance notion
itself, as well as those of the dierent provenance tracking techniques. A natural way
to track provenance information is by instrumenting the run time environment so that
it annotates every piece of data with its provenance and updates these provenance an-
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of the run time environment is likely to have performance ramiﬁcations, conservative
approximations of provenance that can be achieved by static analysis are desirable and
therefore will investigated in this work. At least for the purposes of this work, we think
of provenance management as a feature that would be added on top of the existing infras-
tructure of a distributed environment, no doubt introducing several ramiﬁcations. We
already mentioned the performance ramiﬁcation and the need for static provenance track-
ing. Perhaps more important, the disclosure of provenance is likely to pose privacy and
security concerns and therefore principals should be able to control who has access to
provenance pertaining to their actions. We plan to address this by studying programming
constructs that allow principals to control the disclosure of provenance information.
The approach we take in this work is theoretical and is carried out in a process algebraic
setting. This latter gives us all the basic tools and techniques we need to be able to model
and reason about distributed systems, and allows us to build on the large body of readily
available results by the process algebraic community. A more detailed description of
our approach is given in Section 1.3.
In the following, we list the questions we aim to answer in the thesis:
1. What is provenance? Here, we only concern ourselves with what provenance
means in the context of distributed systems, and mainly as an enabler for judging
the quality of data. The provenance of a value should contain enough informa-
tion about the role of each principal in getting that value to its current state. In
particular:
 Originator: the principal that produced the value matters: the trust policy
of a principal might require it to only consume (or not consume) data that
originated from a particular source.
 Transmitter: the principals that transmitted the value matter: the trust policy
of a principal might require it to only consume (or not consume) data that
was transmitted by a select set of principals.
 Enabler: the principals that enabled the transmission of the value matter: the
trust policy of a principal might require it to only consume (or not consume)
data that was transmitted on communication channels supplied by a select
set of principals.
 Order: the order of events matters: the trust policy of a principal might re-
quire it to only consume (or not consume) data that was transmitted between
a select set of principals and in a particular order.6 Chapter 1 Introduction
 Type: the type of event matters: the trust policy of a principal might require
it to only consume (or not consume) data that was sent but not received (or
vice versa) on a channel supplied by a select set of principals.
2. How do we track provenance? Having answered the previous question and deﬁned
a suitable notion of provenance, the next natural question to ask is how do we plan
to track this provenance information. We already mentioned two possible ways of
tracking provenance information; at run time by annotating each piece of data with
its provenance and updating these annotations after each relevant computational
step, and at compile time by using a static analysis to predict and approximate the
run time provenance of data. These two provenance tracking methods will dier
in their properties, and we wish to compare them based on three main criteria:
(a) Soundness: does provenance tracking include any information that is incor-
rect with respect to the past of the data?
(b) Completeness: does provenance tracking exclude any information that is
deemed essential by the ﬁve criteria of the previous section?
(c) Eciency: does provenance tracking cause any performance overhead?
3. How do principals use provenance? The aim of tracking provenance in a dis-
tributed system is to make it available to principals in order to enable them to
make decisions about how to use the data they receive from other principals, es-
pecially when those principals belong to other trust domains. Hence, the task of
making that provenance available to principals in an accessible and useful way is
at least as important as the task of tracking provenance itself. The main require-
ment here is that principals are able to express trust policies that depend on all ﬁve
criteria of provenance.
4. What are the properties of the provenance notions? Studying the properties of a
provenance notion allows us to better understand it and compare it to other prove-
nance notions. This in turn makes it possible for us to decide which provenance
notion to use in a particular environment or for a particular application.
5. What are the properties of the provenance tracking techniques? In addition to the
above, since there may be multiple approaches to tracking provenance information
for a particular provenance notion, it is important that we compare and contrast
these dierent provenance tracking approaches to be able to tell which approach
is suitable for each of the circumstances that we are interested in.
6. What is the impact of adding provenance tracking to a given computer system?
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ramiﬁcations, the most important of which is probably around the privacy and
securityrequirementsofthissystem. Therefore, aprovenancemanagementsystem
should give principals full control over the disclosure of provenance information
relating to their actions.
1.2 Why
1.2.1 Quality of information in the bazaar
The environments envisaged by ubiquitous computing are characterised by vast num-
bers of computational agents interacting to create, transform and publish data. This
interaction makes use of, and produces, large markets of data whose quality, reﬂected
in several criteria including for example accuracy, currency, and relevance, varies im-
mensely. These data markets are open to agents belonging to dierent trust domains.
Each agent is equipped with a trust policy arising from its local beliefs about the trust-
worthiness of other agents and governing its interaction with them. An agent’s beliefs
also aect the weights it ascribes to the dierent dimensions of data quality. Moreover,
an agent is likely to perceive the quality of a piece of data dierently depending on its
intended use. This latter idea may be seen as corresponding more to the intuitive notion
of the suitability of data for a particular task than the more general notion of data quality.
Indeed, while a piece of data that is perceived to be incomplete may be suitable for some
non-critical applications, it would be regarded unsuitable by most agents for applica-
tions with a critical nature. This distinction is irrelevant for the aims of the present work
however as we do not, nor do we need to, address the problem of directly deﬁning or
measuring the quality of data. Instead, we aim to provide programmatic tools to allow
agents to implement provenance-based trust policies and study the formal properties of
such systems. The beliefs of agents and their perceptions of what constitutes data of
high quality are implicit in the implementation of their trust policies.
1.2.2 The role of provenance
The quality of data may be judged relative to the local beliefs of an agent, the intended
use of the data and its dierent attributes. However, it is often the case that information
about the latter may not be available or may be impossible to verify independently. In
these cases, information about the role each agent played in arriving at a piece of data,
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place in its quality. In fact, such use of provenance information is familiar from many
real life situations. As an example, consider our use of brand names when deciding
what products to buy; actually for many people this yields more inﬂuence than any
other, sometimes more important, attribute in determining whether to buy a particular
product or not. Often, this use of provenance goes even further where it is not only the
maker of a particular product that inﬂuences the decision of what to buy, but also the
retailer, the makers of the dierent components, and any other organisation or entity
involved in creating, assembling, selling, promoting or marketing the product. Such
use of provenance is also common in other applications and is usually guided by simple
intuitions regarding the credibility, authority and honesty of the agents we interact with.
1.3 How
In this section, we describe our approach and the tools and techniques we plan to use to
answer the questions we posed in Section 1.1.
1.3.1 Process calculi
We are interested in the formal foundations of provenance in distributed systems. There-
fore, we need a way of formally modelling and reasoning about these systems. To that
end, we make use of process calculi. Process calculi have matured for over three decades
to become the standard formalism forstudying concurrent and distributed systems. Their
success does not only lie in their use as a language for modeling concurrent systems
and studying their properties, but also, and arguably even more crucially, in providing
a hotbed for the development of a wide range of techniques and tools, both theoretical
and practical.
In this thesis, we start with a variant of the asynchronous -calculus [6, 34]. The -
calculus, introduced by Milner, Parrow and Walker [48, 49], provides an elegant lan-
guage for describing systems whose components interact by communication and whose
network topology may change over time as components acquire new communication
links or channels. The asynchronous -calculus restricts communication to the asyn-
chronous case. We ﬁnd this to be a more faithful model of distributed systems, especially
for the type of settings that motivate our work. We also make use of some of the the-
oretical frameworks developed around process calculi, the most important of which is
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The asynchronous -calculus gives us all we need to model and analyse distributed
systems. However, the notions of provenance we are interested in studying rely on being
able to model agents belonging to dierent trust domains. To do this, we extend the
asynchronous -calculus with principal identities or locations. What this gives us is
a calculus where the trust domain that a process belongs to is made explicit, and the
communication of messages between processes is allowed to cross trust boundaries. The
role of provenance in judging the quality of data then becomes clearer. The basic model
is described in detail in Section 3.1, and its extension with provenance is studied in
Section 3.2.
1.3.2 Bisimulation
Bisimulation is arguably the most important contribution of Concurrency Theory to
Computer Science [65]. One of many process equivalences to be proposed, bisimulation
is distinguished by its coinductive deﬁnition and associated proof technique. Intuitively,
two processes are related by bisimulation, or said to be bisimilar, if they can match each
other’s actions, ad inﬁnitum.
In this work, we use bisimulation for two reasons. First it helps us understand the role of
provenance tracking in the calculus by comparing the equivalence we obtain in the plain
calculus with the one we get when we augment the calculus with provenance. Secondly,
when we look at the security ramiﬁcations of provenance tracking in Chapter 7 and
Chapter 8, process equivalence and bisimulation help us specify some of the privacy and
security goals we wish a given system to achieve.
1.3.3 Static analysis
Static analysis refers to the analysis of computer programs without executing them, usu-
ally performed on the source code. The aim of static analysis is to catch and ﬁx bugs at
compile time to avoid errors at run time when their cost may be more expensive, rang-
ing from minor annoyance and lost productivity to critical safety and security breaches.
Static typing, probably the most popular and successful form of static analysis, consists
usually of annotating a program with type information and verifying that certain prop-
erties would never get violated during the execution of the program. Static typing may
be contrasted with dynamic typing where checks are performed at run time to ensure
the program never violates the desired properties. The advantage of static typing over
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In thiswork, weusestatictypechecking toimplementaform ofprovenancetracking that
does awaywithrun time provenance checks. This provides a conservative approximation
of provenance that avoids the performance overhead of dynamic provenance checking
and which might be desirable in certain cases. In addition to this, it sheds more light
on the properties of the provenance notion we study in this work. Static provenance
tracking is studied in Chapter 6.
1.4 Who
1.4.1 Prerequisites
As we have already mentioned, we are interested in understanding the formal underpin-
nings of provenance in distributed systems. Our approach in accomplishing this draws
on the large repertoire of tools and techniques developed by the theoretical computer sci-
ence community. These include programming language semantics, logic, type systems,
process calculi and bisimulation. We explain the intuition behind each concept as we use
it, however a comprehensive exposition of the whole background is naturally beyond the
scope of this thesis. The reader is referred to Nielson and Nielson [57] for programing
language semantics, Huth and Ryan [37] for logic, Pierce [61, 62] for type systems,
Milner [46] and Sangiorgi [66] for the -calculus, and Sangiorgi [65] for bisimulation.
1.5 Where
We split this section into three parts. In the ﬁrst part, we oer an assessment of the
contributions of this thesis, using the questions described in Section 1.1.4 as our baseline.
The second part provides an overview of the dierent versions of the calculus introduced
in this thesis. In the third and ﬁnal part, we give a brief rundown of the content of the
thesis.
1.5.1 Contributions
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1.5.1.1 The provenance calculus
Our ﬁrst contribution is the deﬁnition of the provenance calculus in Chapter 3. By
presenting the calculus in two versions, we make explicit the extensions that are needed
to incorporate provenance into the calculus. More precisely, three main extensions are
made to the basic process calculus used as our starting point. The extensions are as
follows.
Provenance annotated data. All data exchanged between principals is annotated
with meta-data representing its provenance. These provenance annotations take the form
of nested sequences of events, mirroring the send and receive actions of the calculus
and recording the role each principal plays in routing a value to its destination. These
provenance sequences meet all ﬁve requirements of provenance set out in Section 1.1.4:
 Originator: the principal that produced the value can be found as the author of the
ﬁrst (right-most) event in the sequence. For example, in the sequence c!c1 ;c?c2 ;
b!b1 ; b?b2 ; a!a1, principal a represents the original producer of the value.
 Transmitter: all principals that transmitted the value can be found as the authors
of events in the provenance sequence. For example, in the sequence c!c1 ; c?c2 ;
b!b1 ; b?b2 ; a!a1, the value was produced by a and subsequently transmitted by
b and c to its current location.
 Enabler: the principals that enabled the transmission of the value can be found
in the provenance of the channels used. For example, in the sequence c!c1 ;
c?c2 ; b!b1 ; b?b2 ; a!a1, the provenance subsequences c1, c2, b1, b2, and a1
all give the provenance of the channels used for communication and therefore
information about the principals that enabled the value to be communicated to its
current location.
 Order: provenance sequences are ordered from right to left. The right-most event
is the oldest while the left-most event is the most recent.
 Type: provenance sequences may contain two types of events; send events of
the form a! and receive events of the form a?. These mirror the two types of
communication actions available in the calculus.12 Chapter 1 Introduction
Provenance tracking semantics. The provenance annotations of values are kept up-
to-date as the system evolves by instrumenting the operational semantics of the calculus.
This ensures that each computational step of the system results in updating the prove-
nance of relevant values as required. The provenance tracking semantics is sound and
complete in that it records information which is correct and which meets all ﬁve cri-
teria of the provenance notion. However, it poses both space and time overhead; it
records provenance in the form of annotations which require extra space to store, and
the recording of provenance takes place at run time posing performance overhead.
Dynamic provenance checking. Principals make use of provenance by specifying
provenance policies. These are patterns against which the provenance of values is
checked automatically by the operational semantics of the calculus to guarantee that
principals only consume data with provenance that meets their requirements. Patterns
allow principals to express conditions that depend on all features of provenance, meeting
the third requirement of Section 1.1.4.
In summary, the above three features answer the ﬁrst three questions of Section 1.1.4.
The provenance notion we propose is aimed to capture the role of each principal in get-
ting a value from its original source to its current state. This meets all ﬁve requirements
of provenance. Our ﬁrst answer to the question of how to track provenance takes the
form of automatically updating the provenance annotations with new information as the
computation proceeds. Although it poses extra performance overhead, this method of
tracking provenance is sound and complete. Principals are able to express trust policies
that depend on the full range of information available in provenance annotations, and
to check these provenance annotations against their local trust policies, hence making
fully informed decisions on whether to consume the data or not. The local trust policies
of principals are represented as patterns in a suitable pattern language. Principals asso-
ciate policies with their input channels to indicate what provenance is required for each
channel on which they consume data.
1.5.1.2 Properties of provenance
We study the properties of the provenance calculus in two dierent ways. The ﬁrst,
covered in Chapter 4, consists of deﬁning two behavioural equivalences for the plain
and annotated versions of the calculus and contrasting their discriminating power. The
second is explored in Chapter 5 and takes a denotational approach to look at two proper-
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those provenance sequences that are possible, that is that could arise in a valid computa-
tion. The second property, correctness, is based on deﬁning the semantics of provenance
sequences as formulae in a specially devised logic. It characterises when a provenance
sequence could be said to be a truthful record of the past.
These constitute our answers to the fourth and ﬁfth questions of Section 1.1.4. By
contrasting and comparing the two versions of the calculus, we are able to highlight
the properties of provenance and its role in the calculus. Well-formedness provides a
syntactic deﬁnition of what provenance sequences “make sense”. Provenance sequences
deemed ill-formed would never arise in a computation based on the rules of our calculus.
The soundness property looks at what provenance sequences are meant to represent:
records of some past behaviour of the system. As such, a provenance sequence is sound
only if the information it conveys about the past is true.
1.5.1.3 Static provenance tracking
The provenance policies of principals are enforced dynamically by the operational se-
mantics which checks the provenance of values against the policies of principals before
permitting the principals to consume the values. This causes extra performance over-
head at run time. To remedy this, we propose a type inference system in Chapter 6 that
approximates the provenance of values at compile time and guarantees that in well-typed
systems principals always consume data with provenance that meets their requirements.
This is aimed as an alternative way of keeping track of provenance information and
hence forms part of the answer to our second question, how do we track provenance?
The static analysis eliminates the performance overhead of run time provenance track-
ing. It provides a conservative approximation of the provenance of values, guaranteeing
both soundness and completeness of provenance. However, being a conservative ap-
proximation, it does rule out certain input transitions that would be allowed by run time
provenance tracking. Chapter 6 gives a thorough comparison of the two provenance
tracking approaches.
1.5.1.4 Provenance security
The provenance notion we study in this thesis records the role that each principal played
in getting a given value to the state it is in. What this does is reveal to any principal
that consumes the value some of the actions that these principals have been involved in.
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we propose an extension to the calculus that gives principals the ability to control how
much of the provenance of the values they publish is visible to other principals. We
study the properties of this extension of the calculus in Chapter 8, where we propose a
novel notion of behavioural equivalence that enables us to analyse how much provenance
dierent sets of principals are able to see.
As we already mentioned in the ﬁnal question of Section 1.1.4, security is one of the
main concerns when tracking provenance and hence it is the one we devote Chapter 7
and Chapter 8 to studying. The notion of ﬁlters we propose in Chapter 7 recognises that
ownership of provenance should rest with the principal whose actions the provenance
describes. Filters give principals full control over all provenance information pertaining
to their own actions. This guarantees that provenance tracking does not violate the
privacy and security policies of principals.
1.5.2 Versions of the calculus
We study provenance in the context of a process calculus. We start with a simple exten-
sion of the asynchronous -calculus and incrementally build on it to introduce various
features for provenance management. In particular, there are three main versions of the
calculus and they are as follows:
 The plain version: forms the computationalcore on top ofwhich the otherversions
add provenance management features.
 The annotated version: extends the plain version with provenance annotated data,
dynamic provenance tracking and dynamically checked provenance policies.
 The ﬁltered version: adds ﬁlters to the annotated version in order to enable princi-
pals to control the disclosure of provenance.
We denote the structural congruence relation of the plain version with p, its reduction
relation with !p and its labelled transition relation with

 !p. Variants of the these
relations are also deﬁned for the annotated and ﬁltered versions of the calculus. They
are denoted by a, !a and

 !a in the annotated version and by f, !f and

 !f in the
ﬁlteredversion. In general, functions, relations andanyotherdeﬁnitions belonging to the
plain version of the calculus will have the subscript p, those belonging to the annotated
version will have the subscript a, and those belonging to the ﬁltered version will have
the subscript f. We also introduce several minor variants of the calculus throughout the
thesis. We explain the role of each variant as we introduce it.Chapter 1 Introduction 15
1.5.3 Structure of the thesis
The remainderofthis thesis consists ofeightchapters. Chapter 2 reviews relatedworkon
provenance. The following three chapters, that is chapters 3, 4 and 5, concern the basic
formalism. They introduce the provenance calculus and study its properties. Chapter
6 looks at static enforcement of provenance policies while chapters 7 and 8 aim to
address the security ramiﬁcations of provenance tracking by proposing an extension to
the calculus with security primitives. Chapter 9 concludes the thesis. In the following,
we comment on each chapter in more detail.
In Chapter 2, we provide a review of the provenance literature. We start by looking
at simple forms of provenance. We think of these as precursors to current research
on provenance. We then move on to more recent research eorts. We cover some
of the main lines of provenance research in the database and the scientiﬁc workﬂow
communities. We also look at cross-cutting concerns, namely formalisation, security
and standardisation.
In Chapter 3, we give an overview of the calculus. We start with the plain version with
no provenance annotations and then proceed to describe how provenance annotations,
tracking and querying are added to this basic setting. Provenance querying is performed
using pattern matching, the details of which are orthogonal to our aims and hence are
left unspeciﬁed at this stage. However, in order to give concrete examples, we deﬁne
a sample pattern matching language based on regular expressions. We use this to give
several examples to illustrate the features of the calculus.
Chapter 4 studies the properties of pattern matching languages. It then compares the
plain and annotated versions of the calculus, ﬁrstly by contrasting their reduction rela-
tions and secondly by using behavioural equivalences based on barbed congruence. By
contrasting the equivalences obtained for each version, we highlight better the role that
provenance tracking plays in the calculus.
In Chapter 5, we consider the semantics of provenance sequences and study properties
of our provenance tracking reduction relation. We deﬁne a temporal logic aimed to serve
as a target for deﬁning the denotation of provenance sequences. We then use this to
formulate and prove a property we call provenance correctness. This latter is aimed to
capture the intuitive idea that what the provenance information tells us about the past of
values does indeed coincide with what actually took place.
In Chapter 6, we look at how to eliminate the run time overhead caused by dynamic
provenance tracking and checking. We do this by using a type and eect inference16 Chapter 1 Introduction
system which gives a conservative approximation of the provenance of values and guar-
antees that principals always consume data with provenance that matches their policies.
Chapter 7 considers security issues raised by provenance tracking and proposes an exten-
sion to the calculus to enable each principal to control the disclosure of their provenance
information to other principals. The mechanism proposed is based on the idea of ﬁlters
and gives principals total ownership of provenance information pertaining to their own
activities. Access and control of provenance information belonging to other principals
is, however, at the discretion of the authors of that provenance.
In Chapter 8, we study properties of the extended calculus and the security guarantees
oered by ﬁlters. This is done by deﬁning a notion of behavioural equivalence that
takes the set of principals that are available to the observer into account. Varying the set
of principals available to the observer gives us equivalences with dierent discriminat-
ing power and allows us to highlight the views of provenance that are associated with
dierent principals.
In Chapter 9, we review our contributions and suggest possible avenues for future work.Chapter 2
The History of Provenance
Provenance, in one form or another, has always been an integral part of computer sys-
tems. Indeed, a wide range of familiar applications such as ﬁle systems, revision control
systems, and backup systems keep track of dierent types of information recording their
execution and past states. Although they may refer to these types of information under
a variety of other names, such as logs, audit trails or history trees, all these types of
information are really just dierent notions of provenance. It is important to note here
that although essential to the functioning of these and many other systems, until rela-
tively recently, provenance was not thought of as an important problem in its own right.
Instead, it was intertwined with the many other features those applications provided,
and sometimes like in the case of logs kept by software applications, it came only as an
afterthought. This has meant that lessons learned from the development of one notion
of provenance could not beneﬁt the development of another, and more importantly, that
the guarantees oered by a particular notion of provenance were not at all clear.
It was not until around 2000 that provenance started to draw serious interest from the
Computer Science research community. In fact, interest in provenance came simulta-
neously from several dierent sub-communities within Computer Science, including
databases, scientiﬁc computing and the semantic web. Eorts to bring these communi-
ties together soon followed, and led to several events organised speciﬁcally for research
on provenance. Moreau [51] notes that half the research papers on provenance were
published in the last couple of years, most of them at these events. This is not only a
testament to the success of these events, but also to the sizeable and growing provenance
research community. There are a few reasons for this increase of interest in provenance
research; the most important of which is probably the open and connected nature of the
web. This has enabled the dissemination of information at an unprecedented rate and
has meant that the premise of centrally-controlled, expertly-curated data repositories no
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longer holds. Instead, the reality we are increasingly dealing with is similar to that envi-
sioned by ubiquitous computing, where disparate entities create, transform and publish
data. Provenance, as we already mentioned, stands to play a major role in enabling us to
judge the trustworthiness of data in such environments.
The remainder of this chapter is split into two main sections. In the ﬁrst section, we
look at the ubiquity of provenance in almost every type of computer system. We will
note that many of these systems developed their own notions of provenance to meet
their individual requirements. We will also note that for the most part, these notions of
provenance were implemented in a rather ad hoc fashion and were never made separate
from other features of these systems. In fact, these notions of provenance were not even
thoughtofasinstancesofthesameproblem. Afterthat, wemoveon tothesecondsection
where we focus on the recent rise of interest in provenance research. Here, provenance
starts to be recognised as a separate important research problem in its own right, and
the dierent research communities that work on provenance come together to look at
uniﬁed deﬁnitions of provenance, shared and standardised representations of provenance
and common approaches and strategies to implement provenance tracking systems. We
review works on provenance in databases, in workﬂow and scientiﬁc computing as well
as in the semantic web. We also review research on cross-cutting concerns such as
provenance security and discuss recent standardisation eorts.
2.1 Prehistory
We use the term prehistory to refer, not to a particular span of time, but rather to a way
of thinking about provenance. Prehistory is characterised by the lack of a clear separa-
tion between the provenance notions, the tools and techniques used to track provenance
information, and the plethora of other problems that any nontrivial computer system
is expected to deal with. Because of this, many of the systems belonging in this cate-
gory, which we call prehistoric provenance systems, had to develop their own notions
of provenance and their own implementations to track provenance information. The
lessons learned from one system could not be shared with other systems, and this meant
that prehistoric provenance systems have played very little role in advancing our under-
standing of provenance, even though some of them have been in existence for a very
long time. It is worth noting that the problems with prehistoric provenance systems
we mentioned correspond to two classical software engineering problems, that of the
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track provenance), and that of the separation of concerns (i.e. separating provenance,
security, performance, and other concerns from each other).
The listofindividualsystems thatbelong in this categoryis enormous. In fact, depending
on where one draws the line of what information is considered provenance, it is possible
to classify almost every computer system ever built as keeping some form of provenance
information. An exhaustive review of every such system is clearly beyond the scope
of this thesis, and probably too much for any single work to hope to cover thoroughly.
What we do instead in this section is review a few particular classes of these systems.
We think these highlight some of the most interesting notions of provenance found in
familiarsoftware applications. The classes ofsystems we lookatinclude revision control
systems, wikis, logging and the many other forms of history provided by applications as
features to their users.
2.1.1 Revision control systems
Most widely used in software engineering, revision control systems help software de-
velopers manage changes to source code and other software development artifacts such
as design documents, user manuals and conﬁguration ﬁles. Software development is
incremental by its nature, and in all active software projects, changes are constantly
made to the code base as bugs are ﬁxed and new features are added. To make this task
manageable, to allow for accountability and traceability, and to enable large teams of de-
velopers to collaborate, revision control systems make use of a rich form of provenance
tracking. Every change made to a ﬁle under revision control is tracked by the revision
control system. Figure 2.1 shows sample history information kept by the revision control
system Subversion [63] about a ﬁle. The ﬁgure shows summarised meta-data about each
change, such as who made it, when it was made, how many lines were aected, and a
brief description of the change supplied by the developer. More detailed information
about the change, down to the exact state of the ﬁle before and after the change, can also
be obtained from Subversion.
It is worth noting that revision control systems are not the preserve of software engineer-
ing and are actually used whenever there is a need to track and manage changes made to
documents, especially in collaborative environments. As a result of this, revision control
systems can also be found integrated in many other applications such as word processors,
content management systems and wikis as we will see in the next section.20 Chapter 2 The History of Provenance
Figure 2.1: Provenance of a ﬁle in Subversion
2.1.2 Wikis
Probablyno single computersystem orwebsiteepitomises the democratisation ofknowl-
edge brought about by the rise of the web as much as Wikipedia.1 Wikipedia is an online
encyclopedia that employs the concept of a wiki [44], a website whose content can be
edited by any user, to enable the collaborative creation of a high quality encyclopedia.
The philosophy behind wikis, and Wikipedia in particular, is to make it as easy and quick
as possible for users to add, edit and remove content. This is driven by the premise that
more often than not, the changes made by users would be to correct existing mistakes
rather than to make new ones, leading incrementally to better content. To that end, wikis
try to forego traditional access control methods whenever possible in favour of a form of
revision control that guarantees easy recovery from unacceptable content changes. As
an example, Figure 2.2 shows an extract from the history of the Wikipedia page on the
Scala programming language [58]. As can be seen from the ﬁgure, the revision history
is quite similar to that provided by Subversion and shows every version of the page as a
chronologically ordered list, going back to when the page was ﬁrst created. Each line in
the list represents a particular version of the page in question, and gives the following
information about it:
 A timestamp showing when that version was created.
 The username or IP address of the user who created that version.
 Howmuchofthe contentofthe pagewas changedfrom theprevious version, given
both as the number of bytes changed and the number of lines added or removed.
 A brief textual summary describing what the change was.
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Figure 2.2: Revision history of a Wikipedia page
 A way to revert to the previous version of the web page if the change is deemed
undesirable for whatever reason.
The revision history kept by the wiki software ensures that no change to a web page is
ever lost. This is intended to protect the wiki against bad changes or outright vandalism
as users are able to revert the web page to a previous good version whenever needed.
Revision control systems, both as used in software engineering as well as in wikis, can
be seen as maintaining two types of provenance information:
 The dierent states (or revisions or versions) that a particular artifact, whether a
source code ﬁle or a web page, goes through as it evolves. This allows users to
compare two dierent revisions of an artifact to pinpoint where exactly they dier.
Figure 2.3 shows the dierence between two revisions of the Wikipedia page on
Scala.
 Additional contextual information describing when each change took place, who
made it as well as a short comment by the author of the change describing its
intent and content. This is the information shown in Figure 2.2.
2.1.3 Logging
Another form of provenance that is ubiquitous in every software application is that kept
in logs, persistent stores such as ﬁles or databases where applications record interest-
ing events they encounter while running. That way it is possible to refer back to this
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Figure 2.3: Comparing two revisions of a Wikipedia page
detecting intrusion. For example, the Apache HTTP Server2 keeps two main log ﬁles,
an error log ﬁle where it stores diagnostic information about the errors that it encounters
and an access log ﬁle where it records all requests processed by the server. The exact
content and format of these two log ﬁles is conﬁgurable by the server administrator, but
a typical line in the access log ﬁle would record information about the request, such as
the IP address of the client that sent it, the user that sent it, its date and time, its method
and the resource requested. This would look something like this:
127.0.0.1 - frank [10/Oct/2000:13:55:36 -0700] "GET /apache_pb.gif HTTP/1.0" 200 2326
In their most general form, application logs can contain any run time information a
program cares to record. This is clearly too generic for any single provenance notion to
adequately meet the logging requirements of every application. Hence, it is left as the
responsibility of each application developer to deﬁne their own “provenance notion” and
make sure their code records relevant and sucient information in log ﬁles. Faced with
what is arguably a very intractable problem, common eorts in logging have focused
insteadon developing tools andframeworks to manage the logging process. Forexample,
programs written in the Java programming language beneﬁt from a large selection of so
called logging frameworks. Examples of these include the Java Logging API3, Log4J4
and Apache Commons Logging5. These frameworks aim to make it easier for developers
to log run time information by splitting the task of logging into three components, each
conﬁgurable separately:
 Logger: the job of a logger is to supply the other two components with the mes-
sages that need to be logged. It is the only component that application code needs
to deal with directly. Application code calls methods of the logger with the mes-
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Figure 2.4: Sample log messages using the Java Logging API
 Formatter: this is responsible for determining how to format log messages and
aims to separate the presentation of log messages from their content.
 Appender: the appender receives the messages that need to be logged from the
logger, uses the formatter to decide how these messages should be formatted, and
then writes the formatted messages to the console, log ﬁle or any other output
stream as required.
A logger is associated with a component, package or class in the application. It has
a level which determines the severity of messages that should be logged. Most Java
logging frameworks recognise some or all of the following logging levels: (1) FINEST,
(2) FINER, (3) FINE, (4) CONFIG, (5) INFO, (6) WARNING, (7) SEVERE. Applica-
tion code speciﬁes the level each message should be logged at. Messages with the same
level as the logger or higher would be sent to the appender; all other messages would be
ignored. This allows developers to turn certain logging messages on and o as required.
For example during development, in order to aid in debugging, all logging messages
would be enabled by setting the logging level to the lowest, while when deploying the
application in a production environment only higher levels are enabled to minimise the
performance overhead of logging. Sample output from the default implementation of
the Java Logging API is given in Figure 2.4.
2.1.4 History as a feature of software
Provenance is everywhere. Revision control systems, wikis, and logging are but a
few examples. In fact, in addition to keeping log information, many applications have
integratedsome form ofprovenance as a feature fortheirusers. Forinstance, the Mac OS
X operating system warns users when opening ﬁles they downloaded from the Internet.24 Chapter 2 The History of Provenance
Figure 2.5: Provenance of ﬁles downloaded from the Internet in Mac OS X 10.7
Figure 2.5 shows such a warning dialog box. It asks the user to conﬁrm that they want
to open the ﬁle or program, given its provenance. In this example, it says that the ﬁle the
user is about to open is a Unix application that was downloaded by the Google Chrome
web browser on 18 of May 2012 from the website www.scala-lang.org. This ensures
users are aware of the source of ﬁles they open and aims to protect them from viruses
and other malicious software.
Along similar lines, many applications keep track of recently opened items. For example,
web browsers keep a record of recently visited web pages, word processors keep a
record of recently opened documents, and Unix shells keep a record of recently executed
commands. In fact, these ideas are made a lot more useful by the “undo” and “redo”
features so common in many document editing applications. File systems are not an
exception; they associate with each ﬁle meta-data recording contextual and historical
information about the ﬁle such as when it was created and when it was last edited. Web
cookies, stored by websites on a user’s computer so that the user’s activity on the website
can be checked in future visits, are also a form of provenance. The list of applications
and the list of forms of provenance is indeed immense. This section is only intended to
give the reader an idea of some of the most common forms of provenance in software
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2.2 A bright new past
In the previous section, we looked at forms of provenance that have not been tradition-
ally thought of as provenance. In a way, they are forms of provenance that have been
referred to by many other names but provenance. It is interesting that we now recognise
them as being just dierent, albeit sometimes very simple, notions of provenance. This
realisation, and this common vocabulary, will hopefully have some positive impact on
the way we implement provenance tracking in those systems.
This section aims to provide a brief review of the provenance literature. As noted
in the introduction to this chapter, there has been a dramatic increase of interest in
provenance over the last decade or so. The Computer Science research community
looked at provenance in a variety of domains and for a variety of applications. For
the sake of ease of presentation, we split the works into two topics: databases and
workﬂows. We also group together works on cross-cutting concerns such as formal
models, security and standardisation. This should make it easier for us to compare
similar works and highlight common research themes. However, it is worth noting that
there are works that cannot be neatly classed into one of the aforementioned topics.
This is especially the case, perhaps, with the more recent research eorts that are the
result of collaborations spanning multiple dierent ﬁelds within Computer Science, and
sometimes even touching on the non-Computer Science aspects of provenance.
2.2.1 Databases
Probably the clearest area in provenance research is that of databases, and that is both
in terms of classifying what works belong in this area and also in terms of the dierent
provenance notions that people have proposed. In fact, the database research community
categorises the dierent provenance notions applicable in databases simply in the form
of the questions they answer. For example, one type of provenance in databases is
known as Where-provenance, and as its name suggests, it tells us where in the input, a
piece of data in the output of a query comes from. Another type of provenance is Why-
provenance and it tells us why, in the form of tuples of data in the input, a tuple of data
is present in the output of a query. The type of provenance known as How-provenance
is the most complete of the three and tells us how a piece of data in the output of a query
was derived from its inputs. Having said this, it is worth pointing out that the database
research community has also deﬁned other provenance notions that do not ﬁt in general
within the framework of Where, Why and How provenance. We comment on some of
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2.2.1.1 Statement of the problem
Provenance research in databases is concerned with identifying the origins of the data in
the database and the process by which it arrived there [9]. An important instance of this
problem is where the source of the data is another database. This setting is encountered
often, for instance, in data integration, warehousing, views and in results of queries in
general. It has many applications such as tracing the source of an error in the output
of a query and keeping views up-to-date as their sources are updated. The main aim
of this line of research is to relate items in the output of a query to items in its input
such that the latter can be said to have contributed to the existence of the former. This
can be rephrased as follows, given an output database O, which is the result of query
Q on input database I, that is we have O = Q(I), the provenance of an item o 2 O are
items i 2 I such that i contributes to o. The exact deﬁnition of the provenance notion
(i.e. what is meant by “contributes”) as well as the granularity at which data in the input
and output is considered (i.e. what is meant by “items” in the input or output) varies
depending on the intended use of provenance. Hence, it is possible to obtain dierent
notions of provenance by choosing dierent deﬁnitions of provenance or by looking at
data at dierent granularities.
We already mentioned the three types of provenance that have been studied in the
database literature: Where, Why and How. We take this grouping of provenance notions
from Cheney et al. [16]. There, the authors review many of the provenance notions pro-
posed by the database research community and group them underthese three broad types.
Their review includes the two original characterisations of Where and Why provenance
introduced by Buneman et al. [9], the original deﬁnition of How provenance introduced
by Green et al. [28], as well as other notions of provenance that can be grouped under
one of these three types. We follow the same grouping when presenting the dierent
notions of provenance in this section. We assume a relational model of data when giving
examples. However, it should be noted that these notions are also applicable to other
models of data, and most of the time the deﬁnitions carry over to those settings in a
straightforward way.
2.2.1.2 Where-provenance
The Where characterisation of provenance was introduced by Buneman et al. [9]. It is
probably the most intuitive of the provenance notions in terms of deﬁnition. It takes
as its granularity individual locations in the relation, that is it associates provenance
information with the cells of a relation, and looks at how data is copied from the input ofChapter 2 The History of Provenance 27
composer
name dob
J.S. Bach 1685 c1
G.F. Handel 1685 c2
W.A. Mozart 1756 c3
work
name opus title
J.S. Bach BMV82 I have enough. w1
J.S. Bach BMV552 NULL w2
G.F Handel HMV19 Art thou troubled? w3
Table 2.1: Input relations
result
name dob
J.S. Bach 1685 r1
G.F. Handel 1685 r2
Table 2.2: Result of the ﬁrst query
a query to its output. Given a piece ofdata in the outputofa query, its Where-provenance
is the piece of data in the input from which it was copied. This is best illustrated through
an example, and for this we use one adapted from Buneman et al. [9]. Consider the two
database relations composer and work in Figure 2.1. We use the labels c1, c2, ..., etc
to refer to individual tuples within a database relation, and expressions such as c1(name)
to refer to a particular data item in a tuple. So for example, c1 refers to the tuple (“J. S.
Bach”, 1685) in the relation composer and c1(name) refers to the name attribute of that
tuple.
Now let us consider the following SQL query:
SELECT c.name, c.dob
FROM composer c, work w
WHERE c.name = w.name
The output of this query with respect to the relations composer and work in Figure 2.1,
is the two tuple relation result in Figure 2.2. Now take the tuple (“J. S. Bach”, 1685)
labelled as r1 in the result of the query, and ask the question: where did the data item
r1(dob), that is 1685, come from? The answer is that it was “copied” from the date of
birth attribute of the tuple c1 in the relation composer. Hence, we say that the Where-
provenance of the data item r1(dob) in the result of our example query is the data item
c1(dob) in the input relation composer.
2.2.1.3 Why-provenance
Why-provenance does not just look at where data was copied from, but also considers
what other data in the input contributed to it. It associates with each tuple in the output,
a subset of the input tuples, that is, it takes tuples as its granularity. The intuition behind28 Chapter 2 The History of Provenance
it is rather simple, and as with Where-provenance, is best illustrated through an example.
Consider the example query and relations we used for Where-provenance. We said that J.
S. Bach’s date of birth in the output, that is r1(dob), was copied from the input location
c1( dob), and we took that to be its Where-provenance. Now, lets consider this data
item again. It seems clear that its presence in the output of the query owes to more data
items in the input than just c1(dob). In fact, r1(dob) would not have appeared in the
result of the query if it wasn’t for the tuple c1 in the relation composer, and the tuples
w1 and w2 in the relation work. More precisely, the example query joins the relations
composer and work on their name attribute, and consequently, only composers whose
names appear in both composer and work will appear in the result of the query.
Why-provenance traces its origins to one of the earliest works on provenance tracking
in database management systems, and that is the work of Cui et al. [19] on the lineage
model. The lineage model would associate r1 in the result of our example query with
the set fc1;w1;w2g; this latter being sucient to produce r1 according to the query. A
shortcoming of the lineage model, which can be seen from this simple example, is that
it does not account for the fact that w1 and w2 are not both needed to produce r1. Either
of them together with c1 would be sucient to get r1. This shortcoming was rectiﬁed
by Buneman et al. [9] into the provenance notion that has become known since then as
Why-provenance. Why-provenance accounts for the multiple ways in which a tuple in
the output could be derived from the input according to a particular query. So for our
example, the Why-provenance of r1 is the set ffc1;w1g;fc1;w2gg, indicating that either
fc1;w1g or fc1;w2g is sucient to produce r1.
2.2.1.4 How-provenance
Why-provenance describes the dierent combinations of input tuples that contribute to
producing a particular tuple in the output of a query. What it doesn’t tell us however is
how these tuples are used by the query to construct the output tuple. How-provenance,
proposed by Green et al. [28], aims to do just that. It goes beyond Why-provenance
by including additional structure in the provenance to represent how each tuple in the
provenance was used. This additional structure is based on a semiring whose set is the
set of tuple labels, and whose two binary operations represent join and union. Hence,
the How-provenance of a tuple is a polynomial rather than a set of sets.
As an example of How-provenance, take the tuple r1 in Figure 2.2. Its How-provenance
is the polynomialc1(w1+w2). This tells us thatc1 joined witheitherw1 orw2 is sucientChapter 2 The History of Provenance 29
result
name 1 name 2 dob
J. S. Bach J. S. Bach 1685 r0
1
J. S. Bach G. F. Handel 1685 r0
2
G. F. Handel J. S. Bach 1685 r0
3
G. F. Handel G. F. Handel 1685 r0
4
W. A. Mozart W. A. Mozart 1756 r0
5
Table 2.3: Result of the second query
to produce the tuple r1 according to our example query. Now, compare this to the Why-
provenance of r1, which we said was the set ffc1;w1g;fc1;w2gg. The two are actually
equivalent in this case, albeit they dier in format. In general however, Why-provenance
can be derived from How-provenance, by simply dropping the additional structure and
only retaining the set of sets of labels, whereas the inverse does not hold. To illustrate
this, let us consider another example. Take the following query, which returns the names
and dates of birth of composers who were born on the same day.
SELECT c1.name as name_1, c2.name as name_2, c1.dob as dob
FROM composer c1, composer c2
WHERE c1.dob = c2.dob
The result of the query with respect to the input relations in Figure 2.1 is the relation
result' in Figure 2.3. The query performs a self-join on the relation composer to
get the names of each two composers who share the same date of birth. Since this is
a self-join, and the only condition in the query is that the date of birth is the same in
the two instances of the relation composer, we get tuples such as (“J. S. Bach”, “J. S.
Bach”, 1685), indicating the self-evident fact that J. S. Bach shares his birthday with
himself. The Why-provenance and How-provenance of this tuple are ffc1gg and c1  c1
respectively. Here, the How-provenance of r0
1 tells us more than its Why-provenance.
The How-provenance c1 c1 tells us that c1 was joined with itself to produce r0
1. Contrast
this with ffc1gg which only tells us that c1 is sucient to produce r0
1 but does not tell us
that we actually need two copies of c1 to get r0
1 from our example query.
2.2.1.5 Discussion
Comparison. Each of the three provenance notions is natural and answers in an
intuitive way to a question about the origin of data. The three questions, and three
provenance notions, are clearly related and we have already talked about the relationship
between Why-provenance and How-provenance. The relationship between the prove-
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notions as it sheds more light on the nature of these provenance notions, and on the
nature of provenance in general. As we already mentioned, Why-provenance is con-
tained in How-provenance. That is, How-provenance includes all the information that
Why-provenance includes about the origins of a tuple, and adds even more information
of its own. This additional information tells us how each tuple in the provenance was
used by the query, and as we saw, this uncovers cases where a particular tuple is used
more than once by the query for example. In a way, the relationship between Why and
How provenance is easy to spot since they have the same granularity. Where-provenance,
on the other hand, works at the ﬁner granularity of individual data items or cells. Its
relationship to Why-provenance was studied by Buneman et al. [9] where it was shown
that, for data that is copied by the query from the input relations, the Where-provenance
of a data item is contained in the Why-provenance of its tuple.
Comparing provenance notions as done above is based on their “expressiveness”. An-
other dimension by which provenance notions can be compared is that of invariance
under query rewriting, or lack thereof. That is, does the provenance stay the same if we
replace a query with an equivalent one? It turns out that none of the three provenance
notions is invariant under query rewriting in general. This indicates that although all
three provenance notions are meant to only capture the relationship between the output
of a query and its inputs, part of the query itself “leaks” into the provenance. This means
that the provenance of data according to these notions is in fact a relation between the
input data, the output data and the query according to which the output data was derived
from the input data.
Applications. Several applications of the provenance notions we looked at have been
proposed and studied in the literature. For example, an interesting application of Where-
provenance is in annotation propagation, copying meta-data from the input of a query
to its output. In fact, this was studied in one of the very early works on provenance in
databases by Wang and Madnick in their Polygen model [69]. Annotation propagation
was also studied by Buneman et al. [10] and an implementation of it given in the DB-
Notes annotation management system [5]. Green et al. [29] develop a prototype system,
known as ORCHESTRA, to showcase an application of their How-provenance notion
to the problem of propagating updates in a peer to peer data sharing network related by
schema mappings.
Other provenance notions. The Where, Why, and How provenance models cover a
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notalltheprovenancenotionsthathavebeenproposedﬁtwithinthismodel. Forexample,
the Polygen model of Wang and Madnick [69] that we have already mentioned does not
ﬁt in any of the three provenance notions. Another provenance notion that does not ﬁt is
that proposed by Woodru and Stonebraker [71], which generates lineage information
by inverting processing operations rather than relying on meta-data. Benjelloun et
al. [4] introduce an extension of relational databases they call ULDBs. Their extension
integrates both uncertainty and provenance in one model, and this too is not an instance
of any of the three provenance notions.
Research on annotated databases is also important for provenance. Annotated relations
are not limited to provenance and appear in various other contexts and settings in the
database literature such as in incomplete databases [39] and probabilistic databases
[24, 42]. In these contexts, relations are extended to associate an annotation with each
tuple. Now the problem that arises with these extended relations is how to treat the
annotations when evaluating queries. There are two main approaches to this, annotation
propagation where queries are applied to data and the annotations are merely propa-
gated, and annotation querying where annotations are considered data and treated in
the same way as other data by relational queries. Annotation propagation is usually
considered an implicit treatment of annotations as annotations are propagated without
any interference from the user, while annotation querying is more explicit as the user
is required to manipulate the annotations as they see ﬁt. In annotation propagation,
relational algebra operators are adapted to perform something meaningful on the annota-
tions (based on their semantics). Buneman et al. [8] study the expressiveness of implicit
provenance propagation in query and update languages while Geerts and Bussche [25]
give a comparison of the expressive power of the two approaches.
2.2.1.6 Comparison with our work
At a high level, works on provenance in databases dier from our own in the granularity
at which data is studied. In databases, provenance tracks the operations that are per-
formed on individual data items and tuples whereas in our case we assume data to be
atomic and look at how it moves from one principal in a distributed system to another.
These two dierent views are reﬂected in the formal frameworks used in each case. In
databases, the formal frameworks used are either the Nested Relational Calculus [11], a
core query language, or the -calculus [3], a core functional language. This means that
the fundamental model of provenance in databases is that of functions mapping inputs to
outputs. Provenance in this setting is simply a record of the relation between the inputs
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such as Where, Why and How provenance. In our work, we study distributed systems as
formally modelled by an extension of the -calculus [48, 49]. The basic building blocks
of a distributed system are processes that run in parallel and communicate by message
passing. It is this message passing that gives rise to our notion of provenance. As data
is communicated from one principal in a distributed system to another, we wish to keep
track of the principals that it has been at and what enabled them to transmit it.
The dierences between the two settings are also reﬂected in the way provenance is
represented. In databases, the representation of provenance takes several forms depend-
ing on the exact provenance notion, but generally ranges from simple labels, to sets of
labels, to polynomials of labels. Each item in the input is given a unique label. Items in
the output of a query are then labeled with a provenance annotation in order to record
the items in the input that contributed to their presence in the output. In our case, we
represent provenance as ordered, nested sequences. Each such sequence is composed
of events which record the send and receive actions performed by principals in the dis-
tributed system. Each event records the principal that performed the action, the type of
the action, and the provenance of the channel used.
Other than the provenance notion itself, our work considers the whole provenance man-
agement lifecycle and proposes a formal framework that integrates the deﬁnition of
provenance, its tracking, querying as well as its security, all in one calculus. The Where,
Why and How provenance notions and their formalisations only address two aspects of
the provenance management lifecycle, that of deﬁning provenance and that of tracking
it. The approaches used for deﬁning and tracking provenance, especially in the formal
models of Cheney et al. [15, 16], are similar to ours in that they take the form of either
instrumenting the operational semantics of the calculus to track provenance at run time
or propose a static type system to approximate the provenance of data at compile time.
The details of the operational semantics and the type system are of course dierent
because we are dealing with dierent settings and dierent notions of provenance.
2.2.2 Workﬂows
2.2.2.1 Provenance and reproducibility
Provenance has always been part of the scientiﬁc method, necessitated primarily by
the exploratory nature of scientiﬁc research and the need for reproducibility. Scientists
used logbooks to document the setup of their experiments and allow other researchers
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automation to a large part of the scientiﬁc process. Not only that, but with the availability
of vast computational resources, scientists are able to model more complicated processes
and analyse larger sets of data. Documenting these with handwritten notes is an almost
impossible task, and it is only natural that the same computational tools used to model
processes and analyse data are used to capture their provenance.
2.2.2.2 Scientiﬁc workﬂow systems
Although scientists can use (and have used) general purpose scripting languages and pro-
gramming languages to modelprocesses andanalyse data, these lackseveralfeatures that
make them less than an idealsolution. In this regard, theirmain shortcomings lie perhaps
in their high barrier to entry for non-programmers and their lack of built-in provenance
management. Scientiﬁc workﬂow systems aim to address these shortcomings. They
provide an environment where scientists can interactively create computational tasks,
and where provenance information is tracked automatically by the underlying run time
environment. In most scientiﬁc workﬂow systems, workﬂows are created by composing
together building blocks known as modules. A module is an abstraction of an underlying
service provided by a tool, a scientiﬁc library or a web service. As such, each module
denotes a well deﬁned unit of functionality such as reading input data from a ﬁle or a
database, carrying out certain calculations on these data and producing graphs to visu-
alise the results of calculations. A module has a number of input ports and a number
of output ports. To create a workﬂow, multiple modules are composed together by con-
necting the output ports of one module to the input ports of another. These connections
denote the ﬂow of data from one module to another. Modules may be provided by the
workﬂow system or by extension libraries, or may themselves be created as workﬂows
from other modules, thus providing the ability to nest workﬂow deﬁnitions.
Scientiﬁc workﬂow systems provide an integrated environment in which scientists can
create workﬂows, execute them, and capture their provenance all in a very seamless
manner. The main role of these workﬂows is to provide an easy way for scientists to
integrate disparate services, often provided by dierent groups and institutions. The
scientist can add extra annotations to the static deﬁnition of the workﬂow, or to its run
time executions. However, these only need to be done for aspects of the process which
take place outside the workﬂowsystem; the provenance ofthe workﬂowitselfis captured
systematically by the workﬂow system.34 Chapter 2 The History of Provenance
2.2.2.3 Types of workﬂow provenance
The deﬁnition of a workﬂow itself tells us what processes are involved and what the ﬂow
of data between them looks like, and as such can be considered a form of provenance. In
the workﬂow provenance community, this type of provenance is known as prospective
provenance, as it gives us, a priori, information about the steps that will be executed by
a particular workﬂow. However, prospective provenance naturally lacks information that
would only be available at run time. Examples of such information include the parame-
ters of a particular execution of a workﬂow, the date and time when it was executed, and
the data received from an external data source. Retrospective provenance ﬁlls this gap; it
gives us information about a particular run of a workﬂow, including the run time aspects
of the execution. It should be noted that the two types of provenance do not depend on
each other, and hence access to or availability of one type of provenance does not imply
access to or availability of the other.
Workﬂow systems can capture provenance at dierent levels of detail, and therefore like
provenance in databases, it is possible to have dierent types of provenance depending
on what granularity one chooses. Finer-grained provenance provides more details but
may lead to large amounts of data and as a result would be harder to query and extract
information from. The most natural level at which provenance can be captured is the
workﬂow level itself. That is, capturing the dierent steps executed and the ﬂow of
data between them. As each step in the workﬂow may denote a library call, a remote
service invocation or even the execution of a sub-workﬂow, it is also possible to capture
provenance information about the internal state and execution of the step itself. This of
course depends on the deﬁnition of the workﬂow step. If the step represents a library call
then the code of this latter may be instrumented beforehand to capture its provenance
at a logical level, or the Operating System may be relied on to capture low level system
calls. In the case where the step represents the invocation of a remote service, then the
workﬂow system would have to rely on this remote service to capture meaningful prove-
nance and make it available with the results it provides. Finally, for sub-workﬂows, the
workﬂow system can capture provenance the same way it does for the parent workﬂow.
2.2.2.4 Example scientiﬁc workﬂow systems
There have been several projects with the aim of developing middleware to support
provenance in dierent scientiﬁc domains. These include Chimera [22] (physics and
astronomy), myGrid [68] (biology), CMCS [60] (chemical sciences), and ESSW [23]
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scientists to understand, analyse and reproduce results of experiments. Of these systems
we highlight myGrid , which aims to provide service-based middleware for supporting in
silico experiments in biology, with particular emphasis on the ability to share results of
these experiments. Provenance is considered central for enabling this. myGrid supports
two types of provenance [30]. The ﬁrst is called derivation path provenance, and records
the process by which results were derived from inputs and would include such informa-
tion as database queries, input parameters to programs and workﬂow descriptions. The
second form of provenance consists of annotations attached to dierent kinds of entities,
and may include standard annotations such as time of creation, date of last modiﬁcation
and owner, as well as custom annotations describing the entity with various concepts
from the scientiﬁc domain.
Moreau et al. [53] advocate a vision where applications based on the Service Oriented
Architecture (SOA) are provenance-aware, that is they allow provenance of data to be
retrieved, analysed and reasoned over. To realise this vision, they introduce a provenance
life-cycle, in which provenance-aware applications record process documentation and
store it in a provenance store. The process documentation describes what happened at
execution time while the provenance store oers a persistent and secure database, from
which provenance information can be retrieved and analysed. The provenance store also
oers capabilities for administering the provenance information. Process documentation
may be composed of several p-assertions. These are assertions made by components
of the process documenting their execution. Moreau et al. identify various kinds of
p-assertions including: interaction p-assertions, documenting messages exchanged be-
tween the dierent services of the process; relation p-assertions, describing how the
service obtained output data from input data; and service state p-assertions, which
record the internal state of the service. Together, these dierent types of p-assertions can
provide a complete documentation of the execution of a process.
Simmhan et al. [67], propose a taxonomy of data provenance characteristics and use
it to compare several projects that investigate data provenance. They focus mainly on
projects that deal with provenance for scientiﬁc workﬂows. Their taxonomy categorises
provenance systems in terms of why they record provenance (provenance application),
what entities they document (subject of provenance), how they represent provenance
(provenance representation), how they store it (provenance storage) and what facilities
they provide to access it (provenance dissemination).36 Chapter 2 The History of Provenance
2.2.2.5 Comparison with our work
Works on provenance in workﬂow systems, as we saw in this section, have been largely
practical. This contrasts with our approach which is mainly theoretical and aims to study
the mathematical underpinnings of provenance in distributed systems. The provenance
notions themselves are close to our own however, and at any rate, closer than those
in databases. This similarity stems from the fact that workﬂow systems and Service
Oriented Architectures can be considered as examples of distributed systems. Therefore,
the provenance notions proposed in these settings are often coarse-grained, representing
provenance in the form of graphs, and resembling to some extent our own representation
of provenance.
To illustrate the similarity in how provenance is represented, consider for example the
provenance-aware Service Oriented Architecture proposed by Moreau et al. [53]. The
authors refer to their notion of provenance as process documentation. As we mentioned
already, process documentation is composed of p-assertions. Moreau et al. identify three
types of p-assertions:
 interaction p-assertions which record the messages that are exchanged between
dierent services,
 relation p-assertions which record the relation between the messages that a service
receives and the messages that it sends, and
 service state p-assertions which are meant to record the internal state of the service.
In our calculus, provenance is represented in the form of nested sequences. Each se-
quence is composed of events which are meant to record the send and receive actions
of principals. Therefore, events are similar to interaction p-assertions in the provenance-
aware Service Oriented Architecture. We do not have anything comparable to relation
or service state p-assertions in our provenance notion however. The reason is that since
the values in our model are atomic, the relation between what a process receives and
what it sends is quite simple; it is the identity function since the value is never modiﬁed.
We do not have any explicit notion of service state in our model. One could argue that
the processes running at a principal and the values they have at any given point in time
could be considered its state. We do not document this in provenance however since it
is irrelevant to the applications of provenance we wish to study in this work.Chapter 2 The History of Provenance 37
2.2.3 Cross-cutting concerns
In this section we look at cross-cutting concerns, problems that are of interest to the
wider provenance research community. We identify three such concerns, formalisation,
security and standardisation. All of these are in fact concerns that reach far beyond
provenance andare importantin everyﬁeldofComputerScience. However, theydo need
a special treatment in the context of provenance, requiring either a careful adaptation of
the existing models and tools to provenance, or perhaps even a fresh look that takes into
account any unique features and constraints that provenance tracking may give rise to.
In the following we explain why.
2.2.3.1 Formalisation
Formalisation is concerned with the development of formal models of provenance. The
aim of such formal models is to bring mathematical rigour to the study and analysis of
provenance tracking systems. Cheney et al. [15] were among the ﬁrst to study prove-
nance in a formal setting. Their approach draws on well understood and established
topics from programming languages such as information ﬂow analysis, dependency
analysis and program slicing. They apply these programming language techniques to
give a semantic deﬁnition of provenance. This semantic deﬁnition is based on a prop-
erty they call dependency-correctness, which aims to capture the dependencies between
parts of the output of a query and parts of its input. When annotations are said to be
propagated in a dependency-correct manner by queries, it is meant that changes to parts
of the input annotated with particular annotations will only result in changes to parts of
the output annotated with those same annotations. Cheney et al. provide both a dynamic
provenance tracking semantics as well as an approximation of it based on static type
checking.
Acar et al. [1] develop a core calculus for provenance, based on a general purpose
functional programming language. This promises to be more generic than previously
proposed models that only target one ﬁeld, such as workﬂows or databases. Their opera-
tional semantics captures traces, which they use to compare dierent provenance notions
by providing suitable views overtraces. They also explore two security properties known
as obfuscation and disclosure which we cover in more detail in the next section.38 Chapter 2 The History of Provenance
2.2.3.2 Security
The case for secure provenance is easy to make. On the one hand, if we are to become
dependent on provenance information for making critical decisions, then we need to
make sure that enough provenance information is available and has not been tampered
with. On the other hand, since the provenance of a piece of data or an artifact reveals
information about how that piece of data or artifact came to be, and who changed it
or otherwise inﬂuenced it, then for privacy reasons we may not want that information
leaked to unintended recipients. These are instances of problems that are the staple of
security research in computer systems:
 Availability: information is available whenever it is needed.
 Integrity: information is not tampered with, or at least not undetectably.
 Conﬁdentiality: information is not disclosed to unauthorised parties.
Research on provenance security aims to address these problems in the context of prove-
nance. Provenance poses some interesting new challenges and that makes a straightfor-
ward adaptation of existing security models and tools not possible. The main challenge
lies probably in the relationship between the artifact and its provenance. Provenance
reveals information that describes the past states of the artifact, and in doing so, it might
violate the security requirements of the artifact. This means that security models for
provenance need to take into account both the security requirements of the provenance
information as well as those of the underlying artifact.
Hasan et al. [32] and Braun et al. [7] were among the ﬁrst to highlight the problems
and challenges that provenance posed in terms of privacy and security. They argued that
existing security models were not suitable to deal with these problems and challenges
and advocated the need for research on provenance security. Similar problems were
also raised by Davidson et al. [20, 21], where several key questions about privacy in the
presence of provenance tracking and querying were framed.
Eorts to answer the aforementioned questions followed by those authors as well as
others. Hasan et al. [33] consider the problem of ensuring the integrity of provenance
against forgeries. They propose an architecture to accomplish this and demonstrate its
viability by implementing a prototype library, Sprov, that tracks provenance of data
reads and writes at the application level. They also carry out experiments to analyse the
performance overhead of provenance tracking using their library and conclude that it is
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Cheney [13] proposes a formal framework for provenance security. Within this high-
level generic framework, the author gives deﬁnitions of several provenance properties,
including provenance counterparts to the data availability and conﬁdentiality properties,
which the author terms disclosure and obfuscation respectively. Like availability and
conﬁdentiality, disclosure and obfuscation are meant to characterise what information
principals are able to see and what information is withheld from them. Cheney also
studies three dierent instances of the framework based on automata, databases, and
workﬂows.
2.2.3.3 Standardization
Aware of the plethora of provenance systems that have been developed, standardisation
eorts aim to simplify interoperability between these systems by advocating common
models of provenance. Of these we highlight the community led series of Provenance
Challenges that resulted, among other things, in the proposal of the Open Provenance
Model (OPM) [52]. The Open Provenance Model oers a technology-agnostic repre-
sentation of provenance with the aim of enabling the exchange of provenance between
dierent systems.
With the increase of interest in provenance on the Web, the World Wide Web Consortium
(W3C) commissioned a study to understand the state-of-the-art in provenance. This
culminated in the publication of the Provenance XG Final Report [26] and led to the
formation of the Provenance Working Group. This latter is tasked with deﬁning a
language for exchanging provenance information among applications. As of the time of
writing, the Provenance Working Group has been working on a family of speciﬁcations
under the PROV umbrella [27]. This family of speciﬁcations includes a data model,
PROV-DM [54]; a human-friendly notation for provenance, PROV-N [55]; an ontology,
PROV-O [43]; a mechanism for accessing and querying provenance, PROV-AQ [40]; a
formal semantics, PROV-SEM [14]; and an XML schema, PROV-XML [36].
2.2.3.4 Comparison with our work
This section covered several works which we tried to group under the three headings of
formalisation, security and standardisation. The works on formalisation and security are
close to our own in terms of approach. We agree with them on the use of programming
language semantics and static analysis to formalise provenance. The works of Cheney
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Transparent ML (TML) respectively. These are suitable for studying provenance in
systems that are based on a functional model of computing such as databases. However,
they fall short when considering provenance in distributed systems and it is our opinion
that a framework based on a process calculus such as the -calculus is more suitable.
The -calculus allows us to model in a natural way fundamental features of distributed
systems such as communication, parallel execution and non-determinism.
Standardisation eorts have focused mainly on practical issues. Their representation of
provenance is quite close to ours however. Consider for example the Open Provenance
Model (OPM) where provenance is represented as a directed graph. At this basic level,
this is not very dierent from our model where provenance is represented as a nested,
orderedsequence. OPM recognises three types ofentities, artifacts, processes andagents.
All three types of entities can be found in our model in some form. Plain values are our
artifacts and they are the entities whose history is recorded by provenance. Processes
and agents map to our notions of processes and principals respectively. OPM captures
causal dependencies between the three types of entities in the form of dierent types of
relationships. Examples of these includes:
 Process P used artifact A.
 Artifact A was generated by process P.
 Process P was controlled by agent A.
In the graph model of provenance, the three entities represent the nodes of the graph and
the causal relationships its edges. Viewed as a graph, our provenance representation has
two types of nodes; single principal names and provenance sequences. The principal
names represent the authors of events while the provenance sequences represent the
provenance of the channels used for sending and receiving data. Our provenance notion
also has two types of edges; send edges to record send actions and receive edges to
record receive actions.
The previous section also highlighted the PROV [27] family of speciﬁcations that is
currently being developed by the W3C Provenance Working Group. This family of
speciﬁcations aims to address the various aspects of provenance required to allow for
the interoperable interchange of provenance information on the Web. At the heart of this
family is the PROV-DM [54] data model. The PROV-DM speciﬁcation aims to provide
a common data model for the wide range of provenance applications on the Web. As
such, it is quite generic, admitting notions of entities, activities, agents, roles, time and
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model. Our notions of values and principals can be represented as entities and agents in
PROV-DM, while the ordering ofevents can be cateredforby the notion ofinstantaneous
time found in the PROV-DM speciﬁcation. Concrete representations of the PROV-DM
data model can be obtained in XML and RDF as deﬁned by the PROV-XML [36] and
PROV-O [43] speciﬁcations. In addition to these two, PROV-N [55] deﬁnes a more
human friendly notation for provenance. Our provenance sequences can be encoded in
many formats, including XML and RDF, however such encodings are orthogonal to the
aims of the present work and therefore they are not pursued in this thesis. The PROV
family of speciﬁcations also addresses the problem of interpreting provenance in PROV-
DM by deﬁning PROV-CONSTRAINTS [18], a set of constraints for PROV-DM, and
PROV-SEM [14], a model-theoretic semantics forPROV-DM. Formal semantics is at the
core of the present work. We deﬁne both operational semantics for the calculus as well
as denotational semantics for provenance sequences. We also give formal deﬁnitions
and proofs of all notions and properties used in this work. In addition to these speciﬁca-
tions, the Provenance Working Group is also deﬁning a speciﬁcation for accessing and
querying provenance, PROV-AQ [40]. Querying provenance in our calculus is achieved
using pattern matching. We give an abstract deﬁnition of pattern matching languages
and also deﬁne a concrete pattern matching language to use with examples. The sample
pattern matching language we deﬁne is based on regular expression pattern matching
[35], which can be used to query XML documents, and therefore, any data expressed in
XML.
2.3 Concluding remarks
Comparing provenance in databases to that in workﬂows, it is possible to say that re-
search in databases is concerned with ﬁne-grained provenance while research in work-
ﬂows is mainly interested in coarse-grained provenance. Provenance in databases con-
siders operations on data at granularities ranging from complete databases and relations,
to individual tuples and data items within those relations. In contrast, the provenance
notions that have been studied by the workﬂow community focused on how datasets
move between components of a single system and from one system to another. In this
regard, workﬂow provenance is closer to our work; the provenance notion we study in
this work assumes data is atomic and tracks its ﬂow between dierent principals. In
fact, the -calculus, which forms the basis of our work, can be considered a formal
model of workﬂows, and our work can be seen as a ﬁrst attempt at formalising workﬂow
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not to formalise existing models of provenance in workﬂow systems but rather to study
provenance and related problems in the context of distributed systems.
Research on provenance in workﬂows has been largely practical, focusing on building
systems and middleware to track and manage provenance information. Most theoretical
work has come from the database community, spearheaded primarily by the works of
Cheneyetal.[1,15,16]. Ourworkissimilartothesein spirit. Weagreewiththoseworks
in our use of programming language semantics and type systems to study provenance
tracking. Their works are based on the lambda calculus or its variants however, while
ours takes a process algebraic approach. In fact, to the best of our knowledge, our work
is the ﬁrst to study provenance using process calculi.
Several research works have looked at provenance security and we have already covered
some of them in Section 2.2.3.2. In addition to the dierences in setting and approach,
our work also diers from those works in its aims. Our aim is to study the ramiﬁcations
of provenance tracking on the privacy and security policies of principals and to develop
programmatic tools that allow principals to control the disclosure of provenance.Chapter 3
The Provenance Calculus
In this chapter, we present the provenance calculus, a formalism aimed at studying
provenance in distributed systems. The provenance calculus is based on a variant of
the asynchronous -calculus extended with explicit identities with the aim of modelling
multiple trust domains. This basic setting is then enriched with provenance annotated
data, dynamic provenance tracking and dynamic provenance checking. This means that
all data products (exchangeable entities) are seen as being essentially composed of two
parts: the actual data content and a meta-data annotation representing the provenance
of this content. Dynamic provenance tracking takes the form of a provenance tracking
semantics which ensures that, as the system evolves, the provenance annotations of
values are updated to reﬂect changes to the values or to their context. Finally, principals
are able to specify their trust policies in the form of conditions on the provenance of
values they are interested in consuming, and dynamic provenance checking enforces
these policies at run time, ensuring principals only receive data with provenance that is
compliant with these policies.
We elect to present the calculus in two steps. Firstly, in Section 3.1, we describe the plain
version of the calculus, that is the version with no provenance tracking. This should
allow us to focus on the workings of the calculus itself without the complications of
provenance tracking. We then proceed, in Section 3.2, to present the provenance anno-
tated version. In this latter version, all values are annotated with provenance information
and the reduction relation is modiﬁed in order to update this information as the system
evolves. Splitting the presentation this way makes explicit the two roles of the prove-
nance tracking reduction relation, namely that of describing how the system evolves as
its components interact, and that of tracking the provenance of the dierent values to
reﬂect how the evolution of the system aects them. This means that the provenance
tracking semantics should preserve the system transitions allowed by the plain semantics,
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or in other words, that the two semantics should coincide with respect to possible system
transitions. As we will see, this would have indeed been true if the annotated version of
the calculus only added provenance annotations and provenance tracking. However, in
addition to this, our annotated version also adds provenance checking, allowing princi-
pals to decide what data to receive based on its provenance. This has the eect of ruling
out system transitions that would result in principals receiving values with the wrong
provenance, and hence means that the set of possible transitions in the annotated version
is a subset of that in the plain version.
Section 3.3 deﬁnes a sample pattern language for use in provenance checking. It then
gives several examples to illustrate the main features of the provenance calculus. The
chapter concludes by discussing the design of the calculus and alternative choices of
primitives.
3.1 Plain version
The plain version of the calculus is a variant of the asynchronous -calculus [6, 34],
a version of the -calculus [48, 49] where message output is non-blocking, extended
with explicit identities. As our aim is to use these identities for provenance tracking,
we do not provide any other primitives for dealing with them, and hence they do not
play any role in the plain version of the calculus. The calculus makes use of a form of
input-guarded choice that is restricted to a single channel (similar in spirit to the one
used by Castagna et al. [12]). This results in simpler semantics than the full version of
input-guarded choice; nevertheless it still allows for both internal choice and external
choice in the annotated version of the calculus.
The plain version of the calculus is aimed to represent the computational core of our
calculus, allowing us to model the essence of computation in distributed systems. For
example, the following term:
a[mhvi] j b[m(x):P]
denotes two principals or agents, running in parallel. These two principals do not need
to be co-located, and any interaction between them takes place via message passing. The
principal a[mhvi] has the name a and is running code mhvi. We call such code a process.
Executing this process will send the value v to be received by any principal that may
happen to be listening on channel m. In our calculus, as we will see later, we denote
such a value that is ready to be consumed by the term mhhvii. A principal listening on m,Chapter 3 The Provenance Calculus 45
such as b[m(x):P], would receive this value once it has been made available. When this
principal receives the value v, the result is denoted by the term b[Pfv=xg], indicating that
all free occurrences of the placeholder variable x in process P have been substituted by
the value v just received. Execution of the resulting process will proceed according to
similar rules.
The above simple example illustrates the main computational features of the calculus.
For expressivity, we also include guarded choice for non-determinism, matching for
conditional branching, replication for repetitive behaviour, and restriction of channel
names for lexical scoping. The formal syntax and semantics of the calculus is given in
the following sections.
3.1.1 Syntax
We assume a set X of variables, ranged over by x;y;z;:::, a set C of channel names,
ranged over by l;m;n;:::, and a set A of principal names, ranged over by a;b;c;:::.
We assume that all three sets are pair-wise disjoint and deﬁne the set V of values to be
C [ A, and use the letters u;v;::: to range over this set. We also deﬁne the set I of
identiﬁers as V [ X and use the meta-variables w;w0 to range over identiﬁers.
3.1.1.1 Processes
Processes are ranged over by P;Q;::: and their formal syntax is summarised in Fig-
ure 3.1. The primitive mhvi denotes a process that is ready to output the value v on
channel m. We use a variant of input-guarded choice that is restricted to a single in-
put channel. This simpliﬁes the provenance tracking reduction relation (given in Sec-
tion 3.2) and enables us to focus on the use of provenance. The input-guarded choice
or summation, written as i2Im(x):Pi for some ﬁnite indexing set I, denotes a process
that may receive some value v on channel m and continue as Pj after substituting the
value v just received for the formal parameter x. The continuation process Pj, where
j 2 I, is chosen non-deterministically. As customary, we use 0 as syntactic sugar for
i2;m(x):Pi and m(x):P1 + m(x):P2 as syntactic sugar for i2f1;2gm(x):Pi. Matching,
if v = v0 then P else Q , denotes the process that proceeds as P if v is equal to v0 and
as Q otherwise. Scope restriction of channel n to process P is denoted by (n)P while
parallel composition of processes P and Q is denoted by P j Q. The process P behaves
as an inﬁnite number of copies of P running in parallel.46 Chapter 3 The Provenance Calculus
Figure 3.1. Plain syntax: processes
P;Q ::= process terms
whw0i output of value w0 on channel w
i2Iw(x):Pi input-guarded choice
if w = w0 then P else Q equality test of w and w0
(n)P private channel n with scope P
P j Q parallel composition of P and Q
P replication of P
3.1.1.2 Systems
A system is the composition of zero or more located processes and messages. We use
S;T;::: to range over systems and summarise the syntax of systems in Figure 3.2. The
simplest system is 0 which is used to denote the empty system. A located process, a[P],
stands for a process P that is running under the authority of a principal a. A message is
a value that has been sent but not yet received, and is denoted in the calculus by nhhwii.
Restriction is denoted by (n)S while parallel composition of two systems is denoted by
S j T.
Figure 3.2. Plain syntax: systems
S;T ::= system terms
a[P] located process
nhhwii message
(n)S channel n with scope S
S j T parallel composition of S and T
0 empty system
3.1.1.3 Binders, substitution and -conversion
The variable x in i2Iw(x):Pi binds occurrences of x in the continuations Pi while the
name n in (n)P binds occurrences of n in P. All other occurrences of variables and
names are considered free. We use fv(P), bv(P), fn(P) and bn(P) for the sets of free
variables, bound variables, free names and bound names in process P respectively. We
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derived from each other by the change of bound variables and names. A substitution is
a ﬁnite mapping from variables to identiﬁers. We use ;0 to range over substitutions
and write fw1;:::;wn=x1;:::;xng for the substitution of wi for xi for all i 2 1:::n. We denote by
P the process obtained by applying the capture avoiding substitution  to process P.
We call a process with one or more free variables an open process and a process with no
free variables a closed process. All these notions extend to systems in a straightforward
way.
3.1.2 Reduction semantics
The semantics of the calculus is deﬁned by two relations, the plain structural congru-
ence relation p, and the plain reduction relation !p. Structural congruence allows us
to make structural manipulations of systems which makes the deﬁnition of reduction
simpler. The deﬁnition of structural congruence depends on the deﬁnition of contexts
and congruences, which we give below.
Deﬁnition 3.1 (Context). The set of system contexts C (contexts for short) is given by
the following syntax:
C ::= [:] j (n)C j C j S j S j C
The term C[S] denotes the system obtained by replacing the occurrence of the hole [:]
with the system S. Note that the grammar of contexts ensures that there is exactly one
hole in every context.
Deﬁnition 3.2 (Congruence). An equivalence relation R on systems is contextual, or a
congruence, if whenever (S;T) 2 R then (C[S];C[T]) 2 R for all contexts C.
Deﬁnition 3.3 (Structural congruence). Structural congruence p is the smallest congru-
ence on systems such that the axioms of Figure 3.3 hold.
Figure 3.3. Plain semantics: structural congruence
(PStr Alpha) S p T ) S p T
(PStr Par Nil) S j 0 p S
(PStr Par Comm) S j T p T j S
(PStr Par Assoc) (R j S) j T p R j (S j T)
(PStr Res Nil) (n)0 p 048 Chapter 3 The Provenance Calculus
(PStr Res Res) (n)(m)S p (m)(n)S
(PStr Res Par) ((n)S) j T p (n)(S j T) if n < fn(T)
(PStr Sys Nil) a[0] p 0
(PStr Sys Par) a[P j Q] p a[P] j a[Q]
(PStr Sys Res) a[(n)P] p (n)(a[P])
(PStr Sys Rep) a[P] p a[P j P]
The rule PStr Alpha states that two systems are structurally congruent if they are -
convertible. The three rules PStr Par Nil, PStr Par Comm, and PStr Par Assoc
state that (S;j) is a commutative monoid with identity element 0. The rules PStr Res
Nil, PStr Res Res, and PStr Res Par describe properties of restriction. They
state that redundant restrictions may be garbage collected, that the order of restrictions is
immaterial and that the scope of a restriction may be extruded to include parallel systems.
The last four rules describe properties of located processes. The rule PStr Sys Nil
states the equivalence of a[0] and 0, and hence like PStr Res Nil with redundant
restrictions, it may be seen as stating that redundant principal identiﬁers may be garbage
collected. The rule PStr Sys Par says that the located process a[P j Q] is the same as
the parallel composition of the two located processes a[P] j a[Q], or in other words that
principal identiﬁers distribute over parallel composition. The rule PStr Sys Res says
that the scope of names may be moved from the process level to the system level or vice
versa. The rule PStr Sys Rep states that replication of a process denotes an inﬁnite
number of copies of that process running in parallel.
Having deﬁned structural congruence, we now describe how systems may evolve by
deﬁning the reduction relation.
Deﬁnition 3.4. The reduction relation !p is deﬁned by the rules of Figure 3.4.





a[i2Im(x):Pi] j mhhvii !p a[Pjfv=xg]
PRed Ift
a[if m = m then P else Q ] !p a[P]
PRed If f
m is not equal to n
a[if m = n then P else Q ] !p a[Q]Chapter 3 The Provenance Calculus 49
PRed Res
S !p S 0
(n)S !p (n)S 0
PRed Par
S !p S 0
S j T !p S 0 j T
PRed Str
S p T T !p T0 T0 p S 0
S !p S 0
The two main reduction rules are PRed Snd and PRed Rcv, which describe the
sending and receiving of values respectively. Note that communication is split into these
two steps in the plain version of the calculus to match the semantics of the annotated
version. There, this is done as it simpliﬁes the semantics and more closely matches
our intuitions on the nature of communication and provenance tracking in distributed
systems; a value is ﬁrst packaged and addressed to its intended recipients, and then it is
received and consumed. In the rule PRed Snd, a located process a[mhvi] may output
the value v on the channel m resulting in the message mhhvii. In the rule PRed Rcv,
a message mhhvii may be received by the located process a[i2Im(x):Pi], which then
continues as a[Pjfv=xg]. The process Pj, where j 2 I, is chosen non-deterministically.
The rules PRed IFt and PRed IF f give the semantics of name matching, they state
that the process if u = v then P else Q continues as P if the two values being tested are
equal (PRed IFt) and as Q otherwise (PRed IF f). The other three rules are standard
and state that reduction is preserved under restriction, system composition as well as
under structural congruence.
3.2 Annotated version
Having deﬁned the computational features of the calculus in the form of the plain ver-
sion, we are now ready to describe the annotated version, taking this computational core
and extending it with provenance management. To integrate provenance management
into the calculus, the annotated version adds provenance annotations to all values, in-
struments the semantics of the calculus to update these annotations as the computation
proceeds, and enables principals to use the provenance annotations to decide which data
to receive and how to use it.
The simple example of the previous section, when expressed in the annotated version of
the calculus, would look something like this:
a[m:m hp:pi] j b[m:
0
m (fa;b;cg!Any ; Any as x):P]
The ﬁrst dierence to notice about this system is that the two occurrences of the channel
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provenance sequences m, 0
m and p. These are meant to represent their histories up
to that state in the evolution of the system. Executing the process at a would give us
the message mhhp : a!m ; pii. This packaged message is dierent from that seen in
the previous section, and the dierence lies in the presence of provenance and in the
fact that this provenance changed from p to a!m ; p, indicating that the value p was
sent by a on a channel whose provenance was m, and that before this, the value p
had provenance p. This is how the provenance of values is kept up-to-date with the
evolution of the system. Another dierence to note is that the input construct now takes
the form m:0
m (fa;b;cg!Any ; Any as x). This denotes that principal b is listening on
channel m just like before. However, this time, it is putting a condition on the values
that it would like to receive on channel m, namely, that their provenance must satisfy
the pattern fa;b;cg!Any ; Any. This pattern is satisﬁed by the provenance of any value
that came from either a, b or c. Since the value p would be sent by a in this example,
its provenance would satisfy the condition set by b and hence it would be received by b.
The result of b consuming the value is b[Pfp:b?0
m;a!m;p=xg]. Notice how the provenance of
the value p changed again to reﬂect that it was received by principal b on a channel with
provenance 0
m. Provenance annotated values, the tracking of provenance at run time,
and the ability to specify conditions on the provenance of values to be received are the
three main features the annotated version of the calculus adds on top of the foundation
laid down in the previous section.
3.2.1 Syntax
Syntactically, the annotated version diers from the plain one in two aspects: (1) tagging
values with provenance information, and (2) adding a second parameter, a pattern, to the
input construct. We describe these in the following.
3.2.1.1 Annotated values
All data values are now annotated with meta-data representing their provenance. This is
reﬂected in the introduction of annotated values, terms of the form p : . An annotated
value p :  denotes a plain value p with provenance annotation . Plain values are the
values of the plain calculus and are ranged over by p;q;::: in the annotated calculus.
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We represent the provenance of a value as a sequence of events. The events in a prove-
nance sequence are assumed to be temporally ordered from left to right, with the left-
most event (the head of the sequence) being the most recent. We use K for the set of
provenance sequences and E for the set of events and let ;0;::: and e;e0;::: range over
elements of each set respectively. We denote the empty provenance sequence by , the
singleton sequence composed of event e only by e and the concatenation of sequences 
and 0 by ;0. The concatenation operator ; is associative, so ( ; 0) ; 00 and  ; (0 ; 00)
denote the same provenance sequence. It is not commutative however as our sequences
are ordered. The empty provenance sequence  is the unit of ; so the sequences  ;  and
 ;  are both equivalent to the sequence . We have two types of events: output events,
written as a!, and input events, written as a?. An output event a! in the provenance
of a value denotes that the value has been sent by principal a on a channel whose prove-
nance is , while an input event a? denotes that the value has been received by principal
a on a channel whose provenance is .
Note how the structure of provenance sequences ensures that the requirements of prove-
nance described in Section 1.1.4 are indeed satisﬁed. In particular, the principal that
originally produced the value would be recorded as the author of the right-most event,
satisfying the Originator requirement of provenance. Transmitters of the value are all
the principals that appear as authors of events at the top level in the provenance of the
value. Then, nested within each event, we ﬁnd the provenance of all the channels used
for communicating this value. These record any principal that supplied a channel and
therefore acted as an Enabler in the communication of the value. To meet the Type
requirement, provenance sequences contain two types of events, send events that record
sendactions andreceive events thatrecordreceive actions. Finally, as already mentioned,
provenance sequences are ordered from right to left and therefore they satisfy the Order
requirement. To illustrate these points, consider the example from the previous section,
and in particular the annotated value p : b?0
m ; a!m ; p. To make this concrete, assume
that the provenance sequence 0
m is equivalent to b? ; d! ; , the provenance sequence
m is equivalent to a? ; c! ;  and that the provenance sequence p is equivalent to .
Therefore, the value p has the following provenance b?(b? ; d! ; ) ; a!(a? ; c! ; ) ; .
The right-most event in this provenance sequence is a!(a? ; c! ; ) and therefore the
originator of the value is principal a. The value in this case was transmitted from its
originator, principal a, directly to the principal where it is currently, principal b. Hence,
principals a and b are the only two transmitters of the value so far. The channels used
by b and a for communicating the value were obtained from d and c respectively as
indicated by their provenance sequences b? ; d! ;  and a? ; c! ; . Principals d
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communication channel m. The events in this provenance sequence fall in one of two
types, either send events such as c!, or receive events such as a?. The events at each
level in the provenance sequence are ordered from right to left.
3.2.1.2 Patterns
The second syntactic change lies in modifying the input-guarded choice construct to take
pattern speciﬁcations . Patterns  are used by principals to specify the provenance of
data they are willing to receive on a particular channel and to branch to dierent contin-
uations in response to dierent provenance sequences. The modiﬁed choice construct is
written as i2Iw(i as x):Pi. Instead of deﬁning a particular pattern matching language,
we opt for a more general approach and make the calculus parametric on the choice of
the pattern matching language. We do give a concrete language to use with the examples
however. We give the deﬁnition of pattern matching languages in Deﬁnition 3.5 and
summarise the syntactic changes in Figure 3.5.
Deﬁnition 3.5. A pattern matching language is a pair (;j=) where  is a set of patterns,
ranged over by ;0;:::, and j=  K  is the pattern satisfaction (or matching) relation,
a relation between provenance sequences and patterns.
Figure 3.5. Annotated syntax: summary of changes
P;Q ::= process terms
whw0i output of value w0 on channel w
i2Iw(i as x):Pi input-guarded choice with patterns
if w = w0 then P else Q equality test of w and w0
(n)P private channel n with scope P
P j Q parallel composition of P and Q
P replication of P
 ::= provenance sequences
 empty provenance
e single event
 ;  sequential composition
e ::= events
a! output event
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p;q;::: 2 W , C [ A plain values
u;v;::: 2 V , p :  annotated values
w;w0;::: 2 I , V [ X identiﬁers
;0;::: 2  patterns
3.2.2 Provenance tracking semantics
The deﬁnition of structural congruence for annotated systems, denoted by a, is a
straightforward adaptation of that for plain systems and hence it is omitted. It is worth
noting however that names in scope restriction, such as n in (n)S, appear in plain form
as restriction is an operator of the calculus. Within one such scope, a channel name may
have multiple occurrences, each with a possibly dierent provenance sequence reﬂecting
the history of that particular copy. An annotated channel name n :  is considered bound
if it occurs within the scope of a restriction (n).
The reduction relation in the annotated version of the calculus, which we denote by
!a and often refer to as the provenance tracking reduction relation, extends that of the
plain calculus with two main features. The ﬁrst is that it updates the provenance of the
relevant values after each reduction step and the second is that it allows principals to use
patterns to restrict the set of values they are willing to receive on a particular channel.
Hence, the provenance tracking reduction relation can be seen as performing two tasks.
On the one hand, it prescribes the computational semantics of the calculus. On the other
hand, it keeps track of provenance and ensures provenance policies are complied with.
We deﬁne the provenance tracking reduction relation in Figure 3.6.
Figure 3.6. Annotated semantics: provenance tracking reduction
ARed Snd
a[m:m hp:pi] !a mhhp:a!m ; pii
ARed Rcv
j 2 I p j= j
a[i2Im:m (i as x):Pi] j mhhp:pii !a a[Pjfp:a?m;p=xg]
ARed Ift
a[if m: = m:0 then P else Q ] !a a[P]
ARed If f
m is not equal to n
a[if m: = n:0 then P else Q ] !a a[Q]54 Chapter 3 The Provenance Calculus
ARed Res
S !a S 0
(n)S !a (n)S 0
ARed Par
S !a S 0
S j T !a S 0 j T
ARed Str
S a T T !a T0 T0 a S 0
S !a S 0
In the rule ARed Snd, a located process a[m:m hp:pi] may output the value p : p
on the channel m : m which results in the message mhhp : a!m ; pii. What should be
noted here is that, in addition to describing the sending of the value p as in the plain
version, the rule also describes how the provenance of p changes from p to a!m ; p
after the output action to reﬂect the fact that the value has been most recently sent by
principal a on a channel whose provenance is m. Note also that, since we are interested
in using provenance as a means for deriving trust in the quality of data, and since we see
trust fundamentally as a relation deﬁned between principals, we only keep track of the
principals involved in the action and ignore the channel name used. In the rule ARed
Rcv, a message mhhp:pii maybe receivedbythe locatedprocess a[i2Im:m (i as x):Pi]
if the provenance of the value satisﬁes one of the patterns i. The process Pj whose
pattern j is satisﬁed is chosen for the continuation. If more than one such pattern exists,
one of them is chosen non-deterministically. Note that here too, the provenance of the
value p is updated from p to a?m ; p to reﬂect the fact that it has most recently been
received by principal a on a channel with provenance m. The rules ARed IFt and
ARed IF f give the semantics of matching. It should be noted here that only the plain
values are tested for equality while their provenance is ignored.1 This means that if the
two plain values are equal, irrespective of their provenances, the process in the then
branch is chosen for the continuation as indicated by the rule ARed IFt. If the two plain
values are not equal, then the process in the else branch is chosen for the continuation
as indicated by the rule ARed IF f. Save for the addition of the provenance annotations
and the provenance test in the input rule, the rest of the calculus and its semantics are the
same as in the plain version. The other three rules are the standard ones for restriction,
parallel composition and structural congruence.
3.3 Examples
In this section, we will give a few examples to illustrate the use of the provenance
calculus. As the calculus is parametric on the choice of the pattern language, we start by
1Depending on the intended application, the provenance of the two values tested could be useful and
hence would be tracked in the continuation. This is not considered here however as it is not important for
the aims of the present work.Chapter 3 The Provenance Calculus 55
deﬁning a sample pattern matching language ﬁrst, which we then use in the subsequent
sections to code our examples.
3.3.1 A sample pattern matching language
As our provenance sequences have a tree structure similar to that of XML documents,
we choose to base our sample pattern language on regular expression pattern matching
[35]. It is worth noting however that, since we do not allow variable bindings in our
patterns at the moment, our patterns more closely resemble regular expression types and
our pattern matching is more akin to dynamic type checking. The formal syntax of the
language is given in Figure 3.7 where X ranges over a countably inﬁnite set of pattern
names.





 ;  sequence
 _  alternation
 repetition
 ::= event patterns
G! output
G? input
G ::= group expressions
a single principal
 all principals
G +G group union
G  G group dierence
Pattern names allow us to express recursive patterns. They are interpreted with respect
to a global set of deﬁnitions D which associates with every pattern name X a deﬁnition
of the following form:
pat X = 
ThesetD isseenasamappingfrompatternnamestotheirdeﬁnitions. Weusedom(D)
for the set of pattern names deﬁned by D and D(X) for the body of the deﬁnition of
pattern name X. The deﬁnition of a pattern name may include other pattern names
in its body which allows for the speciﬁcation of recursive patterns. To guarantee that
patterns correspond to regular tree automata, we require a well-formedness condition
that disallows recursion at the top level. Formally, we require that:
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where reach() is deﬁned to be the smallest set satisfying:
reach(X) = fXg [ reach(D(X)) reach() = ; reach() = ;
reach() = reach() reach( ; 
0) = reach() [ reach(
0)
reach( _ 
0) = reach() [ reach(
0)
The formal semantics of patterns is given by the satisfaction relation j= :   K and the
group denotation function ~  : G ! A. These are deﬁned in Figure 3.8.
Figure 3.8. Sample pattern matching language: semantics
Definition of the satisfaction relation (j=).
Sat Name





a 2 ~G  j= 
a! j= G!
Sat Rcv




 j=  _ 0
Sat AltR
 j= 0
 j=  _ 0
Sat Cat
 j=  0 j= 0
 ; 0 j=  ; 0
Sat Rep
8i 2 1:::n:i j= 
1 ; ::: ; n j= 
Definition of the denotation function (~ ).
~a = fag ~ = A ~G +G0 = ~G [ ~G0 ~G  G0 = ~G n ~G0
A pattern name X matches any provenance sequence that is matched by the body of its
deﬁnition. The pattern  matches the empty provenance sequence (denoted by  as well).
The two patterns G! and G? match send and receive events respectively. The use of
group expressions G in these patterns allows us to perform more general tests against
the principal that performed the event. The group expression a denotes the singleton
set containing principal a only, while  denotes the set of all principals. G + G0 and
G   G0 denote union and dierence of groups respectively. The pattern  ; 0 matches
a provenance sequence that is composed of two parts that match  and 0 respectively.
The alternation of patterns  and 0, denoted by _0, matches a sequence that matches
either patterns, while the repetition of pattern , denoted by , matches any provenance
sequence that is the composition of zero or more sub-sequences, each of which matches
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To simplify the examples, we deﬁne the regular expression forms ? and + as syntactic
sugar for  _  and  ;  respectively. We also deﬁne the following pattern names.
AnyEvent = !Any _ ?Any
Any = AnyEvent
which match any event and any provenance sequence respectively. Note that the two
patterns are deﬁned by mutual recursion and are well-deﬁned since AnyEvent
 denotes
either  or one or more occurrences of AnyEvent. To ease readability, we also elide




Probably the simplest use of provenance is to establish the authenticity and integrity of
messages. For example, in the following system, principal a checks that the data it is
receiving on channel m is coming from principal b intact.
a[m(Any ; b!Any ; Anyas x):P] j S
Note how this is accomplished using the pattern Any ; b!Any ; Any, which is satisﬁed
by any value that went through principal b at some point in its route to a. This is the
case because values in our calculus are atomic. The only operations that principals may
perform on them are either to use them as communication channels or send them to other
principals. Therefore, a value with provenance Any;b!Any;Any is a value that originated
somewhere and was transmitted by principal b (possibly among other principals) before
it was received by the current principal.
3.3.2.2 Trust policies and data quality
More elaborate uses of provenance are also possible. For example, principals may ex-
press their trust policies as patterns representing what sources they consider trustworthy
and hence produce high quality data. Consider, for instance, the following system:
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In this system, principal a only accepts data that originated at b on channel m. This
is accomplished using the pattern Any ; b!Any which is matched by any provenance
sequence that ends with an event of the form b! denoting that the value originated at
principal b. On the other hand, principal a only accepts data originating at c on channel
n. This may represent the local trust policy of principal a, reﬂecting the fact that a
considers b to produce high quality data for consumption on m and similarly for c and
channel n. The channels here may represent dierent kinds of data; for example channel
m may be a used for communicating scholarly papers while channel n may be used by a
for consuming entertainment. In this case, the above patterns denote that a considers b
to be a good source of scholarly work while c is reserved for entertainment only.
As another example, consider the following system:
b[l(a!Anyas x):P + l((   a)!Anyasy):Q]
where provenance is used to determine what to do with data received on channel l. If the
data is coming directly from principal a, and it has not been through any other principal,
then it is processed by P, otherwise it is processed by Q. This could be because a
represents a source whose credibility or accuracy is highly regarded, and hence data
authored by this principal is allowed to be used for the highly critical process P. On the
other hand, other sources are not considered as such and hence their data is only suitable
for the less critical process denoted by Q. Naturally, a dierent principal might have a
dierent policy, considering principal a, a source of high quality data from b’s point of
view, as untrustworthy. In this case, this principal would employ dierent patterns to
determine what data to consume, possibly reversing those used by b if its trust beliefs
were completely the opposite of those of b.
Many other provenance policies can be expressed. For example, one can consider poli-
cies that discriminate not only based on the top level provenance of the value, but also
goes deeper and discriminates based on the provenance of the channels used.
3.3.2.3 Auditing
Provenance can also be used as an auditing and troubleshooting tool to establish who
might have been responsible for an error. For example, in the following system:
S , a[mhvi] j s[m(x):n
0 hxi] j c[n
0 (x):P] j b[n
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principal a is trying to send a value v to principal b, and this has to be done through
an intermediary s (because a does not have a direct link to b for example). Because





Now when c detects the error, perhaps due to the unexpected value, c can use the
provenance c?; s!; s?;a! to tell what principals were involved in making this error.
In this case, a, s, and c itself. The three principals may be further investigated to
determine who and what exactly caused the error.
3.3.2.4 Photography competition
The following example describes a photography competition. Contestants submit their
entriesforthecompetitiontotheorganiserofthecompetition, whoforwardsthoseentries
to the appropriate judges. Each judge rates the entries allocated to them and returns the
results to the organiser. The organiser then publishes the results and announces the
winners. We consider a version of the competition with three contestants: c1, c2 and
c3, one organiser: o, and two judges: j1 and j2. The contestants submit their entries
to the organiser on channel sub and receive the published results on channel pub. The
organiser forwards entries submitted by c1 and c3 to judge j1 and the entry by c2 to j2.
The judges return the entries together with their ratings to the organiser. Note that below
we are using polyadic versions of the send and receive constructs; such an extension to
the calculus should be straightforward.
C(c;entry;P) , c[subhentryi j pub(Any ; c!Anyas x ; Anyasy):P]
O , o[(i2f1;2gsub(i as x):ini hxi j res(y;z): pubhy;zi)]
J(j;inc) , j[inc(x):reshx;rate(x)i]
Comp , C(c1;e1;P1) j C(c2;e2;P2) j C(c3;e3;P3) j O j J(j1;in1) j J(j2;in2)
where 1 , (c1 + c3)!Any ; Any and 2 , c2!Any ; Any. The system above evolves as
follows, where i2f1;:::;ngS i is used to denote S 1 j ::: j S n.
Comp!a
 i2f1;2;3go[pubhei : ei;rate(ei) : rii] j O j i2f1;2;3gci[Pif
ei:0
ei;rate(ei):0




> > > <
> > > :
o? ; j1! ; j1? ; o! ; o? ; ci! if i 2 f1;3g
o? ; j2! ; j2? ; o! ; o? ; ci! if i 2 f2g
ri ,
8
> > > <
> > > :
o? ; j1! if i 2 f1;3g
o? ; j2! if i 2 f2g

0
ei , ci? ; o! ; ei

0
ri , ci? ; o! ; ri
After receiving the results from the judges, the organiser publishes them on channel pub
as shown in the replicated output processes pubhei : ei;rate(ei) : rii for i 2 f1;2;3g.
Every contestant listens on channel pub to receive their own results. This is achieved by
the input construct pub(Any ; c!Anyas x ; Anyasy). The pattern speciﬁcations allow
the contestant to receive the pair containing the result for their own entry.
3.4 Concluding remarks
3.4.1 Input-guarded choice
The restriction of input-guarded choice to a single input channel makes the calculus sim-
pler (and probably leads to an easier implementation). It is also closer to our intuitions
and is expressive enough for our purposes. In fact, it still gives us both external and
internal choice in the annotated version of the calculus. External choice manifests itself
when the environment provides values with dierent provenances while internal choice
is exhibited when a provenance sequence satisﬁes more than one pattern in a particular
choice construct.
3.4.2 Patterns in the input construct
Principals make use of provenance by specifying their policies in the form of provenance
patterns in the input construct. Together with the choice primitive, this allows them to
use provenance to decide what data to consume and how to use it. This means that for a
given channel, there are likely to be multiple incompatible patterns speciﬁed by dierent
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not a problem of course as the semantics makes sure, through dynamic provenance tests,
that each principal only receives data that matches their requirements. Intuitively, this
corresponds to a model of “unregulated markets”; that is if we think of each channel as
modelling a market for exchanging data of some kind or for some purpose, then we see
that there are no restrictions on the provenance of data each channel may carry. This is
evident from the syntax of the restriction construct, (n)P, where a channel n is created
with no conditions on the provenance of data that may be exchanged on it. It is because
of this lack of “regulation” that each principal has to check the provenance of the data
before they consume it. One can envisage a dierent model, which we refer to as that of
“regulated markets”, where each channel, besides any possible restrictions on the kind
of data, also has restrictions on the provenance of the data it may carry. This would
require each channel to be mapped to a single pattern specifying the provenance of data
that may be communicated on it. Hence, the syntax of restriction would be modiﬁed to
(n : )P (as would be expected for a standard type system) and the “implementation”
would be either in terms of a static provenance tracking system that guarantees that only
data with provenance that complies with the policy of a channel is exchanged along that
channel, or in terms of a run time check that only allows output operations to proceed
if they would result in data with the correct provenance. In the latter model, transitions
would take place between conﬁgurations of the form   ` S where S is a system and  
an environment recording the provenance policies (i.e., the types) of each free channel
name in S. For example, the send and receive rules may be written as follows:
ARed Snd
a!m ; p j=  (m)
  ` a[m:m hp : pi] !a   ` mhhp : a!m ; pii
ARed Rcv
j 2 I
  ` a[i2Im:m (i as x):Pi] j mhhp : pii !a   ` a[Pjfp:a?km;p=xg]
As the rules show, output is only allowed if the data has provenance that conforms to the
provenance policy of the channel. This allows principals to safely receive data without
making any checks of their own.
3.4.3 Querying provenance
The choice of input-guarded sum as the primitive for querying provenance was inﬂu-
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each principal deems trustworthy. As we mentioned earlier, we think of each channel as
representing a market for exchanging data of a particular kind. Each principal has their
own policies on what combinations of sources produce high quality data. Having these
as patterns in the input construct means that principals only receive data that matches
their provenance policies. One could instead opt for a dierent model where principals
receive any data they ﬁnd available on a particular channel, after which they can then
use a separate primitive for checking the provenance of the data received and determine
what to do with it. For example, a primitive that would allow branching based on the
shape of the provenance sequence of a value could be written as follows:
case w of  then P else Q
and its semantics may be given by the following two rules:
ARed Caset
 j= 
case p :  of  then P else Q !a P
ARed Case f
 6j= 
case p :  of  then P else Q !a Q
A principal could still choose to send the data back on the channel it received it from if
it does not match its provenance policy. This would, however, “pollute” the provenance
of the value with provenance information referring to this principal. This is one of the
reasons why patterns in the input construct were deemed to oer a better primitive. Note
that, depending on the facilities oered by the pattern matching language, our version of
the input construct would often be strictly more expressive than the branching primitive
demonstrated above, in which case this latter may be encoded using our input-guarded
choice construct.
3.4.4 Implementation concerns
The calculus presented in this chapter should be viewed as an abstract model of prove-
nance management systems. It does not address implementation concerns such as space
and time eciency. In fact, a naive implementation of the calculus would provide for a
very inecient system. There are two main reasons for this. The ﬁrst is that provenance
annotations keep expanding without bound as new events are added to them. We expect
a concrete implementation of the calculus to put a limit on how large provenance anno-
tations can get. This limit can be expressed either in terms of the size of the provenance
sequence (i.e. as a provenance sequence reaches a certain size, older events are archived
or deleted) or in terms of its age (i.e. all events older than a certain age are archived orChapter 3 The Provenance Calculus 63
deleted irrespective of the size of the provenance sequence). The second reason is that
annotated data is passed by value in the calculus. That is, a copy of the annotated value
is made when communication happens. This may be inecient for large provenance
sequences, especially in cases where multiple values share common ancestry. To see
what we mean here, consider the following simple system:
a[m:m hp:pi] j b[m:
0
m (x):(n:n hxi j l:l hxi)]
This system is composed of two principals, a principal a that sends a value p on channel
m and a principal b that is ready to receive the value and make two copies of it, one it
intends to send on channel n and the other on channel l. After two transitions, we should
get the following:
b[n:n hp : b?
0
m ; a!m ; pi j l:l hp : b?
0
m ; a!m ; pi]
where we have two copies of the annotated value p : b?0
m ; a!m ; p at principal b.
Naively, this would require double the memory footprint. However, there is no rea-
son why an implementation could not instead store only one copy of the provenance
sequence b?0
m ; a!m ; p and simply have pointers to it from principal b. This could also
be used when communicating a value from one principal to another where only a pointer
to the provenance sequence is passed instead of the actual provenance sequence. These
are just some of the examples of optimizations that an implementation might perform.
The calculus itself is only an abstract model and therefore it does not address issues
relating to the ecient storage and communication of provenance.Chapter 4
The Role of Provenance
The aim of this chapter is to study the role of provenance in our calculus. It does that
by comparing and contrasting the two versions of the calculus, the plain version and the
annotated version. These two, diering only in the provenance management features
added to the annotated version, make it possible for us to quite easily highlight the role
that provenance plays in the calculus.
The ability of principals to access provenance in the annotated version depends on the
patterns they employ. These in turn depend on the speciﬁc pattern matching language we
decide to use and its expressive power. Therefore, we start the chapter with Section 4.1,
where we look at pattern matching languages and study their properties. After highlight-
ing the dierent classes of pattern languages and their impact on principals’ ability to
discern dierent aspects of provenance, we move on to compare the two versions of the
calculus. We ﬁrst draw attention to the syntactic dierences between the two versions,
namely, the annotation of all values with their provenance and the addition of patterns
to the input construct. Naturally, semantic dierences are more important than syntactic
ones. This is especially the case since all annotated systems can be translated to plain
ones by simply erasing the provenance annotations and the input patterns. We use two
approaches to analyse the semantic dierences between the two versions:
 Comparing the system transitions allowed by the reduction relation of each of the
two versions of the calculus. This is carried out in Section 4.2.
 Comparing the discriminating power of the canonical behavioural equivalence of
each of the two versions of the calculus. This is done in Section 4.3.
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We ﬁnd that plain systems have more transitions than annotated ones in general. This is
because the annotated reduction relation only allows input transitions when the prove-
nance of values satisﬁes one of the patterns speciﬁed by the principal. This means that,
in terms of system transitions, the behaviour of annotated systems can be seen as a sub-
set of that of plain ones. In a way, it is the safe subset; the subset of behaviours where
principals only receive data perceived by them as being of acceptably high quality given
its provenance. Behavioural equivalences give us another angle from which to compare
the two versions. We ﬁnd that the equivalence obtained in the case of the plain version
is more coarse, admitting more systems as being equivalent, than the one obtained in the
annotated version. This is because the provenance of values published by a particular
system reveals information about its internal structure; information that would not have
been visible otherwise to an outside observer. This is consistent with the results of
the ﬁrst approach since it is the prohibition of certain system transitions that gives the
equivalence more discriminating power in the annotated version. The remainder of this
chapter oers more details about this.
4.1 Pattern languages
Thedeﬁnitionofpatternlanguageswegavein Deﬁnition3.5isquitegenericandimposes
hardly any conditions at all on what constitutes a pattern language. The sample pattern
language deﬁned in Section 3.3.1 is fairly expressive; it allows principals to discriminate
between values based on the presence or absence of speciﬁc patterns in their provenance.
It is actually very expressive, as expressive as one would want any pattern language to
be in fact as we will demonstrate later in this section. The patterns it oers range from
the very stringent, accepting only one provenance sequence, to the very broad, accepting
all provenance sequences. It also allows the speciﬁcation of unsatisﬁable patterns; ones
with no matching provenance sequences and which when used would mean the input
action ofthe principalwouldneverbe exercised. We do notanticipate manyuses forsuch
patterns, nevertheless they are allowed by the grammar of the sample pattern language.
4.1.1 Separating the tracking of provenance from its usage
What is interesting about the genericity of the pattern language deﬁnition is that it allows
one to envisage a wide range of pattern languages, each useful for a particular class of
applications. This is important since the pattern language is really the interface between
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Through the speciﬁcation of a pattern language, it is possible to provide an abstract
view of provenance and hide from principals as much of the implementation details of
provenance tracking as is desired. Not only that, but dierent notions of provenance can
be achieved in one of two ways:
 either by varying the amount of provenance tracked by the provenance tracking
reduction relation.
 or by varying the amount of provenance made available to principals through the
speciﬁcation of a suitable pattern language.
To see how this would work, consider our annotated calculus from Section 3.2. There,
provenance sequences record the send and receive actions of principals. For each such
action, they record the principal name, the type of the action, and the provenance of
the channel used. This was what our provenance requirements called for. Were our
requirements dierent, say we were interested instead in a provenance notion where
only the author of the action (i.e. the name of the principal executing the action) was
needed, then we could have been able to get away with recording far less provenance.
This would correspond to changing the deﬁnition of the provenance reduction relation
so that it only recorded the author of an action. Speciﬁcally, the send and receive rules
would need to be modiﬁed as follows:
ARed Snd Alt
a[m:m hp:pi] !a mhhp : a ; pii
ARed Rcv Alt
j 2 I m j= j
a[i2Im(i as x):Pi] j mhhp:pii !a a[Pjfp:p=xg]
As can be seen from the above two rules, only the send action records provenance now,
and not only that, but it only records the principal name. The reason is that we only
need to know the list of principals that a value has travelled through to reach its current
location, its route so to speak, and as such recording the name of the principal after the
receive action would be redundant. The structure of provenance becomes much simpler
too, a sequence of principal names of the form a1;:::;an. Naturally, the pattern language
we would use for such a case would take that into account.
Although the above approach might look like the natural way to implement a provenance
notion, it is possible to achieve the same eect in a more abstract way, using a suitable
pattern language as we already pointed out. This would involve keeping the same deﬁ-
nition of provenance tracking given in Section 3.2 and instead using a pattern matching
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this approach is that we can vary the pattern language to obtain dierent provenance
notions without having to modify our deﬁnition of provenance tracking, thus keeping
the calculus of Chapter 3 and any results relating to it intact. For example, to expose
only the route of the value, we can use patterns of the form G1 ; ::: ; G2, where Gi
denotes a group expression similar to those deﬁned for our sample pattern language.
The semantics of these patterns would be given with respect to our original deﬁnition of







We only need to modify the deﬁnition of satisfaction for send and receive events. The
other rules should remain unchanged. As the rules show, although provenance events
still record the author’s name, the event type, and the provenance of the channel used,
the pattern language only looks at the name of the author and ignores the rest. This way,
principals see provenance as though it was simply a sequence of principal names, much
the same as in the above approach. Hence, the two approaches are equivalent in terms
of the provenance they expose to principals, and so allow exactly the same set of system
transitions.
4.1.2 Properties of pattern matching languages
We already commented informally on the expressive power of our sample pattern lan-
guage. Here, we give a brief formal review of some of its properties, drawing attention
to some alternative pattern languages.
Deﬁnition 4.1. Let M , (M;j=M) be a pattern matching language respecting Deﬁni-
tion 3.5 and let  be a pattern in M. We say that:
 Pattern  is satisﬁable if there exists a provenance sequence  such that  j=M ,
pattern  is unsatisﬁable if this does not hold.
 Pattern  is valid if for all provenance sequences , it holds that  j=M , pattern 
is invalid if this does not hold.
 Pattern  uniquely identiﬁes a provenance sequence  if  j=M  and for all prove-
nance sequences 0 it holds that if 0 j=M  then  = 0.
 Language M admits satisﬁable (respectively unsatisﬁable, valid, invalid) prove-
nance sequences if there exists a provenance sequence  such that  is satisﬁable
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 Language M is expressively complete if every provenance sequence  can be
uniquely identiﬁed by a pattern  in M.
These properties are meant to give us a measure of how expressive a particular pattern
language is. The ﬁrst four (satisﬁability, validity and their negations) are elementary
properties; we expect all useful patterns in any nontrivial pattern matching language
to be satisﬁable as the use of unsatisﬁable patterns would simply block input actions.
Additionally, we expect almost all of them to be invalid as otherwise we wouldn’t be
able to discriminate between dierent provenance sequences. A pattern that uniquely
identiﬁes a particular provenance sequence can distinguish this sequence from every
other provenance sequence. A language that is expressively complete gives principals
the ability to discriminate between any two provenance sequences, no matter how small
the dierences between them are. Therefore, it allows principals to express very precise
provenance policies. Conversely, for a pattern language to be useful, it also needs to
include patterns with less discriminating power. That way, principals are also able to
express less stringent provenance policies. Hence, an ideal pattern matching language,
in our view, is one that oers principals a good balance between the ability to express
strict policies on the one hand, and more lenient ones on the other, allowing for the
expression of a wide range of provenance policies.
A language with only one pattern and where the pattern is either unsatisﬁable or valid
is called a provenance-unaware pattern matching language. Note that all unsatisﬁable
patterns can be considered semantically equivalent and hence having more than one
would be redundant. This is also the case for multiple valid patterns. We use M0 to
denote the provenance-unaware language withthe unsatisﬁable pattern andM1 to denote
the provenance-unaware language with the valid pattern. Although these two languages
are too inexpressive for most provenance policies of interest, they are useful tools for
highlighting some properties of provenance. We end this section by formally proving
some of the properties of our sample pattern matching language.
Proposition 4.2. The sample pattern matching language of Section 3.3.1 admits satisﬁ-
able, unsatisﬁable, valid and invalid patterns, and it is expressively complete.
Proof. The ﬁrst part of the proposition is easy to prove as we simply need to give an
example of each type of pattern. For satisﬁability, the pattern a!Any is satisﬁed by the
provenance sequence a!. It is invalid however as it does not match the provenance
sequence a?Any. Both of these can be easily demonstrated using the satisfaction rules
given in Figure 3.8. For an example of an unsatisﬁable pattern, consider (a a)!, which
equates to saying that we need a value that was sent by a but at the same time not sent70 Chapter 4 The Role of Provenance
by a, which clearly can not be satisﬁed by any provenance sequence. An example of
a valid pattern is Any. To prove unsatisﬁability and validity, we have to show that the
pattern (a   a)! matches no provenance sequences, and that the pattern Any matches
every provenance sequence. We can do that by induction on the structure of provenance
sequences. The details are straightforward and hence omitted for brevity.
To show that our sample pattern language is expressively complete, we need to show
that every provenance sequence has a unique pattern that matches it. It turns out this
is very easy in the case of our sample pattern language as patterns are a superset of
provenance sequences, and hence we can use the provenance sequence itself as a pattern
that uniquely identiﬁes it. 
We conclude this section by noting that the properties of patterns we have discussed
are deﬁned relative to the syntax of provenance sequences. This is important to point
out as not all syntactically legal provenance sequences are actually semantically mean-
ingful. The provenance sequence a! ; a! ;  for example is allowed by the grammar
of provenance sequences, but it is semantically incorrect as it would never arise from
a transition in our calculus. The reason for this is that send and receive actions always
interleave in our calculus contrary to what this provenance sequence says. This impacts
both satisﬁability and invalidity and means that some patterns deemed satisﬁable or in-
valid according to the above deﬁnitions may actually be unsatisﬁable or valid if only
semantically correct provenance sequences are considered. To illustrate this with an
example, consider the pattern a!Any ; a!Any ; Any which is satisﬁed by the aforemen-
tioned provenance sequence. This pattern is however unsatisﬁable since the provenance
sequence a!;a!; would never arise in a legal transition in our calculus, nor would any
other provenance sequence that satisﬁes the pattern. Chapter 5 discusses the semantics
of provenance sequences and the reader is referred to that chapter for more details on
this.
4.2 Relating the two versions of the calculus
The plain version of our calculus, presented in Section 3.1, is meant to give the compu-
tational core of the calculus. This computational core was extended with provenance
management features in the annotated version in Section 3.2. The aim of making this
separation explicit is to allow us to more easily highlight the role of provenance man-
agement and its impact on the calculus. The extensions introduced by the annotated
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tracking, and (3) provenance queries or policies. As we have seen, the latter take the
form of patterns speciﬁed by each principal restricting what data they may consume on
a particular channel, and given the ﬂexibility of the input-guarded sum construct, may
also be used to branch to dierent continuations based on the provenance sequence of
the value received. Intuitively, this corresponds to deciding how to use the data based on
how trustworthy it is deemed to be. More fundamentally however, the annotated version
may be seen as simply ruling out those transitions (input transitions to be precise) which
may lead to principals receiving data from sources they consider untrustworthy. That is,
the provenance tracking reduction relation is “faithful” to the computational semantics
of the calculus as given in the plain version, and only alters it by updating the provenance
of values after each “safe” transition. Transitions which may lead to principals receiv-
ing data that violates their provenance policies are deemed unsafe and hence excluded
through dynamic provenance checking. This is the semantics we expect to ﬁnd in most
instances of our calculus. However, as the annotated version is parametric on the choice
of a pattern language, the exact behaviour of input actions will depend on the pattern
language used.
To formalise the relation between the two versions, we deﬁne a set of annotation erasure
functions which map annotated terms to their plain counterparts. More speciﬁcally, we
deﬁne three such functions: one for identiﬁers, one for processes and one for systems.
With a slight abuse of notation, we use j j to denote all three functions. We also deﬁne a
“complementary” function on annotated values which returns the provenance annotation
of a given annotated value. We call this latter the annotation extraction function and
denote it by jj jj. The deﬁnitions are given below.
Deﬁnition 4.3 (Annotation erasure function). The annotation erasure functions for iden-
tiﬁers, processes and systems are deﬁned by induction as shown in Figure 4.1.
Figure 4.1. Annotation erasure function
Identifiers.










ji2Iw(i as x):Pij , i2Ijwj(x):jPij
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Deﬁnition 4.4 (Annotation extraction function). The annotation extraction function
jj jj : V ! K, which given an annotated value, returns its provenance annotation, is
deﬁned by the following clause: jjp : jj , .
Save for provenance tracking and checking, the two reduction systems of the plain
and annotated versions are very similar. Provenance tracking itself does not actually
impact the computational behaviour of the calculus; on the other hand, the checking of
provenance against the policies of principals does have an impact. That impact depends
on the pattern matching language we choose. However, no matter what pattern language
is chosen, we know that the annotated version does not introduce any new behaviour.
This is formalised in Theorem 4.5, which states that all system transitions derivable
using the provenance tracking reduction relation !a may also be derived using the plain
reduction relation !p. As we have already commented, the inverse is not true in general
since the provenance tracking semantics only allows input transitions if the data to be
received has provenance that complies with the recipient’s policies. This means that
if we were to weaken the provenance policies of principals to the point where every
provenance sequence is compliant, then we would expect the transitions of the annotated
version to perfectly match those of the plain version. We have already seen a pattern
matching language thatachieves exactlythis andthatisM1. RecallthatM1 is the pattern
language with the singleton set of patterns, and whose single pattern is valid, matching
every provenance sequence. Formalising this, Theorem 4.7 states that, in the instance
of the calculus with pattern language M1, the provenance tracking reduction relation
is completely faithful to the semantics of the plain version. We call such a reduction
relation a pure provenance tracking reduction relation as it only tracks provenance but
does not let principals check it to determine what data to receive nor otherwise use it.
Note that even in such a setting, provenance tracking would still be useful as it may be
used at the meta level for a wide range of applications such as auditing, troubleshooting
and studying the properties of systems.
Theorem4.5(Soundnessoftheprovenancetrackingsemantics). S !a T impliesjSj !p
jTj.
Proof. Let us assume that S !a T holds. We proceed by induction on the last rule used
in its derivation. In each case, a corresponding rule exists in the plain version which we
can use to derive jSj !p jTj. The rules are exactly the same in the two relations except
for ARed Rcv. This latter has the additional premise p j= j in the annotated version.
A corresponding derivation may be made in the plain version by simply dropping this
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Deﬁnition 4.6 (Pure provenance tracking). Let !ppt denote the instance of the reduction
relation !a where the pattern matching language used is M1.
Theorem 4.7 (Completeness of the pure provenance tracking semantics). S !ppt T
implies jSj !p jTj. Vice versa, jSj !p T implies S !ppt T0 for some T0 such that
jT0j = T.
Proof. The ﬁrst part, S !ppt T implies jSj !p jTj, is just an instance of the more
general statement proved in Theorem 4.5 and so its truth follows from that theorem. The
proof for the other direction, that is jSj !p T implies S !ppt T0 for some T0 such that
jT0j = T, also follows along similar lines to that of Theorem 4.5. For each case, we pick
an annotated system S and consider its erasure jSj and the corresponding plain transition
jSj !p T. We then apply the counterpart of the this transition in the annotated version
to obtain S !ppt T0. This is possible since for each transition (except the input one) in
the annotated version , its counterpart in the plain version has similar premises and a
similar conclusion. It is also possible for the input rule as the annotated version has one
extra premise, p j=M j, but as we know, all j patterns in M1 are actually the same and
are equivalent to the valid pattern, and so that premise will always be true. This means
that we can derive the input transition too. Deriving the annotated transition, we would
ﬁnd that the erasure of the system obtained this way jT0j is indeed equal to the system
obtained in the plain version T. 
4.3 Behavioural equivalences
The previous section looked at the dierence between the two versions of the calculus
by directly comparing their reduction relations. That highlighted the role of provenance
in the calculus, namely that of ruling out transitions deemed unsafe as they would lead if
allowed to principals consuming low quality data. In this section, we compare and con-
trast the two versions of the calculus again, but this time using behavioural equivalences.
The aim is to use the same framework as the basis for developing two behavioural
equivalences, one for each version of the calculus, thus obtaining easily comparable
equivalences. By contrasting the discriminating power of these two equivalences, we
should be able to highlight the role of provenance since any dierences in discriminating
power would be attributable to the addition of provenance in the annotated version.
Generally, behavioural equivalences provide a deep semantic understanding of a process
calculus by deﬁning what systems are considered the same in terms of their behaviour.
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awayfrom anyinternal behaviour. The reason forthis shouldbe clear; internalbehaviour
is invisible from the outside and any dierences between two systems in their internal
behaviour would not be discernible by interacting with them. In other words, the arbi-
trator of equivalence is itself seen as a system subject to the same rules of the calculus,
and hence it is restricted in comparing systems to interacting with them according to the
reduction rules of the calculus.
To give an example, consider the two plain systems S and T deﬁned as follows:
S , a[nhpi] T , (m)(b[mhpi] j c[m(x):nhxi])
System S consists of a single principal a whose behaviour is simply to send the value
p on channel n. On the other hand, T is relatively more complex, it consists of two
principals b andc; principalb sends the value p on a private channelm to principalc who
then publishes it on channel n. In the plain version of the calculus, this is demonstrated
by the transitions of the two systems given below:
S !p nhhpii T !p (m)(mhhpii j c[m(x):nhxi])
!p c[nhpi]
!p nhhpii
Now consider another system O acting as an arbitrator or observer. The job of system
O is to employ all the means it has at its disposal to try and tell systems S and T apart.
This means that its behaviour can be arbitrarily complex as long as it can be expressed
as a system in our calculus. We ﬁnd that the only interaction O can have with S and T
is to receive the value p on channel n. The observer O cannot interact with either S or T
in any other way. It is impossible for it to interact with T on channel m as it is a private
channel. It is also impossible for it to detect the names of principals it is interacting with,
nor can it detect the behaviour of principal b in system T as b only exhibits internal or
private behaviour. Moreover, although T takes three steps to publish p on n compared
to the single step taken by S, it is again impossible for O to detect this “delay” as the
calculus provides no means to do that. Therefore, O will have but to proclaim S and T
equivalent.
The discriminating power of observers changes when we add provenance however. To
demonstrate that, consider the same two systems S and T but now expressed in the
annotated version of the calculus. We assume all values have empty provenance to begin
with and that principal c in T uses a valid pattern such as Any in its input action, and
so using our convention of dropping empty provenance annotations from values and
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annotated version. Their transitions, expressed using the provenance tracking reduction
relation, change to include provenance as shown below:
S !a nhhp : a!ii T !a (m)(mhhp : b!ii j c[m(x):nhxi])
!a c[nhp : c? ; b!i]
!a nhhp : c! ; c? ; b!ii
The result of the transitions in each case is a message with channel n and value p, similar
to what we had in the plain version. The provenance of the value p obtained from system
S is dierent from that obtained from system T however. An observer O, equipped with
a suitable pattern, would be able to tell these two apart. For instance, using our sample
pattern language, the observer O deﬁned as O , o[n(a! as x):P] would consume the
value p when interacting with S but would not consume it when interacting with T. The
reason is that the provenance of p would match O’s policy in the ﬁrst case, while it would
not match it in the second case. This way, the observer O would be able to tell that S
and T are in fact dierent. Not only that, but O can actually detect the names of other
principals making up systems S and T and even detect that the value p had originated at
b in the case of T. An example deﬁnition of an observer that would accomplish this is
O , o[n(Any ; b! as x):P]
What this simple example shows is that provenance alters the discriminating power
of observers, and as a result changes the behavioural equivalence of the calculus. By
checking the provenance of values published by systems, observers are able to discern
more dierences between systems than would have been otherwise possible. In fact,
provenance makes some of the internal behaviour of systems externally visible as we
have seen from the example. The remainder of this section is aimed to formalise these
points.
To study behavioural equivalences for our provenance calculus, we use as a starting
point the intuitive, and increasingly popular, framework of barbed bisimulation (and the
induced congruence). Barbed bisimulation provides a very natural notion of behavioural
equivalence and is easily adaptable to any calculus with a notion of system reduction.
We start with the plain version of the calculus, being simpler, and then move on to
the annotated version. We contrast the equivalences obtained in the two versions of
the calculus, thus highlighting the role that provenance plays in discriminating between
systems. Notethatthe equivalencesdeﬁnedin this section arewhatis commonlyreferred
to as weak equivalences. A weak equivalence is one that abstracts away from the exact
number of internal communication steps since these are not usually detectable by an
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to deﬁne the weak equivalence or as an easier to prove notion of equivalence. Neither of
these are needed in our case.
4.3.1 Plain version
As expected, in the case of the plain version of the calculus, the behavioural equivalences
are identical to their counterparts in the asynchronous -calculus, save for those changes
required to account for the fact that processes are explicitly assigned an identity and for
our use of a special version of the input-guarded choice construct. These changes are
mostly superﬁcial however, since as we commented several times already, the identities
do not play any role in the semantics of the plain version. This fact, we will see, can be
formally proved with the behavioural equivalences.
The equivalence we deﬁne is called reduction barbed congruence and is based on the
reduction system of the plain version given in Figure 3.4. It requires that the two
systems checked for equivalence have the same basic observables, produce equivalent
systems when they reduce and behave in the same way in every context we place them in.
As our calculus is based on the asynchronous -calculus, only outputs are observable;
there is no way, in general, to tell when an input has taken place in an asynchronous
setting. Technically, since we split communication into the two separate steps of sending
and receiving, messages are what is observable and not output processes. Following
common practice in the literature, we only observe the channel name of a message as it
is simpler and equivalent to observing the whole message. We give the deﬁnitions of the
observation predicate and reduction barbed congruence below.
Deﬁnition 4.8 (Plain observation predicate). We saythata channelname m is observable
at a system S, written S #pm, if and only if S p (n)(mhhvii j S 0) for some channel name
n, value v and system S 0 such that m , n. We also write S +p m to mean that there exists
some system S 0 such that S )p S 0 and S 0 #p m.
The observation predicate is meant to characterise the basic observables (barbs) of a
system. When deﬁning these, we need to consider what an outside observer, interacting
with the system, can perceive about its behaviour. Since we are in an asynchronous
setting, an outside observer can only detect the messages that the system under obser-
vation has produced; it cannot tell when the system has consumed a message sent by
the observer. The lemma below states that the observable behaviour of a system does
not changed when the system is placed in certain contexts. Speciﬁcally, the restriction
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world on other channels. Also similarly, placing another system in parallel does not stop
a system from being able to communicate on any of its public channels.
Lemma 4.9. The observation predicate is preserved by contexts as described below:
 (n)S #p m if and only if S #p m and m , n.
 (S j T) #p m if and only if S #p m or T #p m.
Proof. For each of the two properties, we need to prove both directions of the impli-
cation. The proof relies on the deﬁnition of the observation predicate and structural
congruence to analyse the structure of the system in question. The details are long but
straightforward. 
Deﬁnition 4.10 (Plain reduction barbed congruence). Plain (weak) reduction barbed
congruence, up, is the largest symmetric binary relation on systems that is:
 barb-preserving: S up T implies that for all channel names m, if S #p m then
T +p m.
 reduction-closed: S up T implies that if S !p S 0 for some S 0 then T )p T0 for
some T0 such that S 0 up T0.
 contextual: S up T implies that C[S] up C[T] for all contexts C.
The three criteria used in the deﬁnition of reduction barbed congruence follow naturally
from our intuitions of how two equivalent systems are expected to behave. Firstly,
two equivalent systems must have the same basic observables, which means they must
be able to produce identical messages. They must also reduce to equivalent systems,
ensuring that they remain equivalent as they evolve. Finally, when a system is used
as a component to build a larger one, we would like to be able to replace it with an
equivalent one without changing the behaviour of the larger system. To see how this
works, consider again the two systems S and T we saw earlier. We said informally
that these two systems would look the same to an external observer and hence they are
behaviourally equivalent. We now give a formal proof of their equivalence according to
reduction barbed congruence.
Proposition 4.11. Let S and T be the plain systems deﬁned as follows:
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Systems S and T are reduction barbed congruent in the plain version, that is, it is the
case that S up T.
Proof. To prove that S up T holds, we need to ﬁnd a relation r that includes (S;T) and
exhibits all properties of reduction barbed congruence. Since up is by deﬁnition the
largest such relation, it will follow that r 2 up and hence, S up T will also follow from
that. 
Reduction barbed congruence characterises exactly the dierences between systems that
an external observer would be able to discern by interacting with them. As a result,
identities of principals are completely transparent in the plain version of the calculus
since this latter does not provide any constructs to interact with them. This means that
the behaviour of a system should not be aected by the particular identities we pick
for its principals. To make this formal, we deﬁne the notion of renaming. Renamings
are simply substitutions of principal names for principal names. We anticipate that the
behaviour of a system is constant under the application of an arbitrary renaming.
Deﬁnition 4.12. A renaming is a substitution of principal names for principal names.
Renamings are simply a special subset of substitutions. Like substitutions, we use
;0;::: to range over them and S to denote the application of renaming  to sys-
tem S. For example, the application of the renaming  , fa0;b0;c0
=a;b;cg to system
S , a[P] j b[Q] j c[R] yields the system S 0 , a0[P] j b0[Q] j c0[R]. The following
lemma, which shows that renamings are preserved by structural congruence and reduc-
tion, is needed to prove Theorem 4.14. This latter shows that system equivalence is
preserved under renamings, formally proving that principal identities are superﬂuous in
the plain version.
Lemma 4.13. Renamings are preserved by structural congruence and reduction as
described below:
 if S p T then S p T.
 if S !p T then S !p T
Proof. The proof is a straightforward rule induction and hence omitted. 
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Proof. Let r be the smallest relation containing pairs of the form (S;S) and closed
under contexts. By deﬁnition, r is contextual and hence we only need to show that it
preserves observation and is closed under reduction. We proceed by induction on why
the pair (S;T) is in r, and there are two cases to consider.
Case 1. In the ﬁrst case, (S;T) is of the form (S 0;S 0). For preservation of observables,
assume that S 0 #p m. This means that S 0 p (n)(mhhvii j S 00), which implies, by Lemma
4.13, that S 0 p ((n)(mhhvii j S 00)). This latter simpliﬁes to (n)(mhhvii j S 00) which
means that S 0 +p m. For reduction closure, assume that S 0 !p S 00. Then by Lemma
4.13, this implies that S 0 !p S 00, and from the ﬁrst clause in the deﬁnition of r, we
know that (S 00;S 00) is in r.
Case 2. In the second case, (S;T) is of the form (C[S 0];C[T0]) for some context C. We
proceed by induction on the structure of C. The case [:] holds trivially. Consider the
case when C = (n)[:] and assume that (n)S 0 #p m. This means, by Lemma 4.9, that
S 0 #p m and m , n. This latter in turn implies, by the induction hypothesis, that T0 #p m,
which again implies, by Lemma 4.9, that (n)T0 #p m. The case for parallel composition
follows in a similar manner using the second clause of Lemma 4.9. 
4.3.2 Annotated version
We can adapt the deﬁnition of reduction barbed congruence to the annotated version of
the calculus with practically no changes. However, the equivalence we obtain is dierent
in its discriminating power. As we have already commented informally, provenance
exposes principal names and some of the internal behaviour of systems to external
observers. Hence, observers are able to detect more dierences between systems in the
annotated version of the calculus compared to the plain version. The deﬁnitions of the
annotated versions of the observation predicate and reduction barbed congruence are
given below.
Deﬁnition 4.15 (Annotated observation predicate). We say that a channel name m is
observable at a system S, written S #a m, if and only if S a (n)(mhhvii j S 0) for some
name n, value v and system S 0 such that m , n. We also write S +a m to mean that there
exists some system S 0 such that S )a S 0 and S 0 #a m.
Deﬁnition 4.16 (Annotated reduction barbed congruence). Annotated (weak) reduction
barbed congruence, ua, is the largest symmetric binary relation on systems that is:
 barb-preserving: S ua T implies that for all names m, if S #a m then T +a m.80 Chapter 4 The Role of Provenance
 reduction-closed: S ua T implies that if S !a S 0 for some S 0 then T )a T0 for
some T0 such that S 0 ua T0.
 contextual: S ua T implies that C[S] ua C[T] for all contexts C.
The deﬁnition of annotated reduction barbed congruence looks the same as the plain
one, albeit modiﬁed to use the annotated versions of observation, reduction and contexts.
The extra discriminating power of the equivalence comes primarily from the ability of
contexts to check the provenance of values they receive from the system; these reveal
details about the system that the observer would not have had access to in the plain
version. To see this in action, consider again our example systems S , a[nhpi] and
T , (m)(b[mhpi] j c[m(x):nhxi]). Neither of these has any immediate observables
and so the ﬁrst criteria of equivalence, barb preservation, is satisﬁed. Recall that S has
only one reduction yielding nhhp : a!ii. Recall also that T reduces to a similar system
nhhp : c! ; c? ; b!ii in three reduction steps. From the deﬁnition of the observation
predicate, we can show that both nhhp:a!ii#a n and nhhp:c! ;c? ;b!ii#a n hold. The
second criteria of equivalence, reduction closure, allows for a single reduction step from
one system to be matched by multiple steps from the other system. Therefore, S and T
satisfy the reduction-closure criteria. Now let us check if they satisfy the third and ﬁnal
criteria, that is, we want to check whether S and T remain equivalent when placed in an
arbitrary context. It turns out this is not the case, and we have already hinted at a context
that is capable of distinguishing between them. The observer O , o[n(x as a!):P]
which we argued informally may be used to tell S and T apart, can be turned into the
context C , [:] j o[n(x as a!):eurekaheurekai], where eurekaheurekai is just an output
action used by observers to declare the successful consumption of a particular message.
Using this context, we ﬁnd thatC[S]+aeureka holds. However, C[T]+aeureka does not
hold as the provenance of p produced by T does not match the pattern a! and hence the
context C would not be able to consume T’s message and declare eureka as it does in
the case of S. Hence, we can conclude that S and T are not reduction barbed congruent
in the annotated version of the calculus. This is formally proved in Proposition 4.17.
We also prove that the renaming property does not hold for the annotated version. The
details can be found in Theorem 4.18.
Proposition 4.17. Let S and T be the annotated systems deﬁned as follows:
S , a[nhpi] T , (m)(b[mhpi] j c[m(x):nhxi])
Systems S and T are not reduction barbed congruent in the annotated version, that is, it
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Proof. The discussion above contains most of the details of this proof. Although S
and T satisfy the barb preservation and reduction closure properties of the equiva-
lence, they fail to satisfy the contextuality property. A context that demonstrates this
is C , [:] j o[n(x as a!):eurekaheurekai]. Neither C[S] nor C[T] has any immediate
observables. However, after some reduction steps, it is possible for C[S] to exhibit an
observable that C[T] cannot match as shown below:
C[S] = a[nhpi] j o[n(x as a!):eurekaheurekai]
!a nhhp : a!ii j o[n(x as a!):eurekaheurekai]
!a o[eurekaheurekai]
!a eurekahheurekaii
C[T] = (m)(b[mhpi] j c[m(x):nhxi]) j o[n(x as a!):eurekaheurekai]
!a (m)(mhhp : b!ii j c[m(x):nhxi]) j o[n(x as a!):eurekaheurekai]
!a c[nhp : c? ; b!i] j o[n(x as a!):eurekaheurekai]
!a nhhp : c! ; c? ; b!ii j o[n(x as a!):eurekaheurekai]
6!a
From the above, we can infer that C[S] 6ua C[T], and hence conclude that S 6ua T. 
Theorem 4.18. Let  be a renaming and S be an annotated system. It is not the case
that S ua S.
Proof. Even in the annotated version, there are special cases where the renaming prop-
erty holds. What the above theorem says is that renaming does not hold in general. To
prove this, we just need to give an example where the application of a renaming alters
the observable behaviour of a system. For instance, consider the very simple system
a[mhpi]. Any renaming that alters the name of principal a would be recognisable by an
outside observer. Take for example the renaming ffb=agg. Applied to system a[mhpi], it
yields b[mhpi]. The two systems a[mhpi] and b[mhpi] are not reduction barbed congru-
ent and to distinguish between them we can use the same context we used in the proof of
Proposition 4.17, that is, context C , [:] j o[n(x as a!):eurekaheurekai]. This context
would consume value p in the case of a[mhpi] but not in the case of b[mhpi]. Hence
it would be able to declare eureka in the case of the original system while it would not
after the application of the renaming. 
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Proof. Let us assume that S ua T holds. We need to prove that jSj up jTj follows from
this. From the assumption, we can deduce that S and T have the same basic observables,
reduce to equivalent systems and the systems obtained by placing them in a context are
also equivalent. We just need to show that these properties imply that their counterparts
in the plain version hold. 
Deﬁnition 4.20. Let uppt denote the relation deﬁned like ua but with the reduction
relation !a replaced with !ppt. We refer to uppt as pure provenance tracking reduction
barbed congruence, or as pure provenance tracking congruence for short.
Theorem 4.21. S uppt T if and only if jSj up jTj.
Proof. We need to prove both directions of the implication. The direction S uppt T
implies jSj up jTj follows from Theorem 4.19 as uppt is contained in ua (a result of !ppt
being a special case of !a). 
4.4 Concluding remarks
By making the calculus parametric on the pattern matching language, we are able to
prove generic results that apply to all pattern languages or to a particular subset of them.
We are also able to more easily study dierent notions of provenance by simply instanti-
ating the calculus with a suitable pattern language. The pattern language provides the
interface through which principals access provenance. We saw that pure provenance
tracking does not alter the computational semantics of the calculus. It is only when
principals are allowed to make decisions that depend on the provenance of values that
the computational semantics of the calculus changes. The change in our case consisted
of prohibiting, through dynamic provenance checking, input transitions where the prove-
nance of data does not comply with the policies of principals. This was demonstrated
in a number of formal results that compared the reduction relations of the plain and
annotated versions, and it allowed us to highlight the role of provenance in the calculus.
Comparing the reduction semantics of the plain and annotated versions of the calculus
was not the only method we used to study the role of provenance in the calculus. In ad-
dition to this, we also studied behavioural equivalences for both versions of the calculus
and contrasted their discriminating power. We found that provenance gives observers the
ability to discern more dierences between systems than is possible in the plain version.
This is of course subject to the expressive power of the pattern matching language. If the
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then the resulting equivalence would be the same as that of the plain version. This, and
other results were proved formally, further strengthening our results.
The behavioural equivalences we developed are based on barbed congruence. Although
very intuitive and easy to understand, they rely in their deﬁnition on a universal quan-
tiﬁcation over contexts, making them hard to use in general to prove the equivalence
of systems. To alleviate this, we have developed characterisations of them based on
the powerful coinductive notion of bisimulation. The bisimulation equivalences are de-
ﬁned on top of labelled transition systems and coincide with the contextually deﬁned
equivalences, hence providing a sound and complete proof methodology for showing
the equivalence of systems in every context. The deﬁnitions of the labelled transition
systems, the bisimulation equivalences and full abstraction results are all given in Ap-
pendix A.Chapter 5
Semantics of Provenance
In the previous two chapters, we presented our provenance calculus and described its
main features, namely those of annotated data, provenance tracking and provenance
queries. Our presentation of the calculus was in the form of two versions, a plain version
and an annotated version. Contrasting the two versions allowed us to highlight the role
of provenance tracking and checking in the calculus. We elaborated on this further by
deﬁning behavioural equivalences for both versions of the calculus and comparing their
discriminating power. In this chapter, we turn our attention to the problem of deﬁning
the semantics of provenance sequences and formalising some of their properties.
We start by noting that not all syntactically legal provenance sequences are semantically
meaningful. We have already alluded to this brieﬂy in Section 4.1.2 with the example of
provenance sequence a! ; a! ; . There, we argued informally that the provenance of a
value is meant to be a record of some past behaviour, and as such, the system containing
the value must be the result of some sequence of transitions obeying the rules of the
provenance tracking reduction relation. Since no sequence of system transitions follow-
ing the rules of ourcalculus would evergive rise to provenance of the form a!;a!;, we
can then conclude that such a provenance sequence cannot be semantically meaningful.
This intuitive idea leads us to deﬁne the ﬁrst property of provenance sequences, that
of well-formedness. A well-formed system is one that may be derived from an initial
system by a sequence of zero or more transitions. To understand what initial systems
are, note that provenance is a run time property, meaning that associating provenance
with values only makes sense at run time, and hence in their default static state, systems
should only have empty provenance. Any system with non-empty provenance is meant
to represent a run time system that is the result of transitions starting from some initial
state. The deﬁnition of well-formedness we give is a semantic one relying on the ability
to derive what may be a very long sequence of transitions. To alleviate this, we deﬁne
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a syntactic characterisation of well-formedness, which is much easier to use to prove
well-formedness.
Well-formedness is a very weak property though, as all it guarantees about a system
is that there exists some sequence of transitions that leads to it, not that this sequence
of transitions is what really took place. We call this stronger property soundness or
correctness. In order to give a formal deﬁnition of soundness, we present a ﬁrst-order
temporal logic whose modalities are interpreted with respect to the past of the system.1
We then use this to deﬁne the denotation of provenance sequences and the notion of
sound provenance. Based on these deﬁnitions, we prove that our provenance tracking
reduction relation always produces correct provenance sequences. In other words, we
show that provenance sequences produced by the provenance tracking reduction relation
“cannot lie” or “cannot be forged”. These properties of provenance are especially impor-
tant if we consider more complicated notions of provenance or settings where we allow
principals to control provenance tracking.
It should be noted that the properties of the calculus, and indeed the calculus itself, rely
on the assumption that the underlying infrastructure is trusted. By infrastructure here we
mean the combination of software and hardware components that implement the com-
munication and provenance management capabilities of the calculus. This infrastructure
is assumed to allow principals to communicate by message passing, to keep track of
the provenance of data thus communicated, and to make this provenance available to
principals via pattern matching, all as prescribed by the semantics of the calculus in
Chapter 3.
5.1 Well-formed Provenance
Provenance sequences are aimed to represent some past system behaviour. As such,
not all provenance sequences can be considered well-formed as there are some that
cannot arise from any legal system behaviour. For example, the provenance sequence
a!;b!0;00, whichis justa generalisation ofthe sequence a!;a!; we alreadylookedat,
is not well-formed because it tells us that its value was sent by a and immediately before
that it was sent by b. This, however, is impossible according to our provenance tracking
semantics as send and receive events always interleave. Moreover, some provenance
sequences may be well-formed in certain contexts but not others. For example, consider
the provenance sequence a? ; 0. The only context where this provenance would make
1As opposed to the more prevalent uses of modalities in temporal logics which usually refer to the
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sense is if it occurs as the provenance of a value located at principal a. Indeed, it is
impossible, based on the semantics of our calculus, to produce a value with such a
provenance at any principal other than a. We start by formalising these intuitions in
the deﬁnition of well-formed systems. We then present a sound and complete syntactic
characterisation of it.
5.1.1 Deﬁnition of well-formedness
The simplest class of well-formed systems is that of initial systems, whose deﬁnition
is given below. These can be thought of as representing the static state of systems
before they have made any transitions. As such, initial systems contain no messages as
these are considered values in transit and are only present in a system after a principal
makes a send action. In addition to this, initial systems only contain values with empty
provenance; non-empty provenance only arises after a system performs one or more
transitions.
Deﬁnition 5.1. A system S is initial if it contains no messages and all its values have
empty provenance.
As shown by the below proposition, name restriction, parallel composition and structural
congruence do not aect whether a given system is initial or not.
Proposition 5.2. The following properties hold for initial systems:
 S is initial if and only if (n)S is initial.
 S and T are initial if and only if S j T is initial.
 If S is initial and S a S 0 then S 0 is initial.
Proof. All three properties are easy to prove since none of the transformations changes
the provenance of values in a system or introduces messages into it, and hence an initial
system would remain so under any combination of these transformations. 
The deﬁnition ofwell-formedsystems, thatis systems whosevalues allhave well-formed
provenance, isthenstraightforward. Asystemisconsideredwell-formedifitisreachable
from an initial system by a sequence of zero or more transitions.
Deﬁnition 5.3. A system S is well-formed if there exists an initial system S 0 such that
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Already from this deﬁnition we can deduce a number of properties of well-formed
systems. For example, an initial system is well-formed according to this deﬁnition since
it can be derived from itself using a zero-length transition. Another property that we
may deduce is that of preservation of well-formedness under reduction. That is, starting
from a well-formed system, our reduction relation is guaranteed to only produce well-
formed systems. In fact, we can deduce that well-formedness is also preserved under
the same three system transformations as initiality. The properties of well-formedness
are summarised by the below proposition.
Proposition 5.4. The following properties hold for well-formed systems:
 If S is initial then S is well-formed.
 If S is well-formed and S !a S 0 then S 0 is well-formed.
 If S is well-formed and S a S 0 then S 0 is well-formed.
 If S is well-formed then so is (n)S.
 If S and T are well-formed then so is S j T.
Proof. All ﬁve properties are easy to prove. The ﬁrst one follows simply from the
deﬁnition of )a since for any system S it holds that S )a S. Hence, if S is initial then
it follows from the deﬁnition of well-formedness that S is well-formed. For the second
property, that is S is well-formed and S !a S 0 implies S 0 is well-formed, we start by
assuming that S is well-formed and that S !a S 0. By deﬁnition, S being well-formed
implies that there exists an initial system S 0 such that S 0 )a S. This means that we
have S 0 )a S !a S 0, from which it follows that S 0 )a S 0. Hence, S 0 is well-formed.
The last three properties follow from the rules of the reduction relation for structural
congruence, restriction and parallel composition respectively. 
5.1.2 Syntactic characterisation of well-formedness
The deﬁnition of well-formedness given above is a semantic one. To prove that a system
is well-formed according to this deﬁnition, we need to show that it is derivable from
an initial system using a sequence of zero or more transitions. However, this may not
be easy if the system in question is large and complex. What is needed then is an
alternative characterisation of well-formedness that only relies on the syntactic analysis
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 S ` : System S is well-formed.
 P `a : Process P is well-formed at principal a.
 w `a : Annotated value w is well-formed at principal a.
  `a : Provenance  is well-formed at principal a.
These judgements are deﬁned inductively on the structure of systems, processes, values
and provenance sequences respectively. The full deﬁnition is given in Figure 5.1.







 `a  0 `a 





S `  T ` 
S j T ` 
PWF Out
w `a  w0 `a 
whw0i `a 
PWF In
w `a  Pi `a  for all i in I





P `a  Q `a 
P j Q `a 
PWF If
w `a  w0 `a  P `a  Q `a 
if w = w0 then P else Q `a 
PWF Rep










 `a  0 `b  00 `b 
a? ; b!0 ; 00 `a 
The empty system 0 is initial and hence well-formed. The system a[P] is well-formed
if the process P is well-formed in the context where it appears, that is at principal a. A
message is well-formed only if the provenance of its value is of the form a! ; 0, for
some provenance sequences  and 0 that are well-formed at principal a. To see why
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principal in a previous transition and that has not yet been consumed. Its provenance
must represent this. The provenance sequences  and 0 denote the provenance of the
channel name and the previous provenance of the value respectively. Both of these were
located at a prior to the send action that produced the message, and as such, these two
provenance sequences must be well-formed at a. Restriction and parallel composition
simply state that well-formedness is indeed preserved by these two operations.
For processes, all we need to do is guarantee that all values that appear in the process
are well-formed at the principal. The only rule of note is that for replication, which
states that all bound names must have empty provenance. The reason is that for a bound
name to participate in communication, and hence for it to have non-empty provenance,
we need to unfold any replication surrounding it. Once the replication is unfolded, it
cannot be folded again with the rest of the replication as any non-empty provenance it
has would mean it would not match the replicated process. To illustrate this, consider
the following initial system:
S , a[(n)(m: hn:i)] j b[m: (x):P] j c[m: (y):Q]
which is composed of three principals a, b and c. Principal a contains the replicated
process (n)(m: hn:i) and therefore is able to continuosly generate and send a fresh
value n on channel m. Principals b and c both listen for data sent on channel m. As this is
an initial system, all values have empty provenance. This system has only one transition;
principal a could send a fresh value n on channel m. However, the only way for this to
take place is by applying the structural congruence rule a[P] a a[P j P] ﬁrst. This
rule allows the replication to unfold, making it possible to apply one of the rules of
reduction. In the case of system S, the structural congruence rule for replication allows
us to replace a[(n)(m: hn:i)] with a[(n)(m: hn:i) j (n)(m: hn:i)]. Applying
another rule of structural congruence, namely a[P j Q] a a[P] j a[Q], allows us to
replace a[(n)(m: hn:i) j (n)(m: hn:i)] with a[(n)(m: hn:i)] j a[(n)(m: hn:i)].
Therefore, the following holds:
S a a[(n)(m: hn:i)] j a[(n)(m: hn:i)] j b[m: (x):P] j c[m: (y):Q]
We still need to extrude the scope of the bound name n (the one not under replication as
we do not have any rules that allow scope extrusion from under a replication directly).
Doing this gives us:
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Now, we are able to apply the reduction rule for send to get:
S !a (n)(mhhn:a! ; ii) j a[(n)(m: hn:i)] j b[m: (x):P] j c[m: (y):Q]
Note how the replicated process was unfolded to give us a principal that is able to make
a send action. The provenance of the value changed after the send action. However,
the replicated process is still the same and the value n still has empty provenance. By
applying more rules of structural congruence and reduction, we are able to derive the
following transition:
S )a a[(n)(m: hn:i)] j (n)(b[Pf
n:b?;a!;=xg]) j (n)(c[Qf
n:c?;a!;=yg]) j
The replicated process at principal a, and especially the bound value n under the replica-
tion will always have empty provenance as it cannot be involved in any communication
unless the replication is unfolded as shown in the example.
There are two rules for values, one for variables which simply states that all variables are
well-formed since they have no provenance, and one for annotated values which requires
the provenance of the value to be well-formed at the same principal.
For provenance sequences, only two forms are well-formed at a principal, the empty
provenance for values that originated at the principal itself and that have not participated
in any transitions, and provenance sequences of the form a? ; b!0 ; 00, which is used
for values that a principal has received from another one. In this latter case, the prove-
nance of the receive channel must itself be well-formed at the same principal, while
the provenance of the send channel and the previous provenance of the value must be
well-formed at the principal that sent the value.
Having deﬁned the well-formedness judgements, Theorem 5.5 shows that this character-
isation of well-formedness does indeed coincide with the previous semantically deﬁned
notion of well-formedness.
Theorem 5.5 (Well-formedness - Soundness and Completeness). S `  if and only if S
is well-formed.
Proof. We have to show that both directions of the implication hold, that is if S `  then
there exists an initial system S 0 such that S 0 )a S (i.e. S `  is sound), and that if
S 0 )a S for some initial system S 0 then S `  (i.e. S `  is complete).92 Chapter 5 Semantics of Provenance
Soundness. We need to show that if S `  then there exists an initial system S 0 such that
S 0 )a S. Let us assume that S `  holds. We proceed by induction on its derivation.
There are ﬁve cases as follows:
Case SWF Nil. This means that S = 0 and hence it is clearly well-formed as it is an
initial system.
Case SWF Prin. This means that S is of the form a[P] for some principal name a




Upon analysis of the rules of Figure 5.1, it should be clear that all values in P must be
in one of the following three forms:
x v :  v : a?1 ; b!2 ; 3
If no value in P has the third form above, then a[P] is initial and hence well-formed, and
theproofisdone. If, on theotherhand, atleastonevaluein P hastheform v:a?1;b!2;3,
then we can show that v : a?1 ; b!2 ; 3 `a  must hold. This latter must have been
derived using PWF In, and so we can infer that 1 `a , 2 `b , and 3 `b  all hold.
We can show that P a P0fv:a?1;b!2;3=xg if v < bn(P) and that P a (v)(P0fv:a?1;b!2;3=xg)
if v 2 bn(P). Note that this is only possible because we know that all bound names
appearing under a replication in P must have empty provenance as required by rule
PWF Rep.
Let us consider the ﬁrst case, that is when P a P0fv:a?1;b!2;3=xg. Now, take the following
system:
T = mhhv : b!2 ; 3ii j a[m:1(x):P
0]
We have T !a S by rule ARed Rcv, and given that 1 `a , 2 `b , and 3 `b  hold
then we can show that T ` . Therefore, by the induction hypothesis, T is well-formed
and hence so is S.
The case when P a (v)(P0fv:a?1;b!2;3=xg) proceeds similarly.
Case SWF Msg. This means that S is of the form mhhv:a!1 ;2ii and so the derivation
of S `  must have been of the form:
1 `a  2 `a 
mhhv : a!1 ; 2ii
Consider the system a[m : 1 hv : 2i]. Using rule ARed Snd, we get:
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Since 1 `a  and 2 `a  hold as shown above, then it is possible to show that a[m:1 hv:
2i] `  holds. From this, and the induction hypothesis, we can infer that a[m:1 hv:2i]
is well-formed, and therefore we conclude that mhhv : a!1 ; 2ii is well-formed.
Case SWF Res. This means that S is of the form (n)S 0 and so the derivation of S ` 
must have been of the form:
S 0 ` 
(n)S 0 ` 
By the induction hypothesis, S 0 is well-formed and therefore we conclude that (n)S 0 is
well-formed.
Case SWF Par. This means that S is of the form S 0 j S 00 and so the derivation of S ` 
must have been of the form:
S 0 `  S 00 ` 
S 0 j S 00 ` 
By the induction hypothesis, S 0 and S 00 are well-formed and therefore we conclude that
S 0 j S 00 is well-formed.
Completeness. We need to show that if S 0 )a S for some initial system S 0 then S ` 
holds. Let us assume that S 0 )a S holds. We proceed by induction on the length of
this transition. The case when the length of the transition is 0 holds vacuously. In the
induction case, the length of the transition is n+1 for some n  0. That is, the transition
can be written as S 0 )a S n !a S for some system S n where the transition S 0 )a S n is
of length n. By the induction hypothesis, it holds that S n ` . We show that S `  by
induction on the derivation of the transition S n !a S. There are seven cases as deﬁned
in Figure 3.6. We illustrate a few of them below.
Case ARed Snd. This means the transition S n !a S was of the form a[m:m hv:vi] !a
mhhv : a!m ; vii. Since a[m:m hv:vi] `  then from SWF Prin we have m `a  and
v `a . This implies by application of SWF Msg that mhhv : a!m ; vii ` .
Case ARed Rcv. This means that the transition S n !a S was of the form:
j 2 I p j= j
a[i2Im:m (i as x):Pi] j mhhp:pii !a a[Pjfp:a?m;p=xg]
We know from the induction hypothesis that a[i2Im:m (i as x):Pi] j mhhp:pii `  holds.
From this, we can show that m `a  and Pi `a  for all i 2 I hold, and that p must be of
the form b!1 ; 2. From these, it can be shown that a[Pjfp:a?m;p=xg] `  indeed holds.94 Chapter 5 Semantics of Provenance
Case ARed Ift. This means that the transition S n !a S was of the form:
a[if m: = m:0 then P else Q ] !a a[P]
We know from the induction hypothesis that a[if m: = m:0 then P else Q ] ` . From
this, we can show that, among other things, P `a . Hence, we conclude that a[P] ` .
Case ARed If f is similar to the above. The other three cases, ARed Res, ARed Par,
and ARed Str can all be shown to hold in a similar fashion. 
Before we end this section, it is worth noting that some aspects of well-formedness may
be captured in the calculus at the syntax level by modifying the grammars used in the
calculus. However, accounting for all the requirements of well-formedness that way
would become very tedious as we would need to incorporate all the conditions found in
the rules of Figure 5.1. This would only get more complicated if we were to consider
more sophisticated notions of provenance. Hence, it is better to keep well-formedness as
a separate semantic notion as given Deﬁnition 5.3, andaim to characterise itsyntactically
like we did in this section if needed.
5.2 A logic for the past
In this section, we present a simple logic, the aim of which is to act as a target for
deﬁning the semantics of provenance sequences. What we mean by this is that our
goal is to be able to deﬁne the semantics of provenance sequences as formulae in this
logic. Consequently then, the properties that we would like to be able to express in the
logic are meant to mirror those captured by provenance. Therefore, like provenance, the
formulae of the logic are interpreted with respect to the past, meaning that their truth
is judged relative to the past states of systems. Technically, the logic is an extension
of ﬁrst-order logic with the modality A, which intuitively means that action  took
place sometime in the past, and that before action  took place, formula A was true. The
remainder of this section deﬁnes the syntax and semantics of the logic.
5.2.1 Logical formulae
The syntax of the logic is given in Figure 5.2. We let A; B;::: range over formulae,
;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true, :A for the negation of A, and A^B for the conjunction of A and B. We denote exis-
tential quantiﬁcation by 9x:A where the variable x ranges over channel names. We also
use A to denote the sometime in the past modality, which as we already mentioned,
can be understood to mean that action  occurred at some point in the past, before which
A held true.
There are four types of actions:
 the output action a:snd(m; p) which denotes that principal a sent value p on chan-
nel m,
 the input action a:rcv(m; p) which denotes that principal a received value p on
channel m,
 the if-true action a:ift(p;q) which says that principal a tested p and q for equality
and that resulted in true, and
 the if-false action a:iff(p;q) which says that principal a tested p and q for equality
and that returned false.
The constant false F, disjunction _, implication ), double implication ,, and the
universal quantiﬁer 8 may be deﬁned in terms of T, : and ^, 9 in the standard way. As
usual, the quantiﬁers are binders and hence the variable x in formulae 9x:A and 8x:A is
bound with scope A. This leads to the standard deﬁnitions of bound and free variables
of a formula A, which we denote by fv(A) and bv(A) respectively. We use Afm=xg for the
capture avoiding substitution of m for the free occurrences of x in A.
Figure 5.2. The provenance logic: formulae
A; B ::= logic formulae
T constant true
:A negation of A
A ^ B conjunction of A and B








The semantics of logical formulae is deﬁned in terms of the satisfaction relation s j= A
where s is a log and A is a formula. Logs, ranged over by s;t;:::, are sequences of96 Chapter 5 Semantics of Provenance
actions that record the past transitions of a system. Their syntax is given in Figure 5.3.
We use  for the empty sequence,  for the singleton sequence containing action , and
s;t for the concatenation of sequences s and t. As usual, concatenation is associative but
not commutative and has  as identity element. We wish to point out here that despite
their similarity to traces, logs are meant as records of the entire past of a system, not
just its observable behaviour. This is needed as the provenance tracking semantics does
indeed record actions which would otherwise be unobservable to an external observer.




s ; t concatenation
For a given log t, we let length(t) denote its length and ti::j, where i and j are natural
numbers such that i  j and j < length(t), denote the sequence composed of actions at
positions i to j in log t. We also use ti as a shorthand for ti::i. These may be easily deﬁned
as shown below.
Deﬁnition 5.6. The length and sublog functions are deﬁned as follows:
length(1 ; ::: ; n) , n (1 ; ::: ; n)i::j , i ; ::: ; j
With these deﬁnitions in place, we may now deﬁne the satisfaction relation. The rules for
the constant T, negation :A and conjunction A^B are simply adaptations of the standard
deﬁnitions of these to our setting. This is also the case for the existential quantiﬁer 9x:A.
As we mentioned earlier, the bound variable x is meant to range over channel names.
This is reﬂected in the rule for 9x:A, which states that this latter is satisﬁed by a log
t if there exists a channel name n such that t satisﬁes Afn=xg. The sometime modality
A is satisﬁed by a log t if  is the ith action in t and formula A is satisﬁed by the
sublog ti+1::n where n is the length of log t. This does indeed correspond to the intuitive
explanation we gave of the modality. A log t is meant to be a complete account of the
past actions of a system, ordered from the most recent action to the oldest. Hence, log
ti+1::n denotes those actions that took place before action .
Figure 5.4 gives the full deﬁnition of satisfaction.Chapter 5 Semantics of Provenance 97
Figure 5.4. The provenance logic: satisfaction
(LSat True) t j= T
(LSat Not) t j= :A , t 6j= A
(LSat And) t j= A ^ B , t j= A and t j= B
(LSat Sometime) t j= A , ti =  and ti+1::n j= A where length(t) = n
(LSat Exists) t j= 9x:A , t j= Afn=xg for some n 2 C
We wish to use formulae in the logic to describe and make statements about the past
behaviour of a system. With this interpretation, the pre-order between formulae induced
by logical implication ) corresponds quite naturally to the pre-order obtained when
considering “how much information” a particular formula tells us about the past of a
system. That is, given two formulae A and B both describing the past of the same
system, one may ask: how much information does each formula tell us about the past of
the system? Logical implication then answers this question in the relative sense where
A ) B is interpreted as saying that A tells us at least as much about the past as B, or in
other words, that A is at least as informative about the past as B.
We end this section by proving the following lemma, which we need in the proof of
provenance correctness.
Lemma 5.7. t j= A and A does not contain negation implies that ;t j= A.
Proof. We assume that t j= A holds. We then proceed by induction on the last rule used
in the derivation of this latter. In the case when this latter was derived using the rule for
T, ;t j= A holds vacuously. In the case for the sometime modality, we have that A has
the form 0A0, t = t0;0;t00 and t00 j= A0. We ﬁnd that two cases arise from this: the
ﬁrst is when  = 0 and the second is when  , 0. If  = 0, then by applying the rule
for sometime we get t0;0;t00 j= A0, which follows from the induction hypothesis and the
assumption t00 j= A0. If  , 0, then by applying the rule for sometime, we ﬁnd that  is
simplydiscardedwiththe otherirrelevantparts oft (thatis t0) andwe are leftwitht00 j= A0
which holds by assumption. The other cases are straightforward and may be shown to
hold by simple application of the induction hypothesis. The condition that A does not
contain negation means that no subterm of A (including A itself) should be of the form
:B and is important as the statement of the lemma would not hold in the presence of
negation. To see this, consider as a counter example the statement  j= :(T) which
is true since  6j= T. However, the statement  j= :(T) is false since  j= T
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5.3 Correctness of provenance
5.3.1 Denotation of provenance
We interpret the provenance  in an annotated value p: as a set of assertions about the
past of p. These assertions tell us about events that took place in the system and that
are relevant to the value p. For example, consider the annotated value p : a? ; b!0 ; 00,
its provenance tells us that (1) p was most recently received by a on a channel whose
provenance was , (2) before that, it was sent by b on a channel with provenance 0,
(3) and before that, it had provenance 00, (4)  and 0 in turn tell us about the past of the
two channels used by a and b, while 00 tells us about the past of p before it was sent
by b . It is important here to note that the provenance of p does not reveal the identities
of the channels used for communication, nor does it tell us about the ordering between
events in  and those in b!0 ; 00 or between events in 0 and those in 00.
Assertions such as those above may be encoded as formulae in the logic of Section
5.2. This is deﬁned by the function ~  : V !  which maps annotated values to
logical formulae. In the deﬁnition of the function ~ , we use a dierent grammar for
provenance sequences than the one we originally gave in Figure 3.5. This is only done in
order to simplify the deﬁnition of the denotation function. It is easy to check, however,
that for our purposes the two grammars may be considered equivalent.
Deﬁnition 5.8 (Denotation of provenance). The function ~  : V !  is deﬁned
inductively on the structure of provenance sequences as shown in Figure 5.5.
Figure 5.5. Denotation of provenance sequences
~p :  , T
~p : a! ; 0 , 9x:a:snd(x; p)(~x :  ^ ~p : 0)
~p : a? ; 0 , 9x:a:rcv(x; p)(~x :  ^ ~p : 0)
The empty provenance sequence  in the annotated value p :  tells us nothing about
the past of p, and hence ~p :  is taken to be the constant T. The annotated values
p : a! ; 0 and p : a? ; 0 denote that p was sent (respectively received) sometime ago
on some unknown channel x, and that the behaviour of the system up to that point may
be described by ~x: and ~p:0. The conjunction here means that both formulae were
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described by ~p :  and ~x : 0 is unknown as is the fact of whether these actions are
distinct or not. What we mean by this last statement is that the unknown channel name
x may well be a copy of p itself, in which case the two will probably share part of their
past, and hence, the actions they describe would not be distinct. However, provenance
alone does not tell us whether this is the case or not, and hence the same is reﬂected in
logical formulae.
5.3.2 Monitored systems
In order to be able to assess the correctness of provenance, we introduce the notion of
monitored systems. A monitored system is one where every action that takes place is
recorded in a global log. The global log provides a repository where every action is
logged and whose content is not accessible to principals and therefore can be more easily
judged to be correct. Monitored systems are only meant to serve as a proof tool. They
are aimed to help us prove the correctness of the distributed provenance tracking found
in annotated values by relating it to a centralised global log. This global log is shared
by the entire distributed system and takes the form of an ordered sequence of actions.
This assumes that every two actions that take place within the system can be temporally
ordered and therefore resembles an interleaving model of concurrency with a global
clock. It should be noted however that this assumption does not aect the validity of
the results proved in this section. They are assumptions on the proof tool and not on the
actual calculus or any implementation of it. Proposition 5.10 shows that the semantics
of monitored systems is faithful to that of the original calculus which ensures that any
results we prove for monitored systems are indeed applicable to the original calculus.
Intuitively, our chain of reasoning here can be understood as follows. We aim to prove
that the provenance of every value in a system is correct. The provenance of each value
can be seen as recording part of the history of the system. Therefore, the history of
an annotated system as a whole is split between the dierent values it contains. Let us
assume that there is a global log which records the history of the system in its entirety.
Note that we do not need to worry that this assumption might be unfeasible in practice
or wholly unrealistic. The reason is that we are only interested in using it as an aid in the
proofs and therefore we only need to guarantee that it is faithful to the original semantics
of the calculus. Now, assuming the existence of the global log, the provenance of a value
is correct if what it tells us about the past of the system is corroborated by the global log.
In other words, the provenance of a value is correct if its logical denotation according to
the deﬁnitions of the previous section is true with respect to the log.
We use M;N;::: to range over monitored systems and give their formal syntax below.100 Chapter 5 Semantics of Provenance
Figure 5.6. Monitored systems: syntax
M;N ::= monitored systems
t . S system S with global log t
(n)M restriction
M j S parallel composition
The term t . S denotes the monitored system composed of global log t and system S.
Restriction (n)M and parallel composition M j S are needed to allow the global log
to behave like other parts of the system with respect to scope extrusion and intrusion,
giving it access to restricted or private channel names. More speciﬁcally, the form (n)M
allows channel scopes to be extruded or extended to include the log whenever required,
while the form M j S is needed to allow channels whose scope includes the log but not
some part of the system S. Note that, as expected, the above syntax permits exactly one
global log per monitored system, allowing the log to be a record of everything that takes
place within the system. We also deﬁne versions of structural congruence and reduction
for monitored systems and denote them by m and !m respectively. These are given in
ﬁgures 5.7 and 5.8 respectively.
Figure 5.7. Monitored systems: structural congruence
(MStr Alpha) M  M0 ) M m M0
(MStr Log) S a T ) t . S m t . T
(MStr Assoc) (t . S) j S 0 m t . (S j S 0)
(MStr Res Res) (n)(m)M m (m)(n)M
(MStr Res Par1) (n)M j S m (n)(M j S) if x < fn(S)
(MStr Res Par2) M j (n)S m (n)(M j S) if x < fn(M)
Figure 5.8. Monitored systems: reduction
MRed Snd
t . a[m:m hp:pi] !m a:snd(m; p);t . mhhp : a!m ; pii
MRed Rcv
j 2 I p j= j
t . a[i2Im:m (i as x):Pi] j mhhp : pii !m a:rcv(m; p);t . a[Pjfp:a?m;p=xg]Chapter 5 Semantics of Provenance 101
MRed Ift
t . a[if m:km = m:k0
m then P else Q ] !m a:ift(m;m);t . a[P]
MRed If f
m , n






M j S !m M0 j S
MRed Str
M m N N !m N0 N0 m M0
M !m M0
To help us in proving the correspondence between the semantics of monitored systems
and the original provenance tracking semantics of the calculus, we deﬁne the log erasure
function j j. The log erasure function takes a monitored system and removes its global
log, returning just the system part of it.
Deﬁnition 5.9 (Log erasure function). The function j j is deﬁned inductively on the
structure of monitored systems as follows:
jt . Sj , S j(n)Mj , (n)jMj jM j Sj , jMj j S
It should be clear from the deﬁnition of !m that the original provenance tracking seman-
tics of systems is preserved. Indeed, the only dierence between the reduction relation
of monitored systems !m and that of annotated systems !a is the addition of the global
log in the case of monitored systems. Every transition from a monitored system M to a
monitored system M0 using the relation !m has a corresponding one from the system
jMj to the system jM0j using the relation !a. Note that jMj and jM0j represent the results
of removing the global logs from systems M and M0 respectively. This implies that the
semantics of monitored systems does not add any extra behaviours to systems. Similarly,
it does not remove any behaviours from systems. That is, every transition from a system
jMj to a system jM0j using the relation !a has a corresponding one from system M to sys-
tem M0 using the relation !m. This is formalised and proved in Proposition 5.10. This
proposition is very important as it guarantees that any results we prove for monitored
systems are indeed applicable to the original calculus.
Proposition 5.10. M !m M0 implies that jMj !a jM0j. Vice versa, jMj !a S implies
that M !m M0 for some M0 such that jM0j = S.102 Chapter 5 Semantics of Provenance
Proof. The proof for this is by simple rule induction. We assume that M !m M0 and
prove that jMj !a jM0j follows from it. In each case, there is a corresponding rule to use
to derive !a transitions by simply dropping the logs. The other direction follows in a
similar manner where the transitions of the relation !m lead to monitored systems that
are the same as those found in the relation !a but with the addition of a log. Erasing
this shows that the systems obtained are indeed the same. 
5.3.3 Correctness
Now we lookatthe correctness property ofprovenance tracking. A provenance sequence
 in an annotated value p :  is considered correct if what it tells us about the past of p
agrees with what actually took place. This is deﬁned relative to the global log which
is assumed to be a correct and complete record of the past of a system. If every value
in a system has correct provenance, then we say that the system as a whole has correct
provenance. Theorem 5.13 states that provenance correctness is preserved by the reduc-
tion relation. That is, starting from a system with correct provenance, we are guaranteed
to get a system with correct provenance after reduction. Deﬁnition 5.11 makes use of
two auxiliary functions: log( ), which returns the global log of a monitored system, and
values( ), which returns the set of annotated values of a monitored system. The deﬁ-
nition of log( ), by induction on the structure of monitored systems, is straightforward
and simply returns the single term of a monitored system that has the form t. This is
mostly the case for values( ) too and hence, we only discuss the most interesting cases
below. Note that in the rest of this section, we use the meta variables V;U to range over
the set of plain values extended with the symbol ?. The special symbol ? is used to
denote a restricted channel name that is not known to the global log. The set of values
in a monitored system is deﬁned to be that in its system part (i.e. we ignore the global
log and top level restrictions). This is expressed by the following three rules:
values(t . S) , values(S) values((n)M) , values(M)
values(M j S) , values(M) [ values(S)
For systems, we proceed simply by gathering annotated values, that is subterms of the
form v:, and substituting ? for any restricted channel names. So, for example, we have
that:
values(a[P]) , values(P) values(mhhv : ii) , fv : g
values(S j S
0) , values(S) [ values(S
0) values((n)S) , values(S)f
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Note that restriction here is treated dierently from that at the top level of monitored
systems. The rationale behind this discrepancy is that restricted names at the top level
are known to the global log whereas those occurring here are not. The substitution is
done to avoid any clashes with names appearing in the log and is inspired by Lhoussaine
and Sassone [45]. Deﬁnition of values(P) for processes P is similar. The complete
deﬁnitions of log( ) and values( ) are given below.
Figure 5.9. Deﬁnition of log( ) and values( )
Definition of log( ).
log(t . S) = t log((n)M) = log(M) log(M j S) = log(M)
Definition of values( ).
values(t . S) = values(S) values(M j S) = values(M) [ values(S)
values((n)M) = values(M)
values(a[P]) = values(P) values(mhhwii) = values(w)
values((n)S) = values(S)f?=mg values(S j S 0) = values(S) [ values(S 0)
values(whw0i) = values(w) [ values(w0) values(P) = values(P)
values((n)P) = values(P)f?=mg values(P j P0) = values(P) [ values(P0)
values(i2Iw(x;i):Pi) =
S
i2I values(Pi) [ values(w)
values(if w = w0 then P else Q ) = values(w) [ values(w0) [ values(P) [ values(Q)
values(v : ) = fv : g values(x) = ;
Deﬁnition 5.11. A monitored system M has correct provenance if for all V :  in
values(M), we have that log(M) j= ~V : .
Lemma 5.12. M has correct provenance and M m M0 implies that M0 has correct
provenance.
Proof. We assume that M has correct provenance and that M m M0. To prove that M0
has correct provenance, we proceed by induction on the derivation of M m M0. The
details of the proof are straightforward but tedious and are hence omitted. 
Theorem 5.13. (Provenance correctness). M has correct provenance and M !m M0
implies that M0 has correct provenance.
Proof. We assume that M has correct provenance and that M !m M0. We show that M0
has correct provenance by induction on the derivation of M !m M0. Below, we illustrate104 Chapter 5 Semantics of Provenance
the cases when this latter was derived using the rules MRed Snd, MRed Rcv and
MRed Res. Other cases proceed in a similar manner.
Case MRed Snd. This means that M was of the form t . a[m:m hp:pi] and M0 was of
the form a:snd(m; p);t . mhhp:a!m;pii. Since M has correct provenance, then we know
that t j= ~m : m and t j= ~p : p. To prove that M0 has correct provenance, we need to
show that a:snd(m; p);t j= ~p : a!m ; p, that is we need to show that a:snd(m; p);t j=
9x:a:snd(x; p)(~p:p^~x:m). Fromthislatterandbyapplicationoftherules LSat
Exists (substituting m for x) and LSat Sometime, we get t j= ~p:p^~m:m. This
then is concluded to hold by using the rule LSat And and the assumptions t j= ~m:m
and t j= ~p : p. Hence, M0 has correct provenance.
Case MRed Rcv. This means that M was of the form t . a[i2Im:m (i as x):Pi] j mhhp:
pii and M0 was of the form a:rcv(m; p);t . a[Pjfp:a?m;p=xg]. Since M has correct
provenance, then we know that t j= ~m:m, t j= ~p:p and for all V: in values(Pi) (for
all i 2 I), t j= ~V :. To prove that M0 has correct provenance, we need to show that for
all V: in values(Pjfp:a?m;p=xg), it is the case that a:rcv(m; p);t j= ~V: holds. It can be
shown that values(Pjfp:a?m;p=xg) = values(Pj) if x < fv(Pj) and values(Pjfp:a?m;p=xg) =
values(Pj) [ fp : a?m ; pg if x 2 fv(Pj). We know that for all V :  in values(Pj),
t j= ~V :  holds, and hence by application of Lemma 5.7, we are able to infer that
a:rcv(m; p);t j= ~V : holds too. This means that the ﬁrst case (i.e., when x < fv(Pj)) is
satisﬁed. For the second case, we still need to show that a:rcv(m; p);t j= ~p : a?m ; p.
This latter simpliﬁes to a:rcv(m; p);t j= 9x:a:rcv(x; p)(~p : p ^ ~x : m). Using the
rules LSat Exists and LSat Sometime, we get t j= ~p : p ^ ~m : m. This latter
then follows from the assumptions t j= ~m : m and t j= ~p : p by application of the
rule LSat And. Hence, M0 has correct provenance.
Case MRed Res. This means that M !m M0 was derived as follows:
N !m N0
(n)N !m (n)N0
where M is of the form (n)N and M0 is of the form (n)N0. Since (n)N has correct
provenance, then so does N (this follows from the fact that values((n)N) = values(N)
and log((n)N) = log(N)). This implies, by the induction hypothesis, that N0 has correct
provenance. From this latter, it follows that (n)N0 has correct provenance. Hence, M0
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5.4 Concluding remarks
In this chapter, we looked at the semantics of provenance. We started by observing
that not all terms admitted by the grammar of provenance sequences are semantically
meaningful. The intuition behind this was quite simple; a provenance sequence is seman-
tically meaningful only if it could arise from a valid sequence of transitions according
to the semantics of the calculus. We formalised this in the deﬁnition of well-formed
provenance sequences and gave a sound and complete syntactic characterisation of them.
We noted that well-formedness is a weak property however. The only guarantee it gives
us is that the provenance could arise in a valid sequence of transitions. However, it is
entirely possible that this sequence of transitions, while valid, is only hypothetical. That
is, it never actually took place. This led us to deﬁne a stronger properly, correctness.
In order to deﬁne correctness, we introduced a temporal logic with a past modality that
enabled us to make statements about the past behaviour of systems. With this logic,
we were able to give a denotational semantics of provenance sequences in the form of
formulaeinthelogic. Theformaldeﬁnitionofcorrectnessthenwassimple; aprovenance
sequence is correct if its denotation, that is the logical statement it makes about the past
behaviour of the system, is true. To capture the past behaviour of systems in a simple
form, we deﬁned monitored systems. These are systems that are augmented with a
global log of all past system behaviour. The truth or falsehood of what provenance tells
us about the past is deﬁned with respect to this global log. Finally, we proved that the
provenance tracking reduction relation of the calculus always preserves the correctness
of provenance.Chapter 6
Provenance as Types
The calculus we deﬁned and explored in the previous chapters relies on run time prove-
nance tracking and checking. That is, updating the provenance annotations of values and
verifying them against the provenance policies of principals are both done dynamically
as the system evolves. This results in performance overhead at run time and motivates
the need for a static approach to provenance tracking and checking. Such an approach
would consist of analysing systems at compile time and conservatively approximating
the provenance of their values in order to guarantee that no provenance policies would
ever be violated at run time. For systems that pass the static analysis, this would mean
that dynamic provenance tracking and checking become redundant and therefore they
may be dropped. It is the aim of this chapter to propose and study such a static analysis.
To illustrate how the proposed static analysis works, consider the system S deﬁned
below:
S , a[mhpi j nhqi] j b[m(a!Any as x):nhxi] j c[n(Any ; a!Any as x):P]
Note that this system is an annotated one; we are simply using our convention of drop-
ping all  provenance sequences from values. The aim of the static analysis is to avoid
the need to:
 annotate values with provenance sequences,
 update these annotations every time the system makes a computational step, and
 check the provenance policies of principals against these annotations before data
can be consumed.
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To achieve these aims, the static analysis we propose considers all the policies in the
system that need to be satisﬁed, which in the case of the system above would be the
two patterns a!Any and Any ; a!Any imposed on channels m and n respectively. For
this system to pass the static analysis, these two patterns would have to be satisﬁed
in every run of the system. Naturally, this could be achieved by simply enumerating
all the possible runs of the system above and verifying that indeed, the two patterns
would be satisﬁed in every run. For a system as simple as the one above, this is actually
not very dicult. However, such a naive approach would quickly become intractable
as the system gets larger and more complex. The static analysis we propose in this
chapter on the other hand aims to be much more ecient. It proceeds by treating the
two aforementioned patterns as channel constraints that all values sent on those channels
need to satisfy. This means that all values sent on channel m need to satisfy the pattern
a!Any while all values sent on channel n need to satisfy the pattern Any ; a!Any. For
channel m, there is only one output we need to consider which is mhpi at a. This output
would result in value p with provenance a!, and since this satisﬁes the pattern a!Any,
we can conclude that the constraint of channel m is satisﬁed. For channel n, we have
two outputs, nhqi at a and nhxi at b. We can use similar reasoning to that of channel m
to deduce that nhqi would satisfy the constraint Any ; a!Any on channel n. The same is
not possible with nhxi however as we need to know the provenance of variable x ﬁrst.
This depends on what value principal b ends up receiving on channel m and substituting
for variable x, and in general we would not have that information at compile time. What
we have instead is the knowledge that whatever value b receives, its provenance has to
satisfy the constraint a!Any that b is imposing on channel m. Therefore, we can safely
use a!Any as an approximation of the provenance of variable x (or more correctly, of
the value that would ultimately be substituted for variable x). We can show that any
provenance sequence that satisﬁes a!Any must also satisfy Any ; a!Any. Therefore, we
can conclude that all values sent on n satisfy the constraint imposed on it. With this,
we can declare that system S passes the static analysis and hence, there is no need
to perform the provenance checks at run time, or for that matter, to keep track of the
provenance of values. It is important here to note the distinction between the actual
provenance of data and the annotations associated with it. In the calculus studied so far,
the provenance annotations are meant as a concrete record of the provenance of data, and
hence the policies of principals could be veriﬁed against these annotations. With static
analysis, there is no need anymore to keep and update these provenance annotations as
the provenance policies are veriﬁed in a dierent way. In other words, with run time
provenance tracking and checking, the provenance of data is explicitly represented by
the provenance annotations of values; while when using the static analysis, no such
explicit representation is needed and provenance is kept implicit.Chapter 6 Provenance as Types 109
The structure of this chapter is as follows. Section 6.1 gives an overview of the static
analysis with the aim of making it easier to navigate the following sections. In particular,
it provides a summary of the three stages in which we introduce the static analysis. The
ﬁrst stage, which is covered in Section 6.2, starts with a restricted version of the calculus
without the choice operator and proceeds to eliminate provenance checking from the
calculus. However, at this stage, we keep the tracking of provenance in order to allow us
to carryoutthe necessaryproofs. We prove thatthe staticanalysis we propose guarantees
that even without provenance checking, systems that pass the analysis never violate the
provenance policies of their principals at run time. In Section 6.3, we look at the second
stage where provenance tracking too is eliminated from the restricted calculus, and this
without impacting the results of the ﬁrst stage. Finally, the third stage is to adapt the
static analysis to the full calculus; we look at this in Section 6.4. Section 6.5 concludes
the chapter.
6.1 Overview
The static analysis we propose in this chapter takes the form of a type and eect system.
We treat the provenance annotations of values as types and the provenance checks in
inputs as run time type checks. Provenance as types provides for a very interesting
topic of study in its own right since it corresponds to dynamic, behavioural types as
we will see later in the chapter. For instance, consider principal b from the example
above which when written without dropping the  provenance annotations would be
b[m: (a!Any as x):n: hxi]. In our type system, values m and n would both have the
type  while the variable x would be assigned the type a!Any. The type system then
proceeds to approximate how these types would evolve in dierent runs of the system.
The approximated types (or provenance) of output values on a particular channel are
then veriﬁed against the patterns associated with inputs on that channel. If all of these
pass the veriﬁcation, then the system is declared well-typed. A system that is well-typed
with respect to the type and eect system of this chapter is guaranteed to always respect
the provenance policies of principals.
Dealing with input-guarded choice would overcomplicate the type system. The reason
is that from a typing point of view, the variable x in the process i2Im:m (i as x):Pi
has the union type
S
i2I i. This in itself is not dicult to handle in the type system.
However, the semantics of input-guarded choice in the current version of the calculus
dictates that each i should trigger the corresponding continuation Pi. This would not
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the next two sections on the subset of the calculus where the guarded choice construct,
i2Im:m (i as x):Pi, is restricted to empty and singleton indexing sets I. Alternatively,
this may be viewed as simply replacing i2Im:m (i as x):Pi with nil 0 and input preﬁx
m:m ( as x):P, and for simplicity, we shall use these latter as notation and drop the
choice operator and the subscripts for the remainder of this chapter. This means that for
the purposes of the next two sections, we should consider the rule ARed Rcv to be
deﬁned as:
p j= 
a[m:m ( as x):P] j mhhp : pii !a a[Pfp:a?km;p=xg]
(6.1)
Nevertheless, in Section 6.4, we shall discuss ways in which the type system could be
extended to the full calculus.
The aim of the type system is to eliminate both dynamic provenance tracking and check-
ing. What is meant by this is that, with the guarantees oered by the type system, the
main rules of the calculus, i.e., the rules for input and output could be replaced with the
following:
a[mhpi] !a mhhpii a[m( as x):P] j mhhpii !a a[Pfp=xg]
(6.2)
These two rules look almost the same as their counterparts in the plain calculus. They
only dier in that the input construct still has the pattern . However, this latter does
not have any impact on the dynamic semantics of the rule itself. The provenance policy
expressed by this pattern would instead be veriﬁed statically by the type system. Getting
rid of both provenance tracking and checking at the same time makes the proofs of type
preservation more complicated however. For this reason, we do this in two steps. Firstly,
we get rid of provenance checking. This means that we ﬁrst drop the premise p j= 
from the receive rule, replacing the deﬁnition:
p j= 
a[m:m ( as x):P] j mhhp : pii !a a[Pfp:a?km;p=xg]
(6.3)
with
a[m:m ( as x):P] j mhhp : pii !a a[Pfp:a?km;p=xg]
(6.4)
We prove that, in well-typed systems, principals are still guaranteed to only consume
data with the right provenance. After that, we prove that without provenance checking,
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replace the input and output rules:
a[m:m hp:pi] !a mhhp:a!m ; pii
a[m:m ( as x):P] j mhhp:pii !a a[Pfp:a?m;p=xg]
(6.5)
with:
a[m:m hp:pi] !a mhhp:pii
a[m:m ( as x):P] j mhhp : pii !a a[Pfp:p=xg]
(6.6)
Note the dierence between the two sets of rules. The ﬁrst two rules lack provenance
checking in the input rule but do perform provenance tracking as before. On the other
hand, the second two do not perform provenance tracking. Instead, the provenance anno-
tations of values remain the same after the transitions. Since we assume that all systems
start in an initial state, i.e., without any provenance, we would expect the provenance
sequences in these two rules to be simply . Dropping these as per our convention gives
us the rules of 6.2.
6.2 Eliminating provenance checking
Forthe purposes ofthis section, we introduce a statically typedversion ofthe provenance
tracking reduction relation, which we denote by !s. The relation !s does not include
dynamic provenance checks as it is meant to rely on static type checking. As a result,
the deﬁnition of !s only diers from that of !a in the rule for input, which is given as
follows:
a[m:m ( as x):P] j mhhp : pii !s a[Pfp:a?m;p=xg]
As can be seen from the rule above, the only dierence with respect to the rule ARed
Rcv is the omission of the premise p j= . The static analysis ensures that in well-typed
systems, principals always receive data with provenance that meets their requirements,
and hence the dynamic check is not required. The other rules of !s are the same as
those of the relation !a, and we use the convention of naming them similarly but with
the initial “A” replaced with an “S”. So for example, the statically checked counterparts
of the rules ARed Snd, ARed Rcv and ARed Par are SRed Snd, SRed Rcv and
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6.2.1 A type and eect system for provenance
The idea behind the type and eect system proposed in this chapter is to view each
channel name as having a set of constraints, speciﬁed by the consumers of data on that
channel, and required of producers of data on the channel. The constraints of a channel
relatetotheprovenanceofdatathatitmaysafelycarry. Everyuseofthechannelforinput
imposes a new constraint; the pattern that the principal speciﬁes for data it considers
to have acceptable provenance. Every use of the channel for output produces data that
is required to satisfy the constraints of the channel; the provenance of this data must
satisfy every pattern in the channel’s set of constraints. More speciﬁcally, every process
of the form w( as x):P is viewed as imposing a constraint. This constraint consists of
the pattern  which the provenance of every value that may be received by this process
needs to satisfy. In the original rule for input, the premise p j=  represents a check that
is performed at run time to ensure the provenance of the value satisﬁes the pattern. The
value is only consumed if this check passes. Values whose provenance does not meet
any of the constraints of the channel would never be consumed by any principal. Hence,
their existence in the system would not pose any issues with respect to the provenance
policies of principals. Contrast this with what the type and eect system does. Since
the run time provenance check is not present in the calculus anymore, the type system
needs to ensure that the provenance of every value that could potentially be sent on a
particular channel satisﬁes all the constraints of the channel. The provenance of data
is not constant however; it changes as the system evolves. The type system attempts to
predict how the provenance would change at run time in order to ensure that constraints
are satisﬁed against the up-to-date provenance. Naturally, this prediction is only an
approximation of the actual provenance that the data would have at run time. To ensure
safety, this approximation is conservative, opting to reject possibly safe systems rather
than risk admitting unsafe ones.
6.2.1.1 Types and pattern satisfaction
Types. The type system treats provenance sequences, patterns, as well as any combi-
nation of these two as types. The provenance sequence p in the annotated value p : p
is considered as the type of value p. The pattern  in the input construct w( as x):P is
consideredas the type of variable x. Combinations ofprovenance sequences andpatterns
are needed to approximate how the provenance of values is likely to evolve at run time.
For instance, consider the principal a[m:m ( as x):n:n hxi], which listens on channel
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onto channel n. Assuming that a is able to ﬁnd a value that satisﬁes the pattern , say
p:p, then we would expect this value to be substituted for x and sent on channel n. This
sequence of transitions would result in the message nhhp : a!n ; a?m ; pii. However,
principal a could also receive a dierent value with a dierent provenance sequence. In
fact, it could receive any value with any provenance as long as this latter satisﬁes the
pattern . We would not in general know what value is received by a or what provenance
it has until run time. All we know at compile time is that the provenance of this value
must satisfy . Therefore, we can conclude that the value that is going to be substituted
for variable x at run time will have provenance that looks like p : a!n ; a?m ; . Note
the pattern  at the end of this provenance. The type and eect system uses types such
as a!n ; a?m ;  to approximate the provenance of variables at run time.
We use T to denote the set of types and use t;t0;::: to range over its elements. The
syntax of types is given in Figure 6.1. It is easy to check that this syntax includes both
provenance sequences and patterns as subsets, and that it is sucient to account for the
approximation of any run time provenance such as the one from the previous example.
Figure 6.1. Syntax of types




t ; t0 concatenation
 pattern
Satisfaction. Consider again the example system a[m:m ( as x):n:n hxi]. In our
previous discussion, we said that the type system would assign the type a!n ;a?m ; to
variable x afterthe outputaction. Forthis example to be well-typed, the type a!n;a?m;
needs to satisfy all the constraints of channel n. If we take the system in isolation, then
there are no input actions involving channel n and therefore no constraints on it. Hence,
the example is trivially well-typed. However, what if we were to compose this system
in parallel with another one, say b[n: (0 as y):P] for instance. This would mean that
n would now have the constraint 0 and therefore a!n ; a?m ;  would be required to
satisfy it. Satisfaction of patterns has only been deﬁned with respect to provenance
sequences though, and therefore, we have to deﬁne what it means for a type to satisfy
a pattern. This will depend on the speciﬁcs of the pattern language used in the calculus.
For the purposes of this chapter, we assume that the pattern language is equipped with a114 Chapter 6 Provenance as Types
satisfaction relation that is deﬁned forboth provenance sequences and types. Technically,
the satisfaction relation need only be deﬁned for types since these include provenance
sequences as a subset. Deﬁnition 6.1 gives the new speciﬁcation of pattern languages.
Deﬁnition 6.1. A pattern matching language is a pair (;j=) where  is a set of patterns,
ranged over by ;0;:::, and j=  T  is the pattern satisfaction (or matching) relation,
a relation between provenance types and patterns.
In addition to single pattern satisfaction t j= , the type system also makes use of a
generalised notion of satisfaction of the form t j= f1;:::;ng. This is deﬁned below and
can be simply taken as syntactic sugar for
V
i21::n t j= i.
Deﬁnition 6.2. We say that a type t satisﬁes patterns 1;:::;n, written t j= f1;:::;ng,
when it is the case that t j= i for all i 2 1::n.
Subtyping. We assume the existence of a subtyping relation  between types. In
particular, we assume that  satisﬁes two properties:
 Subsumption: if t  t0 and t0 j=  then t j= .
 Compositionality: if t  t0 then:
– a!t  a!t0 for all principal names a.
– a?t  a?t0 for all principal names a.
– t ; t00  t0 ; t00 for all types t00.
Subtyping will be useful when formulating the Substitution Lemma as it allows us to
substitute a value of type t with another of type t0 as long as t0 is a subtype of t, all the
while ensuring that the satisfaction of any constraints remains intact.
6.2.1.2 Type and constraint environments
Type environments. A type system needs to be compositional. That is, it needs to
allow us to type check the dierent parts of a given system separately and then put
them together, obtaining a type derivation for the entire system. To accomplish this,
type systems introduce techniques for representing the interfaces of systems that are
relevant for type checking. That way, when composing multiple systems together, onlyChapter 6 Provenance as Types 115
their interfaces need to be checked to decide whether the compound system is well-
typed or not. Put another way, a type system would use an abstraction of the context
in which a system is to be run in order to type check it. If the system passes the type
checking, then it may be safely plugged into any environment that is consistent with the
interface provided by the abstraction. The simplest kind of these interfaces is probably
the one given by type environments, functions that map free variables to types. Type
environments allow us to determine the acceptable types that may be assigned to the free
variables of a system and still retain its well-typedness.
We use the letters ,  , ...to range over type environments. We denote the assignment
of type t to variable x by the standard notation x :t, and use ;  for the domain disjoint
union of type environments  and  . If x is in the domain of type environment , then
we use (x) to denote the type assigned to it. That is, (x) = t when it is the case that
x : t 2 . It is worth noting here that there is no need for type environments to keep
track of the types of free names. The reason is that free names, like all other values,
are annotated with their provenance. The syntax of type environments is summarised in
Figure 6.2.
Figure 6.2. Syntax of type environments
  ::= typing environments
? empty environment
x :  type assignment
 ;   concatenation
For the purposes of type checking, we extend the annotation extraction function jj jj of
Deﬁnition 4.4 to variables. This is done by deﬁning the function jj jj with respect to
an environment  . We denote the generalised function by jj jj  and give its deﬁnition
below.
Deﬁnition 6.3 (Extended annotation extraction function). The annotation extraction
function is extended to variables as follows:
kp : k  ,  kxk  =  (x)
Constraint environments. In addition to type environments, the type and eect sys-
tem we propose also introduces the notion of constraint environments. As its name
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and therefore is meant to account for all the input patterns of the context. If a system
is well-typed with respect to a particular constraint environment, then it is guaranteed
to only produce data with provenance that satisﬁes the constraints speciﬁed by the con-
straint environment. Therefore, we may safely plug it into any context that is consistent
with this constraint environment, certain that it would never violate the provenance
policies of principals in this context.
We need a way for constraint environments to refer to the bound names and bound
variables of systems from outside their scope; we do this by using the notion of abstract
names and abstract variables [45]. Abstract names and abstract variables can be thought
of simply as references to bound names and bound variables that should be kept globally
unique, in order to make it easier for the type system to compose multiple subsystems
together when type checking. They are purely a technical tool used for the purposes of
the type system. We use m, n, ...to range over abstract names, and x, y, ...to range over
abstract variables. We let the meta-variables V, U, ...range over plain values, variables,
abstract names and abstract variables. Constraint environments contain the constraints
that principals impose on channels. These as we explained are the patterns that specify
what provenance is considered acceptable for those channels, and are represented in
constraint environments by mappings of the form V :c(). This latter denotes that V has
the constraint , i.e., channel V is required to input data with provenance that matches
the pattern . As the calculus allows principals to bind channels to variables at run time,
constraint environments also need a way to keep track of such bindings. We do this
by adding two more types of mappings to constraint environments. The ﬁrst, denoted
by VhV0i and referred to as an output link, means that V0 may be sent on V; while the
second, denoted by V(V0) and referred to as an input link, means that V0 may be received
on V. To understand why these two types of mappings are needed, consider the example
system S deﬁned as follows:
S , a[mhni j nhpi] j b[m(a!Any as x):x(Any ; c!Any as y)]
To decide whether S is well-typed or not, we start by extracting all the constraints that it
contains to buildits constraintenvironment. System S contains two inputs, leading to the
two constraints m:c(a!Any) and x:c(Any;c!Any). For the ﬁrst constraint, m:c(a!Any),
we look for all the outputs on channel m and we ﬁnd only one, mhni at principal a. This
would lead to message mhhn : a!ii, and checking the provenance of its value we ﬁnd
that it satisﬁes the pattern a!Any. Since there are no more outputs on channel m, we
can conclude that its constraints are satisﬁed. Now we move on to the second constraint
x : c(Any ; c!Any). We ﬁnd that this constraint involves the variable x and so in order to
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if any, may be substituted for variable x. To be able to do that, we have to analyse the
communication structure of the system. The results of this analysis are represented in
constraint environments by output and input links. The output and input links are derived
as follows. Working backwards from the input x(Any ; c!Any as y), we ﬁnd that x is
bound to the value received on channel m by the input m(a!Any as x). This fact is
represented by the input link m(x). Now we consider what values may be received on m,
which we do by looking at all the outputs on channel m. We ﬁnd one such output, mhni
at principal a, giving rise to the output link mhni. Together, the two links mhni and m(x)
tell us that variable x may be substituted with channel name n at run time. This means
that any output on channel n would have to satisfy the constraints of variable x. The only
output on channel n is nhpi found at principal a. This output if executed would lead to
the message nhhp : a!ii, which means the provenance sequence a! has to satisfy the
pattern Any ; c!Any. Since this is not the case, we have to conclude that the constraint
x : c(Any ; c!Any) is not satisﬁed, and hence, the system above is not well-typed.
We use the letters , , ...to range over constraint environments. We denote by ? the
empty constraint environment and by  ;  the union of constraint environments  and
. Note that  and  are not required to be domain disjoint as the same channel name
may have multiple constraints for example. We have already seen the three types of
mappings that a constraint environment may contain; channel constraint V : c(), output
link VhVi, and input link V(V). The syntax of constraint environments is summarised in
Figure 6.3.
Figure 6.3. Syntax of constraint environments
 ::= constraint environments
? empty environment
C constraint
 ;  concatenation
C ::= constraint
V : c() channel constraint
VhVi output link
V(V) input link
As we have already seen, abstract values are simply the union of abstract names and
abstract variables. They are used by constraint environments to refer to the bound names
and bound variables of a system. For example, the system (n)(a[nhpi]) would be
assigned the constraint environment nhpi where n is an abstract name that refers to
the bound name n in the system and is used to distinguish it from any other bound or
free name. We use av() to denote the set of abstract values present in the constraint
environment  and give its formal deﬁnition below.118 Chapter 6 Provenance as Types
Deﬁnition 6.4. Given a constraint environment , the set of abstract values occurring
in it is deﬁned as follows:
av(?) , ; av( ; ) , av() [ av()
av(V : ) , av(V) av(VhV
0i) , av(V) [ av(V
0) av(V(V
0)) , av(V) [ av(V
0)
av(n) , fng av(x) , fxg av(p) , ; av(x) , ;
Since abstract values are used to refer to bound names and bound variables, they induce
a notion of -equivalence in constraint environments. We denote this by c. For ex-
ample, the environment mhxi can be -converted to mhyi. We extend this to a structural
congruence relation by admitting changes to the position of constraint mappings within
a constraint environment. We use c to denote the structural congruence relation on con-
straint environments. Moreover, we also deﬁne the notion of sub-environment, written
vc, to act as a partial order between constraint environments. This will be useful later in
the proofs.
Deﬁnition 6.5. A constraint environment  is said to be a sub-environment of , written
 vc  if there exists an environment 0 such   0 and 0 c .
Typing contexts. The composition of a constraint environment and a type environ-
ment gives us a complete characterisation of the context in which a system is to be run
and allows us to type check it separately from its context. We refer to this composition
of a constraint environment and a type environment as a typing context. We denote by
  the typing context composed of constraint environment  and type environment  .
We also use ? as a shorthand for the empty typing context ?? composed of the empty
constraint environment and the empty type environment.
6.2.1.3 Aliases and constraints
Aliases. The previous example demonstrated the need for output and input links in
constraint environments. In the example, the links mhni and m(x) were used to represent
the fact that name n is sent on channel m by some principal, and then received by another
one to be substituted for variable x. This meant that any outputs on channel n needed
to satisfy the constraints of variable x. Although not shown in the example, links work
in the opposite direction as well. An output on some variable needs to satisfy the
constraints of all channels that may be substituted for the variable. To make it easier to
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are all the values that may end up being equivalent to it at run time, either a channel
name and all the variables that it may be substituted for, a variable and all the values that
may be substituted for it, or any values related by the transitive closure of the two. The
aliases of a value are deﬁned with respect to a particular constraint environment. We use
aliases(V) to denote the set of aliases of V with respect to constraint environment .
The formal deﬁnition of the function aliases( ) is given in Figure 6.4.
Figure 6.4. Deﬁnition of aliases(V)
TLink Forward
V00hVi 2  V00(V0) 2 
V0 2 aliases(V)
TLink Backward
V00hV0i 2  V00(V) 2 
V0 2 aliases(V)
TLink Closure
V0 2 aliases(V00) V00 2 aliases(V)
V0 2 aliases(V)
Constraints. An output on a particular channel is required to satisfy the patterns
associated with the channel itself as well as those associated with any of its aliases.
Therefore, for the purposes of accounting for the constraints of a value, we can consider
the set of aliases of a channel as forming an equivalence class. This is reﬂected in the
deﬁnition of the function constraints( ) given below, which includes the patterns that
are associated with the value explicitly as well as those associated with any of its aliases.
Deﬁnition 6.6 (Constraints of a channel). The set constraints(V) of constraints of a
channel V with respect to a constraint environment  is deﬁned as follows:
constraints(V) , f j V :  2 g [ constraints(V
0) for all V
0 2 aliases(V)
6.2.1.4 Typing rules
The type and eect system has two kinds of type judgements, a primary one for systems
and an auxiliary one for processes. These are given below:
   ` S . which may be read as “system S is well-typed with respect to typing
context     and gives rise to its own constraint environment ”.120 Chapter 6 Provenance as Types
     `a P .  which may be read as “process P is well-typed at principal a with
respect to typing context   and gives rise to its own constraint environment ”.
The typing context     provides an abstraction of the context for the purposes of
type checking. The type judgement     ` S .  tells us that system S respects all the
constraints imposed by the constraint environment . This means we can plug it into any
context consistent with  (and typing environment  ) and obtain a well-typed system.
So what does it mean for a system to be consistent with a constraint environment? The
simplest answerto this can be found in the typing judgement itself; a system is consistent
with the constraint environment it gives rise to. To see this in action, consider the rule for
type checking the parallel composition of two systems, which can be given as follows:
 ; 2    ` S 1 . 1  ; 1    ` S 2 . 2
    ` S 1 j S 2 . 1 ; 2
av(1) \ av(2) = ;
The rule shows that in order to be able to type check the parallel composition of S 1 and
S 2, we need to ﬁrst type check S 1 and S 2 separately. We can do this because the typing
context each of them is checked against accounts for the constraints raised by the other.
System S 1 is type checked against the constraint environment   2, representing the
compositionoftheconstraintenvironmentobtainedfromtheexternalcontextofS 1 jS 2
and the constraint environment 2 obtained from the system S 2. In turn, system S 2 is
type checked against the constraint environment   1, representing the composition
of the constraint environment  obtained from the external context of S 1 j S 2 and the
constraint environment 1 obtained from the system S 1. The side condition of the rule
just ensures that there is no conﬂict between the abstract values of the two constraint
environments 1 and 2. We will see later how the constraint environment of the system
itself is deﬁned from its structure. It is also worth noting that consistency allows for
systems that impose less constraints. That is, as expected, if we ﬁnd that a system is
well-typed with respect to a particular constraint environment , then we should be able
to plug it into any context that imposes the same or less constraints than those of the
constraint environment .
The typing judgements are deﬁned by the rules of Figure 6.5. There are two sets of
rules; one for systems which deﬁnes judgements of the form     ` S . , and one for
processes which deﬁnes judgements of the form     `a P . . In the following we
explain the rules in each set.Chapter 6 Provenance as Types 121
Figure 6.5. Typing rules
Typing rules for systems.
TSys Prin
    `a P . 
    ` a[P] . 
TSys Msg
kwk  j= constraints(m)
    ` mhhwii . mhjwji
TSys Res
    ` S . fn=ng
    ` (n)S . 
TSys Par
 ; 2    ` S 1 . 1  ; 1    ` S 2 . 2
    ` S 1 j S 2 . 1 ; 2
av(1) \ av(2) = ;
TSys Nil
    ` 0 . ?
Typing rules for processes.
TProc Out
a!kwk  ; kw0k  j= constraints(jwj)
    `a whw0i . jwjhjw0ji
TProc In
 ; jwj(x)    ; x : a?kwk  ;  `a P . fx=xg
    `a w( as x):P . jwj(x) ; jwj : c() ; 
TProc Par
 ; 2    `a P1 . 1  ; 1    `a P2 . 2
    `a P1 j P2 . 1 ; 2
av(1) \ av(2) = ;
TProc Res
    `a P . fn=ng
    `a (n)P . 
TProc Rep
    `a P . 
    `a P . 
TProc Nil
    `a 0 . ?
TProc Mat
    `a P1 . 1     `a P2 . 2
    `a if w1 = w2 then P1 else P2 . 1 ; 2
Type checking systems. The simplest rule in this set is that for the nil system given
by TSys Nil. This rule simply says that the nil system 0, having no behaviour, is well-
typed with respect to any typing context   and imposes no constraints of its own. The
rule TSys Prin is also quite simple; it states that the single principal a[P] is well typed
under typing context     if the process P is well-typed at principal a with respect to
the same typing context. The rules for type checking processes are explained in the next
paragraph. The rule for type checking messages is given by TSys Msg. Intuitively,
this says that in order for the message mhhwii to be well-typed, the provenance of value w
needs to satisfy any constraints imposed on channel m. This is what is expressed by the122 Chapter 6 Provenance as Types
premise of the rule kwk  j= constraints(m). The only constraint that the message mhhwii
gives rise to is the output link mhjwji. Note that j j is the annotation erasure function
deﬁned by Deﬁnition 4.3 in Chapter 4. The rule for restriction, TSys Res, states that
the restricted system (n)S is well-typed with respect to typing context     if the
system S is well-typed with respect to the same context. What is interesting about this
rule is the constraint environment that results from the system (n)S. Let  stand for this
constraint environment. We know that this constraint environment has to refer to any
channels involved in inputs or outputs in (n)S, including possibly the bound channel
n itself. To be able to refer to the channel name n, the constraint environment  has to
use the abstract name n. Therefore, the constraint environment of system S where the
name n appears free has to be fn=ng, the same as the constraint environment of (n)S
but with the name n substituted for all occurrences of the abstract name n. We have
already described the typing rule for parallel composition which is given by TSys Par.
Type checking processes. The type judgement for processes takes the form     `a
P . . The ﬁrst thing to note about this judgement when compared to that of systems
  ` S . is that processes are type checked with respect to a particular principal. This
means that a process P may be well-typed with respect to principal a but not with respect
to principal b. The reason for this should be self-evident, the type system is checking
that the provenance of values would always satisfy the provenance policies of principals.
Since the provenance of data is made up primarily of principal names, it is expected that
changing these would aect the satisﬁability of provenance policies. The two main rules
for type checking processes are those for output TProc Out and input TProc In. The
rule for output states that the process whw0i located at principal a would be well-typed
with respect to typing context     if the provenance sequence a!kwk  ; kw0k  satisﬁes
the constraint set given by constraints(jwj). The sequence a!kwk  ; kw0k  is what we
would expect the provenance of value w0 to be after it is sent on channel w; the principal
sending the value is a, the provenance of the channel is approximated by kwk , and the
previous provenance of the value is approximated by kw0k . The channel that this value
is being sent on is w and therefore its constraints are given by constraints(jwj). The
process whw0i gives rise to the output link jwjhjw0ji. The rule for type checking the input
process w( as x):P located at principal a states that for this to be well-typed under the
typing context    , the process P located at the same principal needs to be well-typed
under the context  ; jwj(x) ; x:a?kwk  ;. Note that both the constraint environment
as well as the type environment have changed. The constraint environment has been
extended with the input link jwj(x) to account for the input that has just taken place, while
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for the type of variable x. The need to add the input link to the constraint environment
is to detect any new aliases that might be created as a result of the input action. The
variable x which is bound in w( as x):P occurs free in P and so we need to account
for its type in the type environment. We expect the value to be substituted for variable
x to have provenance matching the pattern  and so after updating its provenance to
reﬂect the input action, we would expect it to have provenance of the form a?kwk  ; .
This latter approximates the provenance of the value to be received and states that the
value was received by a on a channel with provenance kwk  and that before this, it
had provenance matching . The input process w( as x):P gives rise to constraint
environment jwj(x);jwj:c();; the input link jwj(x) as we saw lets us detect any aliases
that may be created as a result of the input, the channel constraint jwj : c() ensures that
only data with the correct provenance is consumed, while the constraint environment 
represents those constraints imposed by the continuation process P (where occurrences
of the bound variable x are referenced using the abstract variable x). The rule for
replication, given by TProc Rep, simply states that the replicated process P is well-
typed under the same conditions as the process P. Rule TProc Mat is used to type
check matching if w1 = w2 then P1 else P2 ; it states that both P1 and P2 need to satisfy
all constraints imposed by their context, and the context needs to satisfy the constraints
imposed by either of them. Finally, the rules for parallel composition, restriction and the
nil process are similar to their counterparts for systems.
6.2.2 Type preservation
Type preservation (or subject reduction) states that well-typedness is invariant under the
rules of reduction. This is important for every type system as it ensures that once a
system is proved well-typed, it is guaranteed to remain so in every state it evolves to,
and therefore any safety guarantees oered for the original system also apply to any
of its derivatives. The deﬁnition of well-typedness is simple; a system S is well-typed
under typing context     and has constraints  if the judgement     ` S .  is
derivable using the typing rules of Figure 6.5. Often, we will be dealing with closed
systems (i.e. systems with no free variables) and therefore we would expect the type
environment to be empty. In fact, if we are simply interested in type checking the
system itself in isolation with no requirement to plug it into a larger context, then the
constraint environment of the context can be dropped too. Therefore, the deﬁnition of
well-typedness can be simpliﬁed to the ability to derive the judgement     ` S .  for
any typing context  , including possibly the empty context ?. This can be simpliﬁed
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environment , would also be irrelevant in such cases. We use ` S ., to be read simply
as “S is well-typed”, to mean that there exists a typing context     and constraint
environment  such that     ` S . . The deﬁnition of well-typedness is given in 6.7.
Deﬁnition 6.7 (Well-typedness). We say that a system S is well-typed under typing
context     and has constraints  if the judgement     ` S .  can be derived using
the rules in Figure 6.5. We say that a system S is well-typed, written ` S . , if it is
well-typed under some typing context     and has some constraint environment .
As we mentioned already, aliases behave like equivalence classes with respect to con-
straints. This fact is exhibited in the two properties of aliases given in lemmas 6.8 and
6.9. The ﬁrst, Lemma 6.8, states that the set of constraints of a value V are the same
as those of any of its aliases. The second, Lemma 6.9 states that the set of constraints
of a value with respect to a constraint environment remains the same if we substitute a
value with any of its aliases in that constraint environment. These lemmas as well the
subsequent ones are needed in the proof of type preservation given in Theorem 6.16.
Lemma 6.8. if V0 2 aliases(V) then constraints(V) = constraints(V0)
Proof. You will recall from the deﬁnition of constraints( ) that constraints(V) ,
f j V :  2 g [ constraints(V0) for all V0 2 aliases(V). Let  be a pattern such
that  2 constraints(V0). Then it follows from the deﬁnition that  2 constraints(V).
Since by deﬁnition, V0 2 aliases(V) implies V 2 aliases(V0), then it also follows
that for all patterns , if  2 constraints(V) then  2 constraints(V0). Therefore, we
conclude that constraints(V) = constraints(V0) 
Lemma 6.9. if V0 2 aliases(V) then constraintsfV0=Vg(V00) = constraints(V00)
Proof. Assume that V0 2 aliases(V). Lemma 6.8 implies that constraints(V) =
constraints(V0). If we consider the constraints of V00 with respect to fV0
=Vg, we ﬁnd
there are two cases, either V0 and V are aliases of V00 or not. If V0 and V are aliases of V00,
then substituting V0 for V should yield constraintsfV0=Vg(V00) = C[constraintsfV0=Vg(V0)
for some set of patterns C. We can show that constraints(V00) = C [ constraints(V0)
and since we know that constraints(V) = constraints(V0), then we can conclude that
constraintsfV0=Vg(V00) = constraints(V00). If V and V0 are not aliases of V00 then they
should not have any impact on the set of aliases of V00 and therefore its set of constraints
will also remain the same. 
Lemma 6.10, commonly referred to as the Substitution Lemma in the type systems
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long as the alias has the same type or a stronger one. The two conditions are important
to ensure this holds. The ﬁrst condition, the value being substituted for the variable must
be in the variable’s set of aliases, ensures that the substitution has no impact on the sets
of constraints entailed by the constraint environment. The second condition, requiring
the type of the value to be at least as strong as that assigned to the variable, ensures
that it will still satisfy any constraints that were previously satisﬁed by the type of the
variable.
Lemma 6.10 (Substitution Lemma). if    ; x : t `a P . , V 2 aliases(x) and t0  t
then     `a PfV:t0
=xg . fV=xg.
Proof. Let us assume that  ; x:t `a P., V 2 aliases(x) andt0  t all hold. We need
to show that     `a PfV:t0
=xg . fV=xg follows from these assumptions. We do this by
induction on the derivation of  ; x:t `a P.. There are 7 cases in total corresponding
to the 7 rules for type checking processes. The details are tedious but straightforward.
The only point worth noting is the importance of the two conditions V 2 aliases(x) and
t0  t. The condition V 2 aliases(x) ensures that the substitution does not change the
set of constraints of any channel name, while the condition t0  t guarantees that any
satisfaction involving the type t will still hold after the substitution. 
When a system is declared well-typed with respect to a particular constraint environment,
that guarantees that it satisﬁes all the constraints raised by that constraint environment.
It should be expected then that this same system would be well-typed with respect to
any subset of those constraints since any such subset would have at most the same
constraints. This is proved in Lemma 6.12. Along the same lines, Lemma 6.13 states
that any subsystem of a given system would be guaranteed to be well-typed with respect
to any constraint environment that the system itself is well-typed with respect to. The
reason is that given a system, any of its subsystems would have the same outputs as
the system itself or even less. Therefore, if the system is well-typed with respect to a
particular constraint environment, that means all its outputs must satisfy the constraints
implied by the constraint environment. Hence, any subset of these outputs must also
satisfy those same constraints. Lemma 6.11 is useful for the proof of Lemma 6.12. It
simply states that larger constraint environments would give rise to more constraints
than smaller ones.
Lemma 6.11. if  vc  then constraints(m)  constraints(m)
Proof. It’s sucient to observe that, by deﬁnition, constraints(m) is simply the set of
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, being a sub-environment of , would impose less constraints on channel m and its
aliases, and may even include less aliases for m. Therefore, the set inclusion clearly
holds. 
Lemma 6.12 (Context Weakening). if  ; 0    ` S .  then     ` S . 
Proof. The idea behind the proof is to observe that ultimately, the well-typedness of a
system boils down to showing that its outputs respect all the constraints of their channels.
In the case of the ﬁrst type judgement ;0  ` S ., this means proving satisfactions
of the form t j= constraints;0(m). By Lemma 6.11, any such satisfaction implies
t j= constraints(m). This in turn implies that the type judgement     ` S .  must
hold. 
Lemma 6.13 (System Weakening). if     ` S j S 0 .  ; 0 then     ` S . 
Proof. The proof for this one is similar to the proof of Context Weakening. Since
    ` S j S 0 .  ; 0 holds, then every output in S j S 0 must satisfy all the constraints
raised by the constraint environment . The outputs of S are a subset of those of S j S 0
and hence it follows that they satisfy the constraints raised by . Hence, it follows that
    ` S .  holds. 
The Subject Congruence lemma, given as Lemma 6.14, states that structurally congruent
systems are all well-typed under the same conditions. Again, this is to be expected as
the type system aims to ensure that all provenance policies raised by principals of a
system are guaranteed to be satisﬁed by all outputs of the system. Structurally congruent
systems are essentially the same and only dier in syntax. Hence, they have the same
behaviour; their principals impose the same provenance policies and make the same
outputs.
Lemma 6.14 (Subject Congruence). if     ` S .  and S a S 0 then     ` S 0 . 0
for some 0 such that  c 0.
Proof. Let us assume that     ` S .  and S a S 0 hold. The proof of     ` S 0 . 0
where 0 is a constraint environment such that  c 0 proceeds by induction on the last
rule used in the derivation of S a S 0. The details are tedious but straightforward and
are therefore omitted. 
Lemma 6.15 is a stronger version of Type Preservation given in Theorem 6.16. It states
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must be well-typed with respect to the same typing context. Two points should be noted
here. The ﬁrst is that the typing context stays the same after the transition ensuring
that the system will continue to comply with any constraints imposed by the external
environment. The second point to note is that the internal constraint environment of the
system itself stays the same or weakens. This guarantees that it will at most retain the
same constraints which ensures that itmay still be plugged into any externalenvironment
that it could be plugged into before the transition.
Lemma 6.15. if     ` S .  and S !s S 0 then     ` S 0 . 0 for some 0 such that
0 vc 
Proof. Let us assume that     ` S .  and S !s S 0 hold. Now we need to prove that
    ` S 0 . 0 also holds for some 0 such that 0 vc . We do this by induction on the
last rule used in the derivation of S !s S 0. Let us illustrate some of the cases below.
Case SRed Snd. This means that S !s S 0 is of the form a[m:m hp:pi] !s mhhp :
a!m ; pii. From the assumption, we know that     ` a[m:m hp:pi] . mhpi . This
latter must have been derived using the rules of Figure 6.5. There is only one possible
derivation tree for this and it is as follows:
a!m ; p j= constraints(m)
    `a m:m hp:pi . mhpi
    ` a[m:m hp:pi] . mhpi
The above derivation tree implies that a!m ; p j= constraints(m). Now, if we look at
S 0, that is mhhp:a!m ;pii, and consider what we need to do to prove that   ` S 0 .0
holds, we get the following:
a!m ; p j= constraints(m)
    ` mhhm:a!m ; pii . mhpi
Since we already know that a!m ;v j= constraints(m) holds then we can conclude that
  ` mhhm:a!m ;pii.mhpi holds too. Note that the constraint environments of S and
S 0 in this case are both mhpi, and hence the sub-environment condition holds too.
Case SRed Rcv. This means that S !s S 0 is of the form a[m:m ( as x):P] j mhhp :
pii !s a[Pfp:a?m;p=xg]. By assumption, we know that   ` a[m:m ( as x):P] j mhhp:
pii . m(x) ; m : c() ; P ; mhpi holds. The derivation for this must be of the form:
 ; 2    ` a[m:m ( as x):P] . 1  ; 1    ` mhhv : vii . 2
    ` a[m:m ( as x):P] j mhhp : pii . 1 ; 2128 Chapter 6 Provenance as Types
where 1 and 2 are deﬁned as follows:
1 = m(x) ; m : c() ; P 2 = mhpi
In the above, P is the constraint environment of process P. The derivation of the system
a[m:m ( as x):P] is as follows:
 ; mhpi ; m(x)    ; x : a?m ;  `a P . P
 ; mhpi    `a m:m ( as x):P . m(x) ; m : c() ; P
 ; mhpi    ` a[m:m ( as x):P] . m(x) ; m : c() ; P
while that of the system mhhp : pii is as follows:
p j= constraints;m(x);m:c();P(m)
 ; m(x) ; m : c() ; P    ` mhhp : pii . mhpi
To prove that     ` a[Pfp:a?m;p=xg] . 0 holds for some 0 such that 0 vc , we
consider its derivation tree:
    `a Pfp:a?m;p=xg . 0
    ` a[Pfp:a?m;p=xg] . 0
which means that we need to show that   `a Pfp:a?m;p=xg.0 holds. From ;mhpi;
m(x) ; x:a?m ; `a P.P (which holds by assumption as we saw), it follows p is an
alias of x. Since p j= , it follows that a?m ; p is a subtype of a?m ; . Therefore, by
the Substitution Lemma, we get  ; mhpi ; m(x)    `a Pfp:a?m;p=xg . Pfp=xg. From this
latter, using Lemma 6.12, we deduce that   `a Pfp:a?m;p=xg.Pfp=xg. Therefore, we
may conclude that     ` a[Pfp:a?m;p=xg] . Pfp=xg holds. Note that indeed, Pfp=xg is
a sub-environment of m(x) ; m : c() ; P.
Case SRed Res. This means that the last two lines of the derivation were as follows:
T !s T0
(n)T !s (n)T0
where S = (n)T and S 0 = (n)T0 for some T and T0. We know that, by assumption,
    ` (n)T .  holds. This judgement must have been derived using the TSys Res
rule as follows:
    ` T . fn=ng
    ` (n)T . 
From     ` T . fn=ng and T !s T0, we deduce by the induction hypothesis that
    ` T0 . 0fn=ng for some 0 such that 0 vc . From     ` T0 . 0fn=ng, and byChapter 6 Provenance as Types 129
applying the rule TSys Res, we may conclude that     ` (n)T0 . 0. Again, note
that 0 vc . 
Theorem 6.16 (Subject Reduction). if ` S .  and S !s S 0 then ` S 0 . .
Proof. Follows directly from the deﬁnition of ` S .  and Lemma 6.15. 
6.2.3 Type safety
Type safety, formulated below in Theorem 6.17, states that all reductions of a well-typed
system S which are derivable using the statically typed reduction relation !s are also
derivable using the dynamically typed one !a. What this means is that despite the
absence of dynamic provenance checks, the relation !s, when restricted to well-typed
systems, would not admit any new system transitions compared to !a. In particular, it
would never admit any unsafe transitions that might otherwise lead to principals consum-
ing data with provenance that violates their policies. The implication of this of course is
that dynamic provenance checking is redundant for well-typed systems.
Theorem 6.17 (Type Safety). ` S .  and S !s S 0 implies S !a S 0.
Proof. Let us assume that ` S .  and S !s S 0 hold. We need to show that S !a S 0
follows from these two assumptions. We do this by induction on the last rule used in the
derivation of S !s S 0.
Case SRed Snd. This means that S !s S 0 was of the form a[m:m hp:pi] !s mhhp :
a!m;pii. Now, by applying the rule ARed Snd, we get a[m:m hp:pi] !a mhhp:a!m;
pii, which means that S !a S 0.
Case SRed Rcv. This means that S !s S 0 was of the form a[m:m ( as x):P] j mhhp :
pii !s a[Pfp:a?m;p=xg]. Since S is well-typed, then we know that there exists some type
context     and constraint environment  such that     ` a[m:m ( as x):P] j mhhp :
pii .  holds. The derivation for this must have been as follows:
2  ? `a m:m ( as x):P . 1
2  ? ` a[m:m ( as x):P] . 1
p j= constraints1(m)
1  ? ` mhhp : pii . 2
?  ? ` a[m:m ( as x):P] j mhhp : pii . 1  2130 Chapter 6 Provenance as Types
where 1 and 2 are the constraint environments of a[m:m ( as x):P] and mhhp : pii
respectively and are deﬁned as:




In the above, 0
1 refers the constraint environment of process P. The above derivation
implies that p j= constraintsm(x);m:c();1(m). We know that the constraints set of m is
given as constraintsm(x);m:c();0
1(m) =  [ constraints0
1(m). This implies that p j= .
The transition a[m:m ( as x):P] j mhhp : pii !a a[Pfp:a?m;p=xg] could only be derived
using the rule ARed Rcv if the premise p j=  holds, which we have already shown to
be true. Hence, we conclude that S !a S 0.
Case SRed Res. This means that the last two lines of the derivation were as follows:
T !s T0
(n)T !s (n)T0
where S = (n)T and S 0 = (n)T0 for some T and T0 respectively. Since ` (n)T . 
holds (by assumption), then using rule TSys Res, it is possible to infer that ` T . 
holds too. Now, since we have that ` T .  and T !s T0, then we can use the induction
hypothesis to get T !a T0. Rule ARed Res gives us (n)T !a (n)T0, and hence we
may conclude that S !a S 0.
Case SRed Par. This means that the last two lines of the derivation were as follows:
R !s R0
R j T !s R0 j T
where S = R j T and S 0 = R0 j T for some R, T and R0. Since S is well-typed, then
` R j T . . This latter judgement must have been derived using the rule TSys Par,
which means that ` R .  and ` T .  are also true. Now, the fact that ` R .  and
R !s R0, implies by the induction hypothesis that R !a R0. From this latter, we can
derive R j T !a R0 j T using the rule ARed Par.
Case SRed Str. This means that the last two lines of the derivation were as follows:
S  T T !s T0 T0  S 0
S !s S 0
We know by assumption that ` S .  holds. Since S  T, by Lemma 6.14, this implies
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Now since S  T, T !a T0 and T0  S 0 all hold, using the rule ARed Str, we can
show that S !a S 0. 
Dropping the antecedent ` S . would falsify the implication in the Type Safety theorem.
The reason for this is that the statically typed reduction relation !s lacks dynamic prove-
nance checks and therefore, without type checking, it would admit unsafe transitions. A
simple example of this would be the following system:
a[mhpi] j b[m(c!Any as x):P]
This system would have the following transitions according to the relation !s:
a[mhpi] j b[m(c!Any as x):P] !s mhhp : a!ii j b[m(c!Any as x):P]
!s b[Pfp:b?;a!=xg]
where principal b receives the value p although it has provenance a! that violates its
policy c!Any. Type checking would detect this and declare this system as untypable.
The opposite implication, S !a S 0 =) (S !s S 0^ ` S . ), does not hold either. The
reason is that with dynamic provenance checking in !a, principals are allowed to output
data with provenance that violates some or even all provenance policies. These result
in messages that “ﬂoat around” in the system until they ﬁnd a principal whose policy
permits data with that provenance. Even if no such principal is found, the presence
of these messages would not cause any safety issues. To illustrate this, consider the
following system:
S , a[mhpi] j b[m(a!Any as x)] j c[m(b!Any as y)]
This system is composed of three principals; principal a produces value p on channel m,
while principals b and c are both ready to consume data on channel m. The provenance
policies of b and c are dierent however. Principal b only accepts data produced by a
whereas principal c only accepts data produced by b. This means that a is violating the
provenance policy of c by outputting data on m. Therefore, this system is not well-typed.
Dynamic provenance checking would allow this system to make transitions, leading to
principal b receiving the value sent by a as it has provenance that agrees with its policies.
It would also guarantee that c would never receive this value as it violates its provenance
policy. This is illustrated by the following transitions of system S:
S !a mhhp : a!Anyii j b[m(a!Any as x):P] j c[m(b!Any as y):Q]
!a b[Pfp:b?Any;a!Any=xg] j c[m(b!Any as y)]132 Chapter 6 Provenance as Types
These examples demonstrate the dierence between dynamic provenance checking and
static provenance checking. In fact, these dierences are inherent to dynamic and static
type checking; dynamic type checking allows safe transitions to proceed while blocking
unsafe ones, whereas static type checking takes an all-or-nothing approach where the
system is only declared well-typed if all of its transitions are deemed safe. The following
section looks at this more closely.
6.2.4 Discussion
Together, type preservation and type safety ensure that well-typed systems would never
lead to principals consuming data with provenance that violates their trust policies. This
means that dynamic provenance checks, as well as dynamic provenance tracking as we
will see in the next section, may be dropped from well-typed systems without impacting
the policies of principals. However, systems that fail type-checking will have to rely on
dynamic provenance checking and tracking. The aim of this section is to look at the
expressive power of the type system and analyse under what conditions would a system
be well-typed or fail type checking.
Let us start with an example of a simple system S deﬁned as follows:
S , a[m:am hpa:api] j b[m:bm hpb:bpi] j c[m:cm (cm as x)] j d[m:dm (dm as y)]
System S is composed of four principals; two producers a and b, and two consumers
c and d. All four principals communicate on channel m. We leave the provenance of
values and the policies of principals unspeciﬁed in this initial deﬁnition so that we can
analyse how varying these would aect the well-typedness of the system. We use A, B,
C and D to refer to the single principal systems composed of principals a, b, c and d
respectively. So for example, A refers to the single principal system a[m:am hpa:api].
Therefore, S could be written simply as A j B j C j D. Starting with an empty typing
context, the typing derivation of system S would be as follows:
a!am ; ap j= constraintsB;C;D(m)
:::
B ; C ; D  ? ` A . A
:::
A ; C ; D  ? ` B . B
...
?  ? ` A j B j C j D . A ; B ; C ; D
In the interest of space, we omit the type derivations for C and D and only show parts of
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systems A, B, C and D respectively and can be deﬁned as follows:
A = mhpai B = mhpbi C = m(x) ; m : c(cm) D = m(y) ; m : c(dm)
Therefore, the premise a!am ; ap j= constraintsB;C;D(m) simpliﬁes to a!am ; ap j=
fmc;mdg. Typechecking Balsogivesrisetoasimilarpremise, andthatinturn simpliﬁes
to b!bm ; bp j= fmc;mdg. Systems C and D, having no outputs, do not generate any
such premises. Hence, for system S to be well-typed, the following four conditions need
to be satisﬁed:
a!am ; ap j= mc a!am ; ap j= md b!bm ; bp j= mc b!bm ; bp j= md
This basically says that the provenance of each of the two values sent by a and b needs to
satisfy both of the policies imposed by c andd. What this means is that all fourprincipals
have to agree on what the provenance of data communicated on channel m should be,
and to only use the channel in accordance with this. The calculus itself does not oer a
mechanism to enforce such a global agreement on the use of channels. It does not need
to though as with dynamic provenance checks, each principal can use the channel as
they see ﬁt without violating the provenance policies of other principals. The role of the
static type system can be seen as analysing a system to infer if a global agreement on
the use of channels has been reached, and if has, then the dynamic checks are declared
redundant and may be dropped.
6.2.4.1 Reconcilable provenance policies
For the system S deﬁned above to be well-typed, the policies cm and dm imposed on
channel m need to be reconcilable, that is, they need to impose similar conditions on
the provenance of the data they are willing to consume on channel m. Moreover, the
conditions they impose on channel m need to be satisﬁed by the provenance of data that
may be sent on channel m, namely a!am ; ap and b!bm ; bp. Probably the simplest
way to satisfy this is if the policies cm and dm are the same and are both equivalent
to the pattern Any. In fact, only one of the two patterns needs to be Any if the other
one is satisﬁed by both provenance sequences. A simple pattern that satisﬁes both
of the provenance sequences in this example is a!am ; ap _ b!bm ; bp. It is easy to
specify formally what it means for two or more patterns to be reconcilable as given in
Deﬁnition 6.18.
Deﬁnition 6.18 (Reconcilable patterns). Patterns 1;:::;n are said to be reconcilable
if there exists a provenance type t such that t j= f1;:::;ng. Patterns 1;:::;n are said134 Chapter 6 Provenance as Types
to be reconcilable with respect to types t1;:::;tm if for all i 2 1::m, it is the case that
ti j= f1;:::;ng.
Applying this deﬁnition to our example, for system S to be well-typed, the patterns cm
and dm need to be reconcilable with respect to the types a!am ; ap and b!bm ; bp. If
both cm and dm are equivalent to the pattern Any, or if one of them is Any while the
other is a!am;ap_b!bm;bp, then indeed the two patterns cm and dm are reconcilable
with respect to the provenance types a!am ; ap and b!bm ; bp.
6.2.4.2 Typable and untypable systems
In the example of system S we deﬁned earlier, if the policies imposed by principals c
and d on channel m cannot be reconciled, then system S would not be well-typed. For
instance, the policies cm , a!Any and dm , b!Any cannot be reconciled since cm states
that only data originating from a is acceptable, whereas dm states that only data from
b is acceptable. This means that no provenance sequence can satisfy both a!Any and
b!Any at the same time, and therefore, the only case under which any system with those
two policies would be well-typed is if it had no outputs at all on channel m. However, in
the case of system S, both a and b output on channel m and therefore system S is not
well-typed when instantiated with those two policies. Let us assume that cm and dm
are reconcilable. Note that all this implies is that there exists some provenance type that
satisﬁes both of these policies, and so it is not enough on its own to guarantee system
S to be well-typed. For instance, the policies cm , a!Any and dm , a!Any are the
same and therefore clearly reconcilable. Any system where only principal a is allowed
to output on channel m would be well-typed in that case. However, system S is not such
a system as principal b too produces data on channel m and hence any data it outputs
would not satisfy the pattern a!Any. For system S to be well-typed, the two patterns
cm and dm need to be reconcilable with respect to the two provenance types a!am ; ap
and b!bm ; bp. There is a large set of patterns that satisﬁes this, ranging from the very
generic such as the pattern Any that accepts any provenance types, to the very speciﬁc
such as a!am ; ap _ b!bm ; bp that only accepts the two types a!am ; ap and b!bm ; bp.
In general, for a system to be well-typed, all the policies imposed on a channel need to
be reconcilable with respect to the provenance of outputs on that channel.
Fundamentally, the type system contains two kinds of types, value types and channel
types. Value types are all the types t deﬁned by the syntax of Figure 6.1 and are meant
to represent the provenance or approximated provenance of values. Channel types are
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channel. They represent the provenance policies of principals and therefore specify,
based on provenance, what data a channel is allowed to carry. For a system to be well-
typed, all values transmitted on a channel need to have a type that is consistent with
that of the channel. In typing terms, the channel type of a channel is derived as the
intersection of all the types speciﬁed by principals for the channel. The type of any value
sent on the channel needs to be a subtype of that given by the channel type.
6.3 Eliminating provenance tracking
The type and eect system presented in the previous section guarantees that principals al-
ways receive data with provenance that matches their policies. As we saw, this means the
run time provenance checks become unnecessary. Provenance tracking was maintained
in the calculus however as it was needed to prove Subject Reduction. Since the calculus
did not provide any means for principals to use the provenance annotations of values, it
should be obvious that these and provenance tracking are redundant. We prove this more
formally in this section. This is achieved simply by dropping provenance tracking and
showing that the transitions derivable that way only dier in the provenance annotations
of values when compared to transitions derivable using the reduction relation of the
previous section.
Let !t be the reduction relation deﬁned as !s but with the rules for output and input
modiﬁed as follows.
TRed Snd
a[m:m hp:pi] !t mhhp : pii
TRed Rcv
a[m:m ( as x):P] j mhhp : pii !t a[Pfp:p=xg]
These dier from their counterparts in the relation !s in that they do not perform
provenance tracking. Instead, all values retain their original provenance throughout the
evolution of the system. If we assume that all values start with empty provenance as is




a[m( as x):P] j mhhpii !t a[Pfp=xg]
This makes it clearer that we are indeed dropping explicit provenance annotations, dy-
namic provenance tracking and dynamic provenance checking from the calculus. Theo-
rem 6.19 below states that systems have the same transitions under this new relation as136 Chapter 6 Provenance as Types
they do under the relation !s. This implies that in well-typed systems, both provenance
tracking and checking are redundant.
Theorem 6.19. S !s S 0 implies that S !t S 00 and jS 0j = jS 00j. Vice versa, S !t S 0
implies that S !s S 00 and jS 0j = jS 00j.
Proof. We need to prove each implication separately. For each one, we assume the
antecedent and then proceed by induction on the last rule used in its derivation. In each
case, we ﬁnd that there is a corresponding rule to apply to obtain the consequent. As can
seen from the output and input rules of !s and !t, the only dierence between S 0 and
S 00 is in the provenance of the values, whereby they are updated in the reduction relation
!s but not in the relation !t. By erasing the provenance from both resulting systems as
expressed by jS 0j and jS 00j, we ﬁnd that the systems we obtain are indeed the same. To
illustrate, let us consider the case when S !s S 0 is derived using the rule SRed Snd.
This means that the transition S !s S 0 is in fact of the following form:
a[m:m hv : vi] !s mhhv : a!m ; vii
We can use the rule TRed Snd to derive the following transition:
a[m:m hv : vi] !t mhhv : vii
whichmeans thatin this case S 00 = mhhv:vii. We have thatjS 0j = jmhhv:a!m;viij = mhhvii
and jS 00j = jmhhv : viij = mhhvii. Hence, we conclude that jS 0j = jS 00j. The other cases
follow a similar reasoning. 
6.4 Adapting the type system to the full calculus
The type and eect system presented in this chapter works on the subset of the calculus
where input-guarded choice, i2Im:m (i as x):Pi, is restricted to indexing sets I of size
0 and 1. As we saw, this is equivalent to replacing input-guarded choice with the nil
process 0 and the standard input construct m:m ( as x):P. The full calculus admits
arbitrary indexing sets however, with each index corresponding to a dierent pattern and
a dierentcontinuation process. This reﬂects the willingness ofprincipals to receive data
with provenance that matches any of the patterns speciﬁed in the choice construct. There
are a number of approaches to adapt the static type and eect system of this chapter to
the full calculus. To understand them, let us ﬁrst start by looking at what input-guarded
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channel m could accept data with provenance that matches any of the types i and that
variable x could be assigned any of these types. This is equivalent to saying that m
has the union constraint c(
S
i2I i) and that x has the union type
S
i2I i as we already
mentioned. The type system could be easily extended to incorporate this. However,
we need to ensure the semantics of input-guarded choice is preserved by the static
type system. This means that each continuation process Pi needs to be activated in
response to receiving data with provenance that matches the pattern i. This requires
a check at run time and defeats the point of the static type system. Instead, what we
could do is look at the choice operator as corresponding to an intersection type. That
is, in the process i2Im:m (i as x):Pi, we take variable x to have the type
T
i2I i and
channel m to have the constraint c(
T
i2I i). Outputs would then be required to satisfy
constraints of this form. When all such constraints are satisﬁed, the system is declared
well-typed. At run time, no provenance check is required and a continuation Pi is chosen
non-deterministically. This would be faithful to the dynamic semantics of the calculus.
The reason is that since all outputs satisfy the intersection type
T
i2I i, then it follows
that they also satisfy every pattern i and therefore the non-deterministic choice is what
would have happened in the dynamic semantics. The downside to this approach is that
the more patterns i we have in a choice construct, the stricterthe intersection type would
be and therefore the more likely it is that it would not be satisﬁed by the provenance of
output data. To get around this, the type system could instead look for a subset of the
patterns i that is satisﬁed by all outputs on the channel. That is, attempt to satisfy the
constraint c(
T
j2J j) where J is a subset of I. Any non-satisﬁable patterns are garbage
collected together with their continuation as “unreachable code” by the static analysis.
If every input is left with a non-empty set J, then the system is declared well-typed.
Otherwise, if at least one input is left with an empty choice, then the system would be
considered as having failed to type check. To illustrate this, consider the example system
below:
a[mhpi] j b[mhqi] j c[i2f1;2;3gm(i as x):Pi]
where the patterns i are deﬁned as follows:
1 , fa;bg! 2 , Any 3 , fdg!
Only patterns 1 and 2 would be satisﬁed by both outputs from principals a and b.
Pattern 3 would not be satisﬁed by data from either principal. As such, the static
analysis would assign x the type fa;bg! ^ Any and m the constraint c(fa;bg! ^ Any).
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the summation, yielding the optimised system:
a[mhpi] j b[mhqi] j c[i2f1;2gm(i as x):Pi]
This system would be declared well-typed by the static type system. At run time, a
non-deterministic choice is made between processes P1 and P2, which agrees with the
dynamicsemanticsofthechoiceoperatorastheprovenanceofdatasentbyaandbwould
match both 1 and 2, but not 3. Removing unsatisﬁable summands could be seen as a
static optimisation that removes unreachable code since even with dynamic provenance
tracking and checking, such summands would never be satisﬁed and executed.
6.5 Concluding remarks
This chapter presented a type and eect system for our provenance calculus. The pri-
mary aim of this type and eect system was to alleviate the performance overhead of
provenance tracking and checking by giving static guarantees to enforce the provenance
policies of principals. To ensure systems are well-typed under the type and eect sys-
tem, the policies used by dierent principals for the same channel have to be consistent,
imposing similar restrictions on the provenance of values that may be communicated
on that channel. A system where principals specify conﬂicting policies would not be
well-typed under our type system, nor under any static analysis, as such policies are
inherently irreconcilable. Nonetheless, this still leaves a large set of useful systems for
which the static type system would work. In fact, any system with conﬂicting policies
could be rewritten to avoid such conﬂicts by associating dierent policies with dierent
channels.
The type and eect system is interesting in its own right however. Treating provenance
as types raises severalinteresting points when comparedto more traditionaltype systems.
The most obvious one as we saw is the fact that provenance is dynamic, leading to a type
system where types have a structure resembling that of processes and which changes in
accordance with the behaviour of the system. In this sense, they are akin to behavioural
types such as those studied by Igarashi and Kobayashi [38] and Acciai and Boreale [2].
Our type and eect system diers in some crucial ways however. Firstly, types are not
declared. What we mean by this is that in our calculus values such as channel names
are declared without assigning a type to them. Contrast this with most traditional type
systems for the -calculus where when a channel is declared, via the restriction operator,
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declared to have type t with scope S. So how are types obtained in our type system? As
we have already seen, we can distinguish between two dierent types in the type system.
The ﬁrst consists of the provenance annotations of values. These are not constant but
change as the system evolves. They are under the control of the run time environment
and are not assigned to values by the code. The second kind is found in the provenance
policies associated with channels. Provenance policies, seen as types, are similar to the
channeltypesfoundinothertypesystemsforthe-calculusinthattheyspecifywhatdata
the channelis allowedto carry. Eachuse ofa channelname forinputspeciﬁes a (possibly
dierent) type for it. As a result, it is possible for a channel name to be associated with
conﬂicting provenance policies and hence have a non-satisﬁable type. This actually
highlights another dierence, that of the scope of a type. In type declarations of the form
(n : t)S, all occurrences of the channel name n in S have the same ﬁxed type t. On the
other hand, in our type system every instance of a value will have its own type, whether
in the form of a provenance annotation or a provenance policy. Our type system acts as
a type inference system, attempting to approximate the provenance of values and unify
the dierent provenance policies associated with a channel. Systems that fail to be type
checked are those where the uniﬁed type for the provenance policies can not be satisﬁed
by the approximated provenance of the values.
We end this chapter by discussing how the type system could be implemented in a
distributed setting. The key to this is in the compositionality of the type system. We
already mentioned that compositionality is required in proofs of typability as it enables
us to type check the subsystems of a given system separately and then join them to get
a type derivation for the whole system. Not only that, but compositionality is also very
important in implementations of the type system to ensure that disparate systems can be
type checked in isolation. This is done by type checking a given system with respect to
the type interfaces of other systems it is expected to interact with. The type interfaces of
systems are given by constraint environments in the case of our type system. To illustrate
this, recall the typing rule for parallel composition:
 ; 2    ` S 1 . 1  ; 1    ` S 2 . 2
    ` S 1 j S 2 . 1 ; 2
av(1) \ av(2) = ;
The constraint environments 1 and 2 give the typing interfaces of systems S 1 and S 2
respectively. Each system only needs to be type checked with respect to the constraint
environment of the other system; there is no need to know the internal structure of the
other system. This is what is expressed by the two premises  ; 2    ` S 1 . 1 and
 ; 1    ` S 2 . 2. Constraint environments are similar in purpose to interfaces in
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as C. They allow one to extract the public interface of a system in order to verify that
other systems are compatible with this system and therefore are able to interact with it
in a safe manner.Chapter 7
Security of Provenance
In this chapter, we introduce an extension to the calculus that aims to give principals
some control over the disclosure of provenance. The main motivation behind this is
security. When a provenance annotated value is published by a principal, its provenance
reveals the identity of this principal to any other principal that may consume the value.
Not only that, but it also reveals the identities of other principals further back in the
chain of custody of the value and of any channels it was communicated on. This type
of information may be sensitive and its disclosure may need to be tightly controlled.
Naturally, this would conﬂict with the ability of other principals to make fully informed
decisions about the data they consume. Furthermore, the provenance disclosure policy
of one principal may conﬂict with that of another principal in the chain of custody of the
value. All these factors make this an interesting and non-trivial problem to study.
After giving the motivation for this chapter, we take a step back and look at the more
general problem of allowing principals to control the provenance tracking process. We
consider the possible eects on provenance that such a change would have. The answer
we arrive at is that principals should only be allowed to decrease the provenance of a
value, never to increase it. We formalise this by introducing the concept of weakenings.
To weaken a provenance sequence means simply to reduce the amount of information
that it contains about the past. For example, the pattern ! ;  can be interpreted to
tell us that someone sent an original value on a channel with empty provenance. This
can be considered a weakening of the provenance sequence a! ;  which tells us a little
more than the pattern by revealing the exact identity of the principal that sent the value.
Weakening allows principals to control what parts of a provenance sequence are dis-
closed to other principals, and this gives them the ability to implement their provenance
disclosure policies. We incorporate weakenings into the calculus by introducing another
concept, that of ﬁlters. Filters associate dierent weakenings of a provenance sequence
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with dierent principals, thus allowing a principal to selectively disclose provenance
information. We keep ﬁlters abstract to ensure our results remain general, but we do
demonstrate their applicability by proposing a sample ﬁlter language and giving a wide
range of examples. As with the original calculus described in Chapter 3, we assume that
the provenance tracking infrastructure is trusted and therefore any provenance it records
is trusted. Furthermore, we assume itis also secure, guaranteeing thatprovenance cannot
be forged and ﬁlters cannot be circumvented by principals. Therefore, principals are
only able to access provenance that has not been masked from them by ﬁlters.
The remainder of this chapter is split into four main sections. Section 7.1 looks at
weakenings, Section 7.2 extends the calculus with ﬁlters while Section 7.3 proposes a
sample ﬁlter language and demonstrates its use through several examples. Section 7.4
concludes the chapter.
7.1 Controlling the disclosure of provenance
7.1.1 Motivation
Tracking provenance in the calculus, as presented in Chapter 3, is performed automati-
cally as part of the provenance tracking reduction relation. This, in eect, corresponds
to a model where provenance tracking is handled entirely by the run time environment.
Principals are only given the ability to make boolean tests against the provenance infor-
mation, with no control at all over how this information is gathered or who may use it.
The provenance of data, however, aects the behaviour of principals both directly and
indirectly. It aects the behaviour of a principal directly as it is used by the principal
to determine what data to receive and what branch of computation to proceed with. It
aects it indirectly as it is also used by other principals to make their own decisions
as to which data to receive and which computation branch to take, thus determining,
among other things, the possible interactions they could engage in with the principal.
This motivates the need to give principals some control over the provenance information
and the provenance tracking process.
More speciﬁcally, however, two arguments may be raised in favour of giving principals
control over provenance tracking.
1. Security. The ﬁrst argument concerns access control and aims to address privacy
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recordsitsentirehistoryandreveals, toanyprincipalthatgetsholdofthevalue, the
identity of every principal involved in getting it to that state. This may, however,
conﬂictwiththe security policies ofsome principals. We wouldexpectthe security
policy of a principal to restrict access to sensitive provenance information and
only give other principals access to nonsensitive provenance information. More
generally, the privileges of each principal will determine how much provenance
they are entitled to access.
2. Optimization. The second argument pertains to the size and level of detail of a
provenance sequence. As provenance tracking strictly appends new events to a
provenance sequence, this latter will only expand with time and, in the presence of
“loops” for example, will lead to long and repetitive provenance sequences. This
calls for a mechanism that prunes irrelevant events from provenance sequences
and allows us to abstract away from unimportant details in the provenance of data.
We tackle this problem by breaking it into two parts. We start by considering what
aspects of provenance tracking principals should be involved in. Then, based on this,
we look at how to extend the calculus with programming constructs that allow us to
implement such features. Throughout, our guiding principle will be to preserve the
integrity of the provenance information. By this, we mean that provenance should
always remain correct with respect to the past of the system. We have already deﬁned
what it means for provenance to be correct in Section 5.3. To recap, recall that we
interpret the meaning of provenance as one or more logical statements about the past
of the system. If the truth of these logical statements follows from the past of the
system, then we say that the provenance is correct. Intuitively, this means that what the
provenance tells us about the past of the system did in fact take place. Therefore, to
preserve the integrity of provenance means to disallow any modiﬁcations (or in other
words forgeries) to provenance that would result in claims contrary to what actually took
place. We make these ideas more formal by deﬁning the notions of weakening and ﬁlter
language in the following section.
The approach we take assumes that the run time infrastructure responsible for track-
ing provenance is also responsible for its security. This is reﬂected in the extension of
the calculus presented in this chapter. In this extended calculus, principals are able to
specify their security requirements in the form of ﬁlters. Note that ﬁlters act only as
speciﬁcations of what parts of provenance principals wish to restrict from other princi-
pals. Enforcement of these ﬁlters rests with the run time infrastructure however, which
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access provenance that has not been hidden from them by ﬁlters. We assume this cannot
be circumvented by principals.
7.1.2 Weakening of provenance sequences
First, let us consider what eects on provenance the involvement of principals in prove-
nance tracking should have. This will make it easier to determine the acceptable ways
in which principals may control provenance tracking. As we explained earlier, we view
the provenance of a value as essentially a set of assertions about the past of that value.
Hence, any involvement of principals in provenance tracking would have the eect of
changing this set of assertions, either by adding or removing some assertions. However,
in order to have trust in the provenance information, it is important that this information
is correct. This means that even if principals are involved in provenance tracking, this
involvement should not result in false provenance assertions. By this reasoning, any
addition of false assertions to the provenance information is to be rejected. The addition
of true assertions would be acceptable, but it would result in provenance information
that is unnecessary with respect to the particular notion of provenance we are dealing
with. So, we are left with the removal of assertions, or in other words the decrease of
what a provenance sequence tells us about the past, as the only possible way principals
may control provenance. We call this the weakening of a provenance sequence.
To determine what weakening corresponds to in concrete terms, let us consider the
structure and elements of provenance sequences. A provenance sequence is made up
of zero or more ordered events. Each event may be seen as being composed of three
parts: 1. the author of the event, 2. the type of the event, and 3. the provenance of
the channel used. So, in addition to the temporal ordering of events, this yields four
kinds of information that a provenance sequence contains. Removing any of these
constitutes a weakening of the provenance sequence. To accomplish this, we propose
using the pattern language from Section 3.3.1 as the target for weakening; that is, the
weakening of a provenance sequence is going to be a term in the pattern language. Let
us now illustrate how patterns implement the four types of weakening. For an event a!,
weakening its author may be done using any pattern of the form G! where a 2 ~G.
Weakening its type may be accomplished by the pattern a! _ a? while weakening
the provenance of its channel may be accomplished using any event a! where  is a
weakening of . For concatenation, for example in the provenance sequence ;0, the
pattern (;0) _ (0;) may be considered a weakening for it since we cannot tell from
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It should be clear from the examples above that for a given provenance sequence , any
pattern  such that  j=  may be considered a weakening for it. Looking at this from
a typing point of view, the pattern  is simply any valid type for , including  itself
as the most speciﬁc type (strongest weakening) and any supertype of it as a possible
(weaker) weakening. This yields a veryﬂexible weakening notion allowing a provenance
sequence to be weakened by dierent “amounts” depending on the requirements of the
particular provenance disclosure policy. We deﬁne weakening of provenance sequences
and its generalisation to patterns in deﬁnitions 7.1 and 7.2 respectively.
Deﬁnition 7.1 (Weakening of provenance sequences). We say that a provenance se-
quence  is weakened by a pattern , written   , when it holds that  j= .
Deﬁnition 7.2 (Weakening of patterns). We extend the notion of weakening to patterns
as follows. We say that a pattern  is weakened by a pattern 0, written   0, if and
only if for every provenance sequence , it holds that if  j=  then  j= 0.
Note that the deﬁnition of weakening of patterns can be considered as an extension to
that of provenance sequences since the set of provenance sequences is a subset of the set
of patterns. Note also that the weakening relation is a partial order as shown below.
Proposition 7.3. The relation  is a partial order.
Proof. By showing that  is reﬂexive, antisymmetric and transitive. The details are
straightforward and are hence omitted. 
Weakening does indeed meet our requirements and is enough for us to implement both
kinds ofprovenance controlwe are interestedin. Abstraction maps directlyto weakening
since a provenance sequence can be replaced with a pattern to hide irrelevant provenance
information. For example, e;Any hides the details of the tail of the provenance sequence
e;, while  abstracts away from the exact number of times  took place. For access
control, what we will need to do is assign dierent weakenings to dierent principals
based on their privileges. In the following section, we show how the calculus can be
extended with programming constructs to accomplish this.146 Chapter 7 Security of Provenance
7.2 Filters and calculus extensions
7.2.1 Filter languages
We call a speciﬁcation for the change of provenance visibility a ﬁlter. The application of
a ﬁlter to a provenance sequence is meant to associate with each principal a weakening
of this provenance sequence; we refer to this weakening as the principal’s view of the
provenance sequence. We use ; ;::: to range over ﬁlters and  for the set of all ﬁlters.
We denote by  .  the application of ﬁlter  to provenance sequence . In order to
incorporate this into the calculus, we add the clause  .  to the syntax of provenance
sequences given in Figure 3.5. We refer to the set of provenance sequences extended
with the above clause as ﬁltered provenance sequences and to the subset that contains no
ﬁlter application as unﬁltered provenance sequences. We reserve the letter K for the set
of unﬁltered provenance sequences and use K to refer to ﬁltered provenance sequences,
where the ﬁlters are drawn from set . To relate the two, we deﬁne the ﬁlter erasure
function j j : K ! K which removes all ﬁlters from a provenance sequence. The ﬁlter
erasure function is deﬁned inductively on the structure of ﬁltered provenance sequences
as given in Deﬁnition 7.4.
Deﬁnition 7.4. The ﬁlter erasure function j   j : K ! K removes all ﬁlters from a
given provenance sequence. It is deﬁned as follows:
jj =  jej = e j ; 0j = jj ; j0j j . j = jj
As we mentioned already, ﬁlters will be used to give each principal its own view of
the provenance sequence in question. In light of this, the semantics of ﬁlters would be
to associate with each principal and ﬁltered provenance sequence a weakening of that
provenance sequence. We formalise this in the deﬁnition of ﬁlter languages given below.
Deﬁnition 7.5. A ﬁlter language is a tuple (;view) where  is a set of ﬁlters (we use
the letters ; ;::: to range over ﬁlters) and view : A  K !  is a function such that
for all principals a, provenance sequences  and patterns , it holds that if view(a;) = 
then  is a weakening of jj.
The above gives us a generic deﬁnition of ﬁlter languages. Its only requirement is that
ﬁlters must give each principal a view of the provenance sequence in question which, as
explained before, must be a weakening of the provenance sequence. In the following
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we took with patterns in Chapter 3 and make the calculus parametric on the choice of a
concrete ﬁlter language. Like with patterns, this allows us to keep our results generic and
applicable to any particular ﬁlter language as long as it conforms to the above deﬁnition.
7.2.2 Syntactic changes
We now look at how the calculus is adapted to use ﬁlters. Instead of adding a new
primitive to apply a ﬁlter to the provenance of a value, we elect instead to modify the
output construct so that it takes two parameters: the annotated value to be sent, and a
ﬁlter that would be applied to the resulting provenance sequence of the value. In addition
to keeping the calculus simple, this matches our intuition that principals would usually
apply ﬁlters to values when they decide to publish them to other principals. It also allows
the ﬁlter to reference the complete provenance sequence including the additions to be
made as a result of the output operation itself. We summarise the syntactic changes in
Figure 7.1.
Figure 7.1. Modiﬁed syntax with ﬁlters
P ::= process terms
::: all clauses except output unchanged
whwati modiﬁed output construct with ﬁlters
 ::= provenance sequences
::: same as before
 .  ﬁltered sequence
7.2.3 Semantic changes
In addition to the syntactic changes, we also modify the semantics of the calculus to take
ﬁlters into account. We use f and !f to denote the structural congruence and reduction
relations of the new calculus respectively. Structural congruence stays the same while
only the input and output rules in the reduction relation change.
The new reduction rules are given in Figure 7.2. Rule FRed Snd states that when a
value p:p is sent by a principal a on a channel m:m, its provenance is updated as before
to be a!m ;p. In addition to this, the latter is also annotated with the ﬁlter  speciﬁed in
the output construct to give us the ﬁltered provenance sequence 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Rcv rule, pattern matching is done against the view of the receiving principal, a in this
case, as opposed to the original provenance sequence as done in the rule ARed Rcv.
Principal a’s view of the provenance sequence p is given by the function view( ) as
view(a;p). The result of the function view( ) is a pattern, and hence the check that we
make in the input rule is a pattern weakening check (instead of the satisfaction check we
made in the original semantics). If j (where j 2 I) is a weakening of view(a;p), then
Pj is chosen for the continuation and the appropriate substitution is made. As before, if
more than one such pattern exists, one of them is chosen nondeterministically.
Figure 7.2. Modiﬁed semantics with ﬁlters
FRed Snd
a[m:m hp:p ati] !f mhhp :  . a!m ; pii
FRed Rcv
view(a;p)  j j 2 I
a[i2Im:m (i as x):Pi] k mhhp : pii !f a[Pjfp:a?km;p=xg]
7.3 A sample ﬁlter language
In the previous section, we gave a generic deﬁnition of the ﬁlter language but left its
details unspeciﬁed. This is useful since it allows us to focus on the more important
aspects of ﬁlters and weakenings without having to worry about the details of the ﬁlter
language. It also means that any results we show would be applicable to any setting
as long as the concrete ﬁlter language chosen complies with Deﬁnition 7.5. For the
purpose of giving examples, and also to provide a more in-depth analysis of ﬁlters and
their eects on provenance tracking, we give a sample ﬁlter language in this section.
Probably the simplest ﬁlter language is the one where each principal name is mapped
to the pattern intended to act as its view of the provenance sequence in question. This
would look something like:
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where the view of  assigned to ai is i. The semantics of this ﬁlter language can be
given by the following simple clause:
view(ai;(a1 7! 1;:::;ai 7! i;:::;an 7! n) . ) = i
Hence, in order for this language to be compliant with the deﬁnition of ﬁlter languages
given in Deﬁnition 7.5, all patterns i need to be weakenings of jj. While such a lan-
guage could indeed act as a sample pattern language, it is unduly verbose and inﬂexible.
For instance, principals need to explicitly specify the full view of provenance they want
to associate with each principal. They also need to make sure the patterns they specify
are correct weakenings of the provenance sequence in question. More importantly, the
ﬁlters speciﬁed by a principal override all previous ﬁlters applied by other principals,
which may violate the provenance disclosure policies of those principals.
The ﬁlter language we propose to use instead gives principals full ownership of the
provenance of data they publish. It allows them to control the disclosure of provenance
pertainingtotheirownactions, aswellasthatrelatingtootherprincipals’actions(subject
to the provenance disclosure policies of those principals). This enables principals to
change the visibility of provenance sequences in a controlled manner. What we mean by
this is that while principals are able to change the views assigned to other principals, they
can only do so in accordance with their own privileges. The mechanism for achieving
this consists of enabling principals to decide whether the view to be assigned to another
principal is computed with respect to their own view (which intuitively corresponds
to the principal sharing parts of their view with the other principal) or with respect to
the other principal’s existing view (in eect weakening the other principal’s view even
further). This is explained in more detail in Section 7.3.1.
To keep the sample ﬁlterlanguage simple, we only target a subset of the pattern language.
We let principals hide both single principal names and whole subsequences. We do this
by using the following two forms of weakening.
 Hiding principal names: the principal name a in the sequence a!;0 can be hidden
using the pattern ! ; 0.
 Hiding subsequences: the provenance sequence  in a! ; 0 can be hidden using
the pattern a!Any ; 0.
What this means is that weakenings can be formally deﬁned as the subset of patterns
given by the following grammar.150 Chapter 7 Security of Provenance




 ;  concatenation
Any hidden sequence
 ::= event
G! ;  send event




For the remainder of this section, when we refer to weakenings it should be understood
to mean this restricted subset of patterns, unless otherwise stated. Note that the patterns
used in the input construct are drawn from whatever pattern language the calculus is
instantiated with, and hence from the full set of patterns when that pattern language is
the sample language given in Chapter 3.
7.3.1 Syntax
7.3.1.1 Filters, mappings and modes
The syntax of the ﬁlter language is given in Figure 7.4. A ﬁlter  is a term of the
form a:F where a denotes the principal that issued the ﬁlter and F is a ﬁlter mapping.
Filter mappings simply associate with each group expression G a mode m and a ﬁltering
expression E. We denote each such association by G 7!m E and use ? for the empty
mapping and F;F for the composition of mappings. Group expressions are the same
as in Section 3.3.1 and enable us to associate a ﬁltering expression with more than one
principal. Modes aect the way ﬁlter expressions are applied and may be one of two
kinds: casc, which stands for cascade; and over, which stands for override.
To understand the role of modes, consider that a particular provenance sequence will get
tagged with a ﬁlter each time it is published by a principal. This results in provenance
sequences with multiple nested ﬁlters such as  . ;0 . 0 for example, where 0 was
applied to 0 after which the events in  took place and then  was applied to the resulting
sequence. Now, if we consider how the view of some principal, say a for example, may
be computed, we ﬁnd two natural methods arise: either with respect to a’s view of
;0.0, which we refer to as casc mode; or with respect to the issuer’s view of ;0.0,
which we refer to as over mode. The mode casc only permits the views that principals
already have of a provenance sequence to be weakened. On the other hand, the modeChapter 7 Security of Provenance 151
over allows both weakening and “strengthening”, leading to a mechanism which enables
full dynamic change of provenance visibility. Note, however, that a principal’s view
can only be strengthened up to that of the issuer; this is what we referred to previously
when we said that our sample ﬁlter language allows principals to change the visibility of
provenance in a controlled manner. Note also that the name of the principal that issued
the ﬁlter is kept for the purpose of calculating views when the mode speciﬁed is over.
Figure 7.4. The ﬁlter language: syntax
 ::= ﬁlters
a:F issuer a and mapping F
F ::= ﬁlter mappings
? empty mapping









E  E composition
A ﬁlter name
H ::= selectors
all select entire subtree
author select author only
channel select channel only
tail select tail only
7.3.1.2 Filter expressions
Filter expressions specify the parts of a provenance sequence that need to be hidden or
masked from principals. The parts of a provenance sequence which are not selected by
theﬁlterarewhatconstitutestheprincipal’sview. Wecan alsoenvisageacomplementary
setup where ﬁlter expressions specify what is visible and everything else is made hidden
from principals. The choice between these two is mostly a matter of taste. Alternatively,
we can even have a ﬁlter language that combines both of these types of ﬁlter expressions,
allowing principals to choose to either specify what provenance to hide (negative ﬁlters)
or what provenance to show (positive ﬁlters). We feel negative ﬁlters are expressive
enough to allow us to encode all provenance disclosure policies we are interested in and
hence ﬁnd no real need to include positive ﬁlters as well.
Filter expressions treat provenance sequences as nested lists, each of which is composed
of a head and a tail. They allow principals to manipulate the top-most level of the
provenance sequence as well as delve deeper into its subsequences. The simplest class152 Chapter 7 Security of Provenance
of ﬁlter expressions is that of selectors H, which work at the top-most level of the
provenance sequence. They are meant to reﬂect the structure of the provenance sequence
and allow principals to reference its dierent parts. There are fourtypes of selectors. The
selector all hides the entire provenance sequence in the current context, which means
it would transform any sequence  to Any. The selector author hides the author of the
most recent event in the provenance sequence. So, for example, applying author to the
provenance sequence a! ;0 would result in ! ;0. The third selector is channel and it
hides the channel of the most recent event, transforming the sequence a!;0 to a!Any;.
The last selector, tail, hides the tail of the provenance sequence. For example, applying
it to a! ;  would result in a! ; Any.
Seen as a nested list, a provenance sequence such as a! ; 0 contains two subsequences,
the channel, , and the tail, 0. To access these, principals may use the two ﬁlter ex-
pressions channel=E and tail=E. These apply the ﬁlter expression E to the channel
provenance, , and tail provenance, 0, respectively. The conditional ﬁlter expression,
[]E, applies the ﬁlter expression to the provenance sequence if it matches the pattern
 and leaves it unaltered otherwise. The form E  E0 denotes the composition of ﬁlters
E and E0. The result of applying it to a provenance sequence is that of applying E to
the sequence obtained as a result of applying E0. Filter names A allow us to express
recursive ﬁlters and are necessary to be able to express some of our examples as we will
see later.
7.3.2 Semantics
The structure of ﬁlters reﬂects their expected role as discussed earlier, where we have
a component that is responsible for weakening provenance sequences (ﬁltering expres-
sions, modes and the name of the issuer), and another for associating weakenings with
principals (ﬁlter mappings). When the aim of the ﬁlter is to abstract away from unim-
portant information, we expect all principals to be mapped to the same view, whereas
in the case of security policies we would likely ﬁnd dierent principals given dierent
views depending on the requirements of the particular provenance disclosure policy.
We view ﬁlters as mappings from principals to modes and ﬁltering expressions, and
hence deﬁne the notions of domain of a ﬁlter and image of a principal under a ﬁlter
below. The domain of a ﬁlter gives the set of groups which are assigned some mode and
ﬁltering expression by the ﬁlter, and is intended to account for those principals explicitly
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mode and ﬁltering expression associated with the principal and is inferred from their
group membership.
Deﬁnition 7.6. The issuer of a ﬁlter  = a:F is the principal a.
Deﬁnition 7.7. The domain of a ﬁlter mapping F, written dom(F), is deﬁned by induc-
tion on the structure of F as follows:
dom(?) = ; dom(G 7!m F) = fGg dom(F;F
0) = dom(F) [ dom(F
0)
The domain dom() of a ﬁlter  = a:F is the domain of its mapping F.
Deﬁnition 7.8. The image of a principal a under a ﬁlter mapping F, written img(a;F),
is deﬁned as follows:
img(a;?) = ; img(a;F;F
0) = img(a;F) [ img(a;F
0)




f(m;E)g if a 2 ~G
; otherwise
The image of a principal a under a ﬁlter  = a:F is the image of the principal under the
mapping F.
The semantics of ﬁlters is given by deﬁning the function view, which returns for every
principal and ﬁltered provenance sequence a pattern representing that principal’s view
of the provenance sequence. The function view is only deﬁned when all ﬁlters in the
provenance sequence are both exhaustive and non-ambiguous. These two properties
ensure that every principal gets exactly one view and are deﬁned in 7.9 and 7.10 respec-
tively. An alternative to requiring ﬁlters to be exhaustive and non-ambiguous would be
to assign a default ﬁltering expression to every principal not included in the ﬁlter and to
assume a ﬁrst-match (or last-match) policy whereby a principal is assigned the ﬁrst (or
last) ﬁlter mapping that applies to them.
Deﬁnition 7.9 (Exhaustivenss). A ﬁlter  is exhaustive if every principal belongs to at
least one group in the domain of the ﬁlter, that is
S
G2dom()~G = A.
Deﬁnition 7.10 (Non-ambiguity). A ﬁlter  is non-ambiguous if every principal belongs
to at most one group in the domain of the ﬁlter, that is ~G \ ~G0 = ; for all distinct
groups G and G0 in dom().
It is easy to check that an exhaustive, non-ambiguous ﬁlter assigns every principal
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deﬁne the projection of a ﬁlter  onto a principal a, which we denote by a, to be the
tuple containing the principal that issued the ﬁlter, the mode and the ﬁltering expression
assigned to the principal. This tuple summarises all the information in a ﬁlter that is
relevant to a particular principal and is needed to compute their view of a provenance
sequence.
Deﬁnition 7.11. The projection a of an exhaustive, non-ambiguous ﬁlter  onto a
principal a is the tuple (b;m;E) where b is the issuer of  and (m;E) is the image of a
under .
We give the formal semantics of ﬁlters in Figure 7.5. As in Section 5.3, it turns out to be
simpler to use a modiﬁed grammar for provenance sequences. The two grammars are
equivalent for our purposes however, and any choice of one over the other is merely for
convenience.
Figure 7.5. The ﬁlter language: semantics of ﬁlter mappings
view(a;) , 
view(a;e ; ) , e ; view(a;)




apply(E;view(a;)) if a = (b;casc;E)
apply(E;view(b;)) if a = (b;over;E)
A principal’s view of the empty provenance sequence  is simply the empty sequence
itself as there are no ﬁlters in this case. For concatenation e;, the view of principal a is
given as e ; view(a;), where the event e is left unaltered as no ﬁlter is applied to it, and
is concatenated to a’s view of the remainder of the sequence . For a ﬁltered provenance
sequence b:F . , the view of principal a depends on the mode speciﬁed: if the mode
is casc then it is given as apply(E;view(a;)), that is by applying the ﬁlter expression
E associated with a to their view of the rest of the sequence ; otherwise if the mode
is over, a’s view is given as apply(E;view(b;)), which is to say by applying E to the
issuer’s own view. The function apply takes a ﬁlter expression and a pattern and returns
a weakening of that pattern. It gives the semantics of ﬁlter expressions and its deﬁnition
is given in Figure 7.6.
Wehavealreadyexplainedinformallyhoweachofthedierentﬁlterexpressionswork. It
is probably worth iterating that ﬁlter expressions are used to select parts of a provenance
sequence, and that those parts that are selected are hidden from principals by replacing
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not selected are left visible to the principal. The evaluation of ﬁlter names is done with
respect to a global set of deﬁnitions D, which associates with each ﬁlter name A a
ﬁltering expression E. Each such association is denoted by:
ﬁl A = E
The ﬁlter expression E associated with A is given by D(A). To guarantee that ﬁlter
names are well deﬁned, we impose the same well-formedness condition on the set D
as the one imposed on pattern name deﬁnitions.
Figure 7.6. The ﬁlter language: semantics of ﬁlter expressions
apply(H;) ,
8
> > > > > > > > > > > > <
> > > > > > > > > > > > :
Any if H = all
!0 ; 00 if H = author and  = G!0 ; 00
G!Any ; 00 if H = channel and  = G!0 ; 00




> > > > > <
> > > > > :
G!apply(E;0) ; 00 if H = channel and  = G!0 ; 00






apply(E;) if   0
 otherwise
apply(E  E0;) , apply(E;apply(E0;))
apply(A;) , apply(E;) where D(A) = E
Note: All rules for send events a! are similarly applicable to receive events a?.
Our sample ﬁlter language guarantees that the views granted to principals are always
weakenings of the underlying provenance sequence. This is proved formally in Proposi-
tion 7.14. The following two lemmas are needed for the proof of the proposition.
Lemma 7.12.   0 implies that  ;    ; 0.
Proof. Assume it is the case that   0. Also assume that there exists a provenance
sequence  such that  j=  ; . It is easy to check that, from the deﬁnition of pattern
satisfaction,  must be of the form e ; 0 where e j=  and 0 j= . Recall that, from the156 Chapter 7 Security of Provenance
deﬁnition pattern weakening, since 0 j=  then it must be that 0 j= 0. From this latter,
we can infer that e ; 0 j=  ; 0. Hence, we conclude that  ;    ; 0. 
Lemma 7.13.   0 implies that   apply(E;0).
Proof. The full proof of this proceeds by induction on the deﬁnition apply( ), however
it is be enough to observe that the result of apply( ) is always either the same pattern
we started with or a weakening of it. 
Proposition 7.14. The language deﬁned in this section is a ﬁlter language.
Proof. We need to show that it is always the case that view(a;) is a weakening of jj,
that is, jj  view(a;). This can be done by induction on the deﬁnition of the function
view( ). There are three cases.
In the ﬁrst case, we have view(a;) = . So the properly clearly holds since   .
In the second case, we have view(a;e;0) = e;view(a;0). From the induction hypothesis,
we can get j0j  view(a;0), and from this latter, we can conclude by Lemma 7.12 that
je ; 0j  e ; view(a;0).
In the last case, we have view(a; . 0) = apply(E;view(a;0)) if a = (b;casc;E) or
view(a; . 0) = apply(E;view(b;0)) if a = (b;over;E). The induction hypothesis
gives us j0j  view(a;0) and j0j  view(b;0) respectively. So all we need to do is
show that j0j  view(a;0) and j0j  view(b;0) imply j0j  apply(E;view(a;0)) and
j0j  apply(E;view(b;0)), which follow directly from Lemma 7.13 
7.3.3 Examples
In this section, we give a few example ﬁlters and systems to illustrate the use of our
sample ﬁlter language and the interplay between ﬁlters and provenance tracking in the
calculus. We start by deﬁning some useful ﬁlters and then use them to deﬁne systems
that model some common scenarios and settings.
7.3.3.1 Useful ﬁlters
Here we only deﬁne the ﬁlter expressions. We can then plug them into the appropri-
ate ﬁlter mappings depending on the requirements of the system we are interested in
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Turning o provenance tracking. The simplest ﬁlter expression is the one that hides
all provenance information. We denote it by o  and deﬁne it as follows:
o  = all
Thisﬁlterexpressionhidesallprovenance, whetherrelatingtotheprincipal’sownactions
or to those of other principals. This is consistent with the aims of ﬁlters as we want
principals to be able to hide their own actions as well as those of their “sources”. If every
principal were to apply this ﬁlter to all their outputs, it would have the eect of turning
o provenance tracking completely.
Identity ﬁlter. The ﬁlter expression o  hides all provenance information; at the
other end of the spectrum we ﬁnd the identity ﬁlter expression id. This latter does not
hide any provenance from principals. It simply keeps the view of provenance given to
principals unchanged. The id ﬁlter is deﬁned as follows:
id = [F]all
where F stands for any unsatisﬁable pattern such as a!Any;a!Any. Since the condition of
this ﬁlter expression is unsatisﬁable, it won’t match any part of the provenance sequence
and hence will not hide any provenance from principals. Note that, strictly speaking, the
ﬁlter id does not give principals full view of the provenance sequence. What it does
instead is give principals full view of the provenance relating to the issuer’s own actions;
access to provenance relating to other principals’ actions will depend on what ﬁlters
were applied by those other principals. This is an intended feature of the ﬁlter language
as every principal should have full ownership of their own provenance and its disclosure
should be subject to their own policies.
Anonymising ﬁlter. The third ﬁlter we deﬁne is one that allows principals to post data
anonymously. It leaves all provenance relating to other principals intact but completely
masks the identify of the poster. It is deﬁned as follows:
anon = A  tail=A
A = author  channel=(author  A)
This ﬁlter is more complicated than the ﬁrst two and shows a bit more of the features of
our ﬁlter language. To see that it correctly allows a principal to post data anonymously,
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event after data is posted by the principal, as shown below:
a!(a?::: ; b!:::) ; a?(a?:::) ; :::
As can be seen from the example sequence above, the identity of the poster does not only
appear as the author of the receive and send events. It may also appear as the author in
the provenance of the channels used to receive and send, and so on in the provenance of
the nested channels. To correctly mask the identity of a in the example above, the ﬁlter
needs to mask all shown occurrences of a as well as those deeper in the provenance of
the two channels. The ﬁlter anon achieves that since it masks the author of the output
event, then selects the provenance of the channel used in the output, and masks the
author there too, then does this recursively. The same is done for the input event too; it
is selected using the tail selector, then its author is masked and the same recursive calls
are made to ensure that any occurrence of a as author in the provenance of the channel
is masked.
Hide my tracks. The anonymising ﬁlter we deﬁned above hides the name of the
principal from the last two events, allowing the principal to post data anonymously.
However, if the principal’s name appears in earlier parts of the provenance sequence, it
will still be visible to other principals (unless masked by other ﬁlters of course). We can
deﬁne a stronger ﬁlter which masks the name of the principal anywhere it appears in the
provenance sequence. This is given below.
hidemytracks(a) = [AnyEventBy(a) ; Any]A  tail=hidemytracks(a)
A = author  channel=(author  A)
AnyEventBy(a) = a!Any _ a?Any
The deﬁnition of the ﬁlter hidemytracks(a), where a is the name of the principal to hide,
relies on the pattern AnyEventBy(a). This latter matches any event whose author is a
and is used as part of the condition in the ﬁlter to ensure that only the name of principal
a gets hidden. After hiding a from the head of the sequence using the ﬁlter expression
A, a recursive call is made to do the same for the rest of the sequence.
Hide my sources. Another useful ﬁlter expression is hidemysources, which as the
name suggests, allows a principal to hide the sources of its data. This includes the
provenance of the value before it reached the principal. It also includes the provenance
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the same for any nested channel provenance). The deﬁnition of hidemysources is given
below.
hidemysources = A  tail=A  tail=tail=all
A = channel=(tail  A)
The deﬁnition above achieves this as follows:
 The call to the recursively deﬁned ﬁlter name A allows us to mask the provenance
of the channel used to send the value, as well as that of any nested channel. We
only mask provenance that was added to the channels before they reached the
current principal.
 The call to tail=A does the same as the above but for the channel used to receive
the value.
 The ﬁlter expression tail=tail=all hides any provenance that was added the value
before it reached the current principal.
7.3.3.2 Example systems
Anonymous proxy. Consider a system S composed of two principals a and b deﬁned
as follows:
S = a[mhpi] j b[m(b as x):P]
b = fa;b;c;:::g!Any ; Any
As can be seen from its provenance policy b, principal b only accepts data from a
certain set of principals (fa;b;c;:::g). This set happens to include a and so a can send




However, a may not wish to reveal its identity to b. In this case, another way for it to
send data to b but still hide its identity is to use another principal trusted by b as a proxy.
The following system achieves that.
S = a[nhpatai] j c[n(x):mhxi] j b[m(b as x):P]
a = fa;cg 7!casc id ; (   fa;cg) 7!casc o 160 Chapter 7 Security of Provenance
This new system can still make a similar transition to the above, in which b ends up with
the value p but a’s identity remains hidden from it. The following transition illustrates
this.
S )f c[mhp : c? ; a . a!i] j b[m(b as x):P]
)f b[Pfp:b?;c!;c?;a.a!=xg]
Here, a uses the ﬁlter a to hide the entire provenance of the value p (including a’s
identity) from every principal except a itself and c. This way c can verify the source of
the value if it needs to. Principal c then simply forwards it to b, who consumes it happily
since it trusts c. We could have achieved a similar eect in a number of other ways. For
example, by using the weaker ﬁlter anon at a to hide the identity of a only and leave
any other provenance visible, or by letting c decide how best to hide the identity of a
from b before forwarding the value.
Conference. The second example we give models a simpliﬁed version of the paper
reviewing process at a conference. In this simpliﬁed model, the program committee is
represented by a single principal whose job is to announce the conference call for papers,
collect papers submitted by authors and forward them to selected referees for review.
Once the papers are reviewed, the program committee collates this information and
decides which papers to accept to the conference. The reviews and committee decisions
are then communicated to the authors of papers. We assume a double blind reviewing
process where the identities of a paper’s authors are kept hidden from the reviewers of
the paper and the identities of the reviewers are kept hidden from the authors of the paper.
This has to be ensured by the program committee.
System overview. At a high level, the conference can be modelled as a system Conf
composed of three subsystems: PC (representing the program committee of the confer-
ence), Auth (representing one or more authors of papers submitted to the conference),
and Ref (representing one or more referees responsible for reviewing submissions).
Conf = PC j Auth j Ref
To keep things simple, we model the program committee as a single principal and we
assume that we only have 3 authors (each writing and submitting a single paper) and 2
referees (each reviewing all 3 papers).Chapter 7 Security of Provenance 161
Authors. We start by modeling the behaviour of authors as follows.
Auth = i2f1;2;3gauthi[ann(x):xhpaperi;rii j ri (yp;yrs):Pi]
Authors receive the announcement that the conference is open for paper submissions
on channel ann. With the announcement, they receive the channel name on which the
submissions should be made. Each author authi then submits their paper paperi together
with a return channel ri on which the program committee can send back the paper and
its reviews to the author.
Referees. The behaviour of the two referees is described below.
Ref = i2f1;2gref i[j2f1;2;3greqi (xj):revi hxj;reviewi(xj)i]
Each referee ref i receives the three papers to review on channel reqi. The referee then
sends back the papers together with their reviews to the program committee on channel
revi. Associated with each referee ref i is a function reviewi which gives their review of
paper p as reviewi(p).
Program committee. Now we describe the behaviour of the program committee. As
we have seen, the authors and referees do not employ any ﬁlters to hide the provenance
of data they send to the program committee. Instead, they rely on this latter to mask
their identities as required to ensure that the reviewing process retains its anonymity
properties.
PC = pc[i2f1;2;3g((n)annhni j n(xi;yi):
j2f1;2g(reqj hxi at
0i j revj (xp; xr):yi hxp at
00; xr at
00i))]
The program committee announces the conference is open for paper submissions on
channel ann. Each paper author that listens for this announcement will receive a fresh
channel n on which to send back their paper. The program committee accepts three
paper submissions, and forwards each paper it receives to the two referees on channels
req1 and req2. When sending the papers to the referees, the program committee applies
the ﬁlter 0 to their provenance to mask the identity of the authors from the referees. It
then listens on channels rev1 and rev2 for the response from the referees. The responses
from the referees consist of the papers together with their reviews. Each pair of these
gets forwarded to the respective author of the paper, making sure of course that any
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appropriately. This is done using the ﬁlter 00. The deﬁnitions of the two ﬁlters 0 and
00 are given below.
Filters. We know what each of the ﬁlters 0 and 00 needs to achieve.
1. Filter 0 should mask any provenance information that might reveal the identity
of a paper’s author, in particular to the referees.
2. Filter 00 should mask any provenance information that might reveal the identity
of a paper’s reviewer, in particular to its author.
The ﬁlter 0 can be implemented easily by hiding all provenance information that refers
to the history of the paper before it reached the program committee. This way the ﬁlter
0 does not depend on the speciﬁcs of any particular paper or its history before it reached
the program committee. The provenance information should be hidden from everyone
except the program committee itself, which will need this information when sending
back the reviews to the authors.

0 = (   pc 7!over hidemysources) ; (pc 7!over id)
For ﬁlter 00, again to avoid depending on the speciﬁcs of the papers or the referees’
behaviour, we mask all provenance information that was added after the value was
sent from the program committee to the referees. In addition to this, since the reviewing
process is complete now, the program committee can reveal the identities of authors. The
program committee is able do this since it retained full access to the entire provenance
information of the papers and therefore it can use a ﬁlter with mode over to reveal the
previously hidden identities of authors.

00 = (   pc 7!over hidemytracks(ref 1)  hidemytracks(ref 2)) ; (pc 7!over id)
System transitions. Our conference system Conf proceeds as follows. First, the
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Finally, the program committee sends the papers and their reviews to the authors, an-















This chapter introduced two concepts, weakenings and ﬁlters. These two allowed us to
split the problem of controlling the disclosure of provenance into two parts. The ﬁrst
part, addressed by weakenings, considered how the control of provenance disclosure is
achieved; while the second, addressed by ﬁlters, looked at what programming constructs
need to be added to the calculus to implement provenance disclosure policies. The ver-
satility of the pattern language introduced in Chapter 3 and the similarity of its patterns
to provenance sequences meant that these patterns could serve as a general notion of
weakening. This enabled us to implement a wide range of provenance disclosure policies164 Chapter 7 Security of Provenance
giving principals full control over what parts of provenance are made available to other
principals.
The sample ﬁlter language we proposed, while targeting only a subset of weakenings,
still allowed us to express a very broad set of examples with varying requirements for
provenance disclosure. Not only that, but the combination of over and casc modes
oered us a lot of ﬂexibility and allowed us to implement systems where previously
hidden provenance may be revealed. The aim of this, as we saw, is to give principals
ownership of the provenance of their data and provide them with a way of dynamically
changing the visibility of provenance information. All of these points were illustrated
by examples in Section 7.3.3.
It is worth noting that the primary driver for this extension of the calculus is security. In
Section 7.1, we described how weakenings can also achieve another aim, that of abstract-
ing away from irrelevant details in provenance sequences. We did not consider this when
proposing ﬁlters however. If removing irrelevant details from provenance sequences is
required, then it may still be achievable through ﬁlters. One way to do this would be to
perform an optimization on systems whereby inaccessible provenance is deleted. Con-
sider for example the ﬁlter  7!over o  which when applied to a provenance sequence
hides all of it from every principal. Consider the application of this ﬁlter to provenance
sequence  which results in the ﬁltered provenance sequence ( 7!over o ) . . This
provenance sequence would be seen as Any by every principal and there is no way for
any principal to change that. Hence, there is no reason to keep the original provenance
sequence, and a run time optimization may simply replace it with Any without aecting
the behaviour of the system. We do not pursue this further in this work as it is orthogonal
to our aims.
As explained already, the tracking of provenance in the original calculus is performed at
run time by the operational semantics. Recall that the aim of the operational semantics
is to provide a formal speciﬁcation of the behaviour of the underlying infrastructure.
This infrastructure may take the form of a run time environment, an operating system or
even a combination of software and hardware components. As an implementation of the
operational semantics, the underlying infrastructure is therefore responsible for handling
communication between principals and tracking the provenance of data. The infrastruc-
ture guarantees the integrity of provenance information and is assumed to be trustworthy.
This same assumption is also present in the extension of the calculus described in this
chapter. Furthermore, the infrastructure is also responsible for implementing ﬁlters and
enforcing their security requirements. There are likely to be several ways of doing this
depending on how provenance tracking, storage and access are implemented. One wayChapter 7 Security of Provenance 165
to implement these latter is for the infrastructure to track provenance, store it in a secure
provenance repository and only pass references it to principals. When a principal makes
a provenance query, which in our calculus takes the form of a pattern on an input action,
the infrastructure checks the provenance sequence referenced against the pattern and
returns a boolean true or false depending on whether the provenance sequence satisﬁes
the pattern or not. The principal has no access to the actual provenance information.
This makes implementing ﬁlters easy. The infrastructure stores the ﬁltered provenance
sequence (that is the provenance sequence with all the ﬁlters imposed on it) in the
provenance repository. When a principal makes a provenance query, the infrastructure
calculates the principal’s view of the referenced provenance sequence, checks this view
against the query and returns the results to the principal. Again, queries are simply
patterns and therefore their results are simply a boolean specifying whether the pattern
is satisﬁed by the principal’s view or not.Chapter 8
Domain Bisimulation
In the extension of the provenance calculus presented in the previous chapter, principals
are able, through the application of ﬁlters, to associate dierent views of the same prove-
nance sequence with dierent principals. The ﬁlters speciﬁed by a particular principal
can be thought of as the implementation of an underlying provenance disclosure policy,
which itself is left implicit. This is similar to patterns; patterns as we saw in chapters
3 and 4 provide the implementation of the principal’s provenance consumption policy.
These two are complementary, patterns allow principals to use available provenance in-
formation to decide which data to consume while ﬁlters allow them to decide who may
access the provenance of data they produce. The behavioural equivalences proposed
in Chapter 4 allowed us to study the role of patterns and provenance tracking in the
calculus at a more abstract level. Similarly, with the aim of providing a more declarative
way to talk about provenance disclosure policies and the role of ﬁlters, we deﬁne in
this chapter a notion of behavioural equivalence for the ﬁltered calculus. We make this
equivalence parametric on the set of principals comprising the observer. By varying the
set of principals, and hence the privileges, available to the observer, we should be able
to specify the requirements of provenance disclosure policies and verify the correctness
of their implementations as sets of ﬁlters.
We ﬁrst start by reviewing the version of the calculus deﬁned in the previous chapter and
providing an alternative formulation of its semantics in the form of a labelled transition
system. This is covered in Section 8.1. After that, in Section 8.2, we deﬁne domain
congruences, a family of behavioural equivalences that is sensitive to the domain of the
observer. This means that the discriminating powerof the equivalence depends on the set
of principals available to the observer. The reason for making the equivalence parametric
on the domain of the observer is to be able to reﬂect, in the equivalence, the dierent
views assigned to dierent principals by ﬁlters. That way, we can use the equivalences
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to specify the desired aims of a principal’s provenance disclosure policy and check
whether the ﬁlters used by the principal achieve those aims. Finally, in Section 8.3, we
provide a characterisation of domain equivalence based on the labelled transition system
semantics of the calculus. Not only does this provide us with an ecient way to prove
domain equivalence, it also sheds more light on its properties and the role of ﬁlters in
the calculus. Section 8.4 provides some concluding remarks.
8.1 The provenance calculus with ﬁlters
Chapter7extendedtheprovenancecalculuswithﬁlterstogiveprincipalscontroloverthe
provenance information of data they publish. Filters allowed principals to specify how
much provenance other principals are able to see and hence gave them a way to control
the disclosure of sensitive provenance information. This extension involved changes
to the output construct so that principals could specify what ﬁlter to apply, as well as
changes to the input construct so that principals could only check their policies against
their views of provenance and not the entire provenance sequence. We give a brief
overview of these changes in this section and then provide an alternative formulation
of the semantics of the calculus using a labelled transition system. This alternative
semantics will form the basis of the bisimulation deﬁned later in section 8.3. Note
that for the purposes of this chapter, we do not need to rely on the speciﬁcs of any
ﬁlter language. Instead, we give our results in terms of the generic description of ﬁlter
languages given in Deﬁnition 7.5. The results should be correct for any concrete ﬁlter
language, including of course the sample ﬁlter language deﬁned in the previous chapter.
8.1.1 Syntax and reduction semantics
In terms of syntax, we introduced a new syntactic category for ﬁlters, ranged over by
the letters ; ;:::. We also extended the syntax of provenance sequences with ﬁltered
sequences  .  to denote the application of ﬁlter  to provenance sequence . The
output construct was also modiﬁed to specify, in addition to the channel name and value,
the ﬁlter to apply to the provenance of the value being sent. The syntax of ﬁlters itself
was left unspeciﬁed as the calculus was made parametric on the ﬁlter language. We do
the same here as the exact details of the ﬁlter language should not have any bearing on
the results presented in this chapter. The rest of the syntax of the calculus remained
unchanged from what was given in Chapter 3.Chapter 8 Domain Bisimulation 169
The reduction semantics of the calculus was given in terms of two relations, structural
congruence f and reduction !f. Structural congruence for the extended calculus is the
same as that of the original calculus, of course adapted to the new syntax. The reduction
relation on the other hand changes to account for the addition of ﬁlters. As we saw, only
the input and output rules were modiﬁed. When sending a value, the ﬁlter speciﬁed by
the principal is applied to the provenance of the value, while when receiving a value,
the principal is only allowed to perform pattern matching against their own view of
provenance. The previous chapter gives more information about the calculus and ﬁlters
while Appendix B gives the full deﬁnitions of its syntax and reduction semantics.
8.1.2 Labelled semantics
In this chapter, we aim to deﬁne both a contextual equivalence and a coinductive charac-
terisation of it. In order to be able to deﬁne this latter, we need to introduce a labelled
version of the semantics of the ﬁltered calculus.
8.1.2.1 Actions
The labelled semantics is given in terms of a family of binary relations on systems of
the form

 !f, where  ranges over actions. We have four kinds of actions as follows:
1. mhp:i: which denotes the output of the free annotated value p :  on channel m.
2. m(n:): which denotes the output of the bound annotated name n :  on channel m.
3. mhp:i: which denotes the input of the free annotated value p :  on channel m.
4. : which denotes the unobservable (internal) action.
As indicated above, the name n in action m(n : ) is bound; all other occurrences of
names in actions are free. We use bn() and fn() for the sets of bound names and free
names in action  respectively. We denote the union of these two by n().
8.1.2.2 Rules of the labelled transition system
While the reduction semantics gives an internal view of the behaviour of systems, ex-
pressing how communication happens within a system; the labelled semantics gives an170 Chapter 8 Domain Bisimulation
external view of it, expressing how a system could potentially communicate if put in a
suitable environment. Internal actions, labelled with , indicate the communication of
some value within the system itself, and hence should correspond to system transitions
in the reduction semantics. The external environment would not be expected to aect
or perceive internal actions beyond merely observing their occurrence. External actions
on the other hand, labelled with input or output labels as described already, indicate the
ability of the system to engage in communication if the environment were to perform a
complementary action. This requirement on the side of the external environment means
that the environment is able to observe exactly what took place in the case of external
actions.
The family of transition relations

 !f, where  ranges over actions, is deﬁned by the
rules of Figure 8.1.
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The rules in Figure 8.1 describe what actions a particular system is able to perform. The
rule FAct Snd expresses that a principal a[m:m hp:p ati] may perform an internal
action  which would result in the message mhhp :  . a!m ; pii. This is actually the
same as FRed Snd. As previously stated, this is to be expected as internal actions in
the labelled semantics are meant to mirror the transitions of the reduction relation. The
message produced by the output system may be consumed by a system listening on the
same channel like we saw in the reduction semantics. In the labelled semantics, this is
expressed by a number of rules. Firstly, the production of a value to be consumed is
expressedby the rule FAct Msg, whichstates thata message mhhp:pii may perform the
action mhp:pi, indicating the outputoffree value p:p on channelm. Secondly, a system
listening on channel m may perform the input action mhp:pi, inputting a value with
suitable provenance and resulting in the system a[Pjfp:a?m;p=xg]. The two rules FAct
Msg and FAct Rcv give the two halves of communication expressed by the rule FRed
Rcv in the reduction semantics. So ﬁnally, to complete the communication transition,
these two halves may be joined together by the rule FAct Comm-l, indicating the
communication of a value from one part of the system to another. This, from the point
of view of the external environment, is perceived as an internal action  with no further
details on what value was actually communicated or what channel it was communicated
on. Note that for some rules, we have a left and a right variant, which dier only in the
position of the two systems involved. These rules have the sux “-l” to distinguish
them from others. We only included the left versions in the above ﬁgure; the right
versions can be obtained by swapping the positions of the two systems in the left version.
The remaining rules of the labelled transition system are for the most part adaptations
of those of the asynchronous -calculus to our setting. The reader is referred to the
literature for more information on labelled transition systems in general as well as to
their use in the -calculus in particular.
8.1.2.3 Correspondence between the two semantics
The labelled transition system of Figure 8.1 is meant to provide an alternative formu-
lation of the semantics of the ﬁltered calculus, and as such, we expect it to coincide
with the reduction semantics which we reviewed brieﬂy in the previous section. This is172 Chapter 8 Domain Bisimulation
shown formally in Theorem 8.5. To prove this latter as well as other results below, we
need to ﬁrst prove a number of properties concerning the labelled transition system and
its relation to the reduction semantics. We do this below. Note that we omit the proofs
of these lemmas as they are simply adaptations of equivalent results from the literature
to our setting.
Lemma 8.1. S f T and T

 !f T0 implies that S

 !f S 0 for some S 0 such that
T0 f S 0.
Lemma 8.2. S

 !f S 0 implies that S  !f S 0.
Lemma 8.3. The labelled semantics satisﬁes the following properties:
 S
mhvi
 !f S 0 implies that S f mhhvii j S 0.
 S
m(n)
 !f S 0 implies that S f (n)(mhhnii j S 0).
Lemma 8.4. S  !f S 0 implies that S

 !f S 00 for some S 00 such that S 0 f S 00.
Theorem 8.5. S  !f S 0 if and only if S

 !f S 00 and S 00 f S 0.
Proof. Follows from Lemma 8.2 and Lemma 8.4. 
8.2 Contextual equivalence
Filters give principals ownership of the provenance information and allow them to spec-
ify how much of it they wish to be made available to other principals. Even more, they
let a principal classify other principals into dierent groups and give each group its own
view of provenance. The classiﬁcation of principals into groups would be driven by
the properties of the underlying domain being modelled, such as the trustworthiness
attributed to dierent principals, their assigned clearance levels, or their registered in-
terests. What exactly drives this classiﬁcation in a particular system, and indeed the
classiﬁcation itself and what it entails in terms of provenance disclosure, are left implicit
however. What we are able to see instead is how this is implemented by ﬁlters. Be-
cause ﬁlters are “embedded in the code”, it is hard to tell from them what the intended
provenance disclosure policy of the principal is. Moreover, the absence of a high level
speciﬁcation of a principal’s provenance disclosure policy, and of a method to relate it
to its low level implementation by a set of ﬁlters, means that there is no way for us to
tell if the ﬁlters correctly implement the desired policy of the principal. Our aim in this
section is to address this by proposing a notion of behavioural equivalence that could
serve such a purpose.Chapter 8 Domain Bisimulation 173
8.2.1 Provenance disclosure policies
Fundamentally, provenance disclosure policies, and by extension ﬁlters as these latter
are no more than the implementations of disclosure policies, assign each principal or
group of principals a view of the provenance information. Hence, in order for us to be
able to reason about the role of ﬁlters, we make our notion of behavioural equivalence
parametric on the set of principals available to the observer. That way, we can vary the
set of principals making up the observer and look at how that aects the equivalence.
What that gives us, in eect, is a more declarative higher level way of looking at the
provenance view assigned to each principal. To illustrate this, consider for example a
principal a running process P and whose provenance disclosure policy dictates that they
should remain anonymous in all their dealings with principals b and c. To ensure this,
we could analyse the process P running at a and make sure that in all its interactions
with the outside world it never does anything that could divulge its identity to b or c.
This means verifying all patterns and ﬁlters used in P and ensuring that they eectively
hide a’s identity from b and c. Even for such a simple policy, the analysis would not
be straightforward. Using our notion of equivalence on the other hand, anonymity with
respect to principals b and c could be stated simply as:
a[P] ub;c a[P] for all renamings 
What the above says is that the system a[P] is indistinguishable to principals b and c
from the system a[P]. This latter represents the result of renaming a in a[P] to some
other principal name. Since b and c (no matter what processes they are running) can
not distinguish between a[P] and a0[P] (or a00[P] or any system that we would get by
applying a renaming  to a[P]), then we know that the ﬁlters in P correctly hide the
identity of a from b and c.
The two principals b and c in the equivalence ub;c can be thought of as the two principals
comprising the observer. That is, the observer, working to distinguish between the two
systems a[P] and a[P], may run any process under the authority of principals b and c.
That allows the observer to view any provenance made available to these two principals.
We refer to sets of principal names such as fb;cg as domains, and refer to notions of
behavioural equivalence such as ub;c that are parametric on such sets of principal names
as domain congruences. Note that the notion of observer used in domain congruences
is the traditional one used in most deﬁnitions of bisimulation. That is, an observer is a
term in the calculus and therefore has no additional information than that obtained from
interacting with the systems under observation according to the rules of the calculus.174 Chapter 8 Domain Bisimulation
Note also that since we are making the equivalence parametric on the domain of the
observer, what we actually have is a family of equivalence relations, one foreach domain.
8.2.2 Domain congruences
Domaincongruencesareanadaptation ofthestandardframeworkofbarbedbisimulation
and congruence [50, 64] to our setting. Like other barbed congruences, they equate two
systems if they exhibit the same observable behaviour, evolve to equivalent systems, and
cannot be distinguished when put in the same context. The dierence, however, is in
the contexts we choose; each domain congruence is identiﬁed by a set of principals and
required to be closed under contexts of that set.
8.2.2.1 Domains
The domain of a system is simply the set of principals it contains. This is important since
ﬁlters associate views of provenance with principals, and therefore knowing the domain
of a system allows us to determine how much provenance is available to it. Given a
system S, its domain is denoted by dom(S) and is deﬁned inductively on the structure of
system S as given in Deﬁnition 8.6. We extend the notion of domains to contexts in 8.7.
To make it easier to group systems and contexts based on their domains, we deﬁne the
notion of D-systems and D-contexts. A system S is said to be a D-system if its domain
is a subset of the set of principal names D. Again, D-contexts are deﬁned similarly. The
formal deﬁnition of D-systems and D-contexts is given in Deﬁnition 8.8.
Deﬁnition 8.6 (Domain of a system). The domain of a system is deﬁned as follows:




fag if a[P] 6f 0
; if a[P] f 0
dom((n)S) = dom(S) dom(S j T) = dom(S) [ dom(T)
Deﬁnition 8.7 (Domain of a context). The domain of a context is deﬁned as follows:
dom([:]) = ; dom((n)C) = dom(C)
dom(S j C) = dom(S) [ dom(C) dom(C j S) = dom(C) [ dom(S)Chapter 8 Domain Bisimulation 175
Deﬁnition 8.8 (D-systems and D-contexts). Let D be a domain. A D-system is a system
S whose domain is a subset of D, i.e., dom(S)  D. Similarly, a D-context is a context
C whose domain is a subset of D, i.e., dom(C)  D.
Note that dom( ) is preserved under structural congruence. That is, for any two systems
S and T, the fact that S f T holds implies that dom(S) = dom(T) also holds. This is
the case because the clause for dom(a[P]) guarantees that any inactive principals are not
included in the domain of the system. To illustrate this, consider the following example:
a[mhvi] f a[mhvi] j b[0] f a[mhvi] j b[0] j c[0]
Although all three systems above contain dierent principals, their domains are in fact
the same because they only dier in the inactive principals b[0] and c[0]. These two
both have the empty set as their domain, and therefore, the domains of all three systems
are the set fag. Proposition 8.9 shows that the notion of D-systems (and by extension
D-contexts) is preserved under structural congruence.
Proposition 8.9. Let S and T be systems. If S f T holds, then for all domains D, it
holds that S is a D-system if and only if T is a D-system.
Proof. Let us assume that S f T. The proof proceeds by rule induction on the deriva-
tion of S f T. In each case, it should be obvious that dom(S) = dom(T). In fact, the
only case where the set of principals appearing in the systems changes is a[0] f 0. As
we have already explained, both of these have the domain ;. In all other cases, the set
of principals stays the same. Since the domains of S and T are the same, then they are
subsets of exactly the same sets. Therefore, system S is a D-system if and only if system
T is a D-system. 
8.2.2.2 The family of domain congruences
The observation predicate, denoted by S #f m and deﬁned formally in Deﬁnition 8.10,
states that channel name m is observable at system S. What this means is that a system
that is interacting with system S, particularly an observer, can expect system S to send
some value on channel m. Therefore, all that is needed for the observer to interact with
S is to listen on channel m. Other than listening for outputs from the systems under
observation, the observer has no other way of telling systems apart. In particular, it has
no information aboutthe internalstructure ofthe systems, itcannoteavesdrop on internal
communication performed on private channels, and it cannot in general tell when a value176 Chapter 8 Domain Bisimulation
it sent is received as the calculus only allows asynchronous communication. In addition
to this, the provenance infrastructure is assumed to be both trusted and secure; that is,
provenance information cannot be forged and ﬁlters cannot be circumvented.
Deﬁnition 8.10 (Observation predicate). We say that a channel name m is observable at
a system S, written S #f m, if and only if S f (n)(mhhvii j S 0) for some name n, value
v and system S 0 such that m , n. We also write S +f m to mean that there exists some
system S 0 such that S =)f S 0 and S 0 #f m.
Since we are working in an asynchronous setting, only outputs are generally observable
by the environment. That is, in most cases, an observer interacting with the system
according to the rules of the calculus would not be able to detect when a value it sent has
been received by the system. There are special cases under which inputs are observable
however and we shall comment on these later. Note that since we use two-step commu-
nication in our calculus, what is observable are messages and not to output processes.
We only need to consider the channel of the message as the equivalence we obtain is
the same as the one that we would get if we had taken more of the message as our basic
observable.
We deﬁne the family of domain congruences below. Each domain congruence is associ-
ated with a domain D and characterises those systems that are perceived as behaviourally
equivalent by all observers whose domain is the set D. The dierence between an
observer whose domain is D and an observer whose domain is D0 is the amount of
provenance they are able to view. Therefore, domain equivalences enable us to reason
about the views of provenance assigned to principals by ﬁlters. The other aspects of
the deﬁnition of domain congruences are standard. Two systems are considered to be
behaviourally equivalent if they exhibit the same observables, remain equivalent through-
out their lifecycles and cannot be distinguished by any context induced by the particular
domain congruence.
Deﬁnition 8.11 (Domain congruence). Let D be a domain. D-congruence, uD, is the
largest symmetric binary relation on systems that is:
 barb-preserving: S uD T implies that for all channel names m, if S #f m then
T +f m.
 reduction-closed: S uD T implies that if S  !f S 0 for some S 0 then T =)f T0
for some T0 such that S 0 uD T0.
 D-contextual: S uD T implies that C[S] uD C[T] for all initial D-contexts C.Chapter 8 Domain Bisimulation 177
Restricting contextuality in domain congruences to contexts with a particular domain
means that some dierences in provenance between systems will not be detectable by
the observing environment. An observer whose domain is restricted to principals in a
particular set can only discriminate between systems based on the views of provenance
made available to principals in that set. Note that in addition to this, we are also re-
stricting contextuality to initial contexts. Recall that a context is initial if all its values
have empty provenance. The reason we restrict the equivalence to initial contexts is to
be able to account for all provenance that arises in the observer by its interaction with
the system under observation. It should be clear that the more principal names that are
available to the observer to use, the more provenance the observer is able to see, and
hence the ﬁner the resulting domain equivalence is. This is formally stated and proved
in Proposition 8.12.
Proposition 8.12. Let D be a domain. For all domains D0 such that D0  D, it holds
that uD  uD0.
Proof. Let D and D0 be two domains such that D0  D. To prove that uD  uD0 holds,
we just need to show that uD satisﬁes all the properties of uD0. By deﬁnition, uD is
symmetric, barb-preserving and reduction-closed. So we just need to show that it is
preserved by D0-contexts. This is easy to show since uD is preserved by D-contexts, and
every D0 context is by deﬁnition a D-context. 
The second property we prove about domain congruences is that they are equivalence
relations. This will allow us to use equational reasoning to prove the equivalence of
systems.
Proposition 8.13. Let D be a domain. The domain congruence uD is an equivalence
relation.
Proof. Let D be a domain. We know that uD is symmetric by deﬁnition. We need
to show that it is also reﬂexive and transitive; we do that by contradiction. Assume
(S;S) < uD and consider the relation
:
uD deﬁned as (S;S) [ uD. It is easy to show that
:
uD satisﬁes all the deﬁning properties of Deﬁnition 8.11 and since it is larger than uD,
we have reached a contradiction. Hence, it must be the case that S uD S. The proof of
transitivity is similar. 178 Chapter 8 Domain Bisimulation
8.2.2.3 System properties
With these deﬁnitions in place, we can now formally prove properties about systems
modelledin the ﬁlteredcalculus. Forinstance, we can prove whetherthe ﬁlters employed
by principal a in the example given earlier in this section correctly keep its identity
anonymous from principals b and c or not. In order to do that, we need to give more
concrete details about the example itself. Let us then use the sample ﬁlter language of
Section 7.3 and deﬁne the system S as follows:
S , a[mhpati] where  , fb;cg 7!over anon ; (   fb;cg) 7!over id
The example above is very simple and makes use of two of the ﬁlter idioms we deﬁned
in the previous chapter, anon and id. As we saw in the previous chapter, the ﬁlter
anon is an anonymising ﬁlter while the ﬁlter id is an inert ﬁlter. Used as given above
in the example, these should allow principal a to hide its identify from b and c.
Proposition 8.14. Let S be the system deﬁned as follows:
S , a[mhpati] where  , fb;cg 7!over anon ; (   fb;cg) 7!over id
It is the case that S ub;c S for any renaming .
Proof. In order to show that S ub;c S, we just need to ﬁnd a relation r that contains
the pair (S;S) and that exhibits the three deﬁning properties of ub;c. Once we do
that, it would follow that r  ub;c since ub;c is by deﬁnition the largest relation that
satisﬁes those three properties. Let r be the relation containing pairs of the form (S;S)
and closed under initial fb;cg-contexts. Relation r is by deﬁnition fb;cg-contextual and
therefore we only need to show that it is barb-preserving and reduction-closed. We do
this by induction on why the pair (S;T) is in relation r. There are two cases, either
(S;T) is of the form (S 0;S 0) for some system S 0 and renaming , or (S;T) is of the
form (C[S 0];C[T0]) for some initial fb;cg-context C and systems S 0 and T0 that are in
relation r. In each case, we need to show that (S;T) have the same observables and
make the same reductions. The details should be straightforward. The important thing
to note is that the systems C[S] and C[S] will have exactly the same observables and
reductions because the context C will not be able to detect the name of principal a and
its renaming a in the provenance of value p. This is a result of the application of ﬁlter
 to the provenance sequence. 
Recall that renamings were one of the methods we used to compare the plain version
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identities do not play any role in the semantics of the plain version of the calculus,
its behavioural equivalence was invariant under renamings. However, this was not the
case in the annotated version as provenance tracking and checking expose the identities
of principals to the external environment. The above proposition, on the other hand,
shows that under certain circumstances renamings are immaterial in the ﬁltered version
of the calculus too. This is interesting as it shows the trade-os between provenance
tracking and ﬁltering. Provenance tracking exposes the identities of principals and
their communication history to other principals; while ﬁltering masks that information,
positioning the ﬁltered calculus somewhere between the plain version and the annotated
version in terms of the availability of provenance.
Renamings are most useful for expressing and proving anonymity properties. Domain
congruences can also be used to provide speciﬁcations for more general properties
however. For example, consider the following system which is supposed to implement a
proxy:
a[m(Any as x):nhxati] where  =  7!over hidemysources
This system continuously reads data from channel m and forwards it onto channel n. It
uses the ﬁlter expression hidemysources to hide the previous provenance of the value
it receives on m before it sends it on n. A principal can use this system as a proxy when
interacting with other principals to hide all provenance of its data. We can express this
property of the proxy by the following equivalence:
S(1) u S(2)
where the system S is deﬁned as follows:
S(X) , (m)(mhhp : Xii j a[m(Any as x):nhxati])
What the above equivalence says is that the two systems S(1) and S(2) are indistin-
guishable to every system. System S(X) represents the proxy attempting to hide the
provenance X. If we can prove that S(1) and S(2) are equivalent, then that should
constitute irrefutable proof that the proxy a[m(Any as x):nhxati] does indeed hide
its sources. Many other properties of ﬁlters can be expressed in a similar way using
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8.3 Domain bisimilarity
The deﬁnition of domain congruence involves a universal quantiﬁcation over initial con-
texts, and this makes it dicult to use for proving the equivalence of systems in general.
To obtain a more tractable proof methodology, we deﬁne domain bisimilarity. The deﬁni-
tion of this latter relies on the labelled transition system of Figure 8.1, which provides an
alternative formulation of the semantics of the ﬁltered version of the calculus. We should
note that the notion of bisimilarity we propose in this section is proved to be sound but
not complete. What that means is that any two systems that are deemed equivalent by
a domain bisimilarity, are guaranteed to be equivalent under the corresponding domain
congruence. However, the inverse implication does not hold. Provenance and ﬁlters
interact in subtle ways as the deﬁnition of domain bisimilarity will show. We leave it as
an open question whether a sound and complete coinductive characterisation of domain
congruence exists.
8.3.1 Observational labelled transition systems
The challenge in deﬁning a bisimulation based on the labelled transition system of Fig-
ure 8.1 is that this latter is not observational. What we mean by this is that the action
labels of the transition system contain information that would not be detectable by an
observer interacting with the system according to the rules of the calculus. More specif-
ically, an observer can only see the parts of provenance that have not been ﬁltered out
from the views of its principals. This means that we have to consider the principals avail-
able to the observer before we can decide whether two output actions are observationally
equivalent or not. To illustrate this, consider the following two systems:
S , a[mhpati] T , b[mhpati]
where  , fcg 7!over anon ; (   fcg) 7!over id. The transitions of the two systems can
be given as follows:
S






 !f mhhp :  . b!ii
mhp:.b!i
 !f 0
System S makes a  action followed by an output action with the label mhp :  . a!i.
System T makes a similar  action followed by an output action with a dierent label,
mhp :  . b!i. Since the two output labels dier in the principal name, a bisimulation
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inequivalent. However, observers interacting with the two systems do not perceive the
output labels as mhp :  . a!i and mhp :  . b!i. Instead, observers see the provenance
of data as it appears in the views assigned to their principals. So for example, if the
observer is only restricted to processes running at principal c, then it would actually
perceivethetwolabelsasmhp : !iandmhp : !i. Therefore, observerswhosedomain
is fcg would have but to declare systems S and T as equivalent. On the other hand,
observers with access to other principals, say fdg for example, would be able to observe
the entire provenance, perceiving the two outputlabels as mhp : a!i andmhp : b!i. This
implies that such observers would be able to tell the two systems S and T apart.
Comparing the views of provenance assigned to the observer is not enough to give us
a bisimulation that is consistent with domain congruences however. The reason is that
even when the observeris not able to directly access the provenance information, it could
feed the values it receives back to the two systems under testing and observe how they
react. If the reactions of the two systems are dierent, the observer can infer the reason
to be most probably hidden provenance. Either case, the observer would be able to
discern a dierence between the two systems and therefore declare them as inequivalent.
Hence, a bisimulation based on the labelled transition system need not only consider the
views of provenance available to the observer, but also those available to the two systems
themselves. The latter is important since it is possible that, by accessing provenance that
is hidden from the observer, the two systems may unintentionally leak it.
8.3.2 Equivalence of provenance
Two provenance sequences, 1 and 2 may be indistinguishable to a principal a if they
associate the same view with principal a. That is, if view(a;1) = view(a;2). We
generalise this to sets of principals by deﬁning D-equivalence.
Deﬁnition 8.15. Let D be a domain. Two provenance sequences 1 and 2 are said to be
D-equivalent, written 1 =D 2, if for all a 2 D, it holds that view(a;1) = view(a;2).
When considering whether two systems are equivalent or not, we have to take into ac-
countthe provenance annotations ofvalues they publish. Ifthese provenance annotations
are meant to be indistinguishable to the observer, then the two systems under observation
need to make sure they do not inadvertently leak any hidden provenance if those values
are fed back to them. To allow us to keep track of the dierent provenance sequences
published by the two systems in the bisimulation, we use equivalence environments.
Equivalence environments are used to keep track of pairs of provenance sequences that182 Chapter 8 Domain Bisimulation
the observer is meant to perceive as being equivalent. As the two systems under ob-
servation intend to convince the observer that any pair of provenance sequences in the
equivalence environment are the same, they need to “pretend” that these two are indeed
equivalent in all their interactions with the observer. We deﬁne D-environments to be
equivalence environments where every pair of provenance sequences are D-equivalent.
Deﬁnition 8.16. An equivalence environment is a set of pairs of provenance sequences.
We use the letter  and its variants to denote equivalence environments. We deﬁne
a D-environment to be one where every pair of provenance sequences (1;2) are D-
equivalent, i.e., where it is the case that 1 =D 2.
For a given domain D, every pair of provenance sequences in a D-environment are
considered equivalent. In addition to this, a D-environment also yields other equivalent
pairs by inference. More speciﬁcally, any two provenance sequences of which the pairs
in the D-environment are part should also be considered equivalent. We capture this in
the deﬁnition of equivalence under an environment given below.
Deﬁnition 8.17. Let D be a domain. Two provenance sequences 1 and 2 are said to be
D-equivalent under environment , written  ` 1 =D 2, if such a judgement could be
derived from the axioms and rules of Figure 8.2.
Figure 8.2. Deﬁnition of  ` 1 =D 2
Prov Eps
 `a  =D 
Prov out
a 2 D  `a 1 =D 2  `a 0
1 =D 0
2
 ` a!1 ; 0
1 =D a!2 ; 0
2
Prov In1
 `a 1 =D 2  ` 0
1 =D 0
2
 `a a?1 ; 0
1 =D a?2 ; 0
2
Prov In2
 `a 1 =D 2 (0
1;0
2) 2 
 `a a?1 ; 0
1 =D a?2 ; 0
2
8.3.3 Equivalence of systems
The following equivalence relation is useful in the proof of soundness of domain bisimi-
larity given in Theorem 8.26. The relation itself is too ﬁne as a behavioural equivalence
however as the systems it equates are identical in their plain form and only dier in
provenance. The equivalence allows the two systems to use any domain equivalent
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Deﬁnition 8.18. Let D be a domain. Two D-systems S and T are said to be equivalent
under environment , written  ` S =D T, if they do not contain any messages, their
plain counterparts are the same, and their provenance sequences are D-equivalent under
environment .
Lemma 8.19 states that systems related by the equivalence relation of Deﬁnition 8.18
remain equivalent after input actions.
Lemma 8.19. Let D be a domain,  be an environment, and S and T be two D-systems
such that  ` S =D T. If S
mhp:i
 !f S 0, then for all 0 such that  `  =D 0, it holds that
T
mhp:0i
 !f T0, for some T0 such that :(;0) ` S 0 =D T0.
Proof. Assume S and T are two D-systems such that S =D T. Assume also that S
mhp:i
 !f
S 0. We proceed by rule induction on the derivation of this transition.
The ﬁrst case is FAct Rcv, which means that the transition has the following form:
j 2 I view(a;) j= j
a[i2Im:m (i as x):Pi]
mhp:i
 !f a[Pjfp:a?m;=xg]
Since S is of the form a[i2Im:m (i as x):Pi] and S =D T, then T must be of the
form a[i2Im:0
m (i as x):P0
i] where 0
m =D m and P0
i =D Pi for i 2 I. Now, Let 0 be a
provenance sequence such that =D 0. We know thata is in the domain D, which means
that view(a;0) j= j, and hence we should be able to derive the following transition:
j 2 I view(a;0) j= j
a[i2Im:0







It is easy to see that since Pj =D P0
j and p:a?m ;  =D p:a?0





There are several other cases, but they should all be straightforward. We illustrate FAct
Exp and FAct Par-l below.
Case FAct Exp means that S
mhp:i
 !f S 0 has the form:
a[P]
mhp:i




We know that T is of the form a[(n)P0] such that P =D P0, and by the induction
hypothesis, we also know that a[P0]
mhp:0i
 !f T00 where S 00 =D T00 and  =D 0. We can184 Chapter 8 Domain Bisimulation
then use FAct Exp to derive the transition a[(n)P0]
mhp:0i
 !f (n)T00, and since S 00 =D T00
we can conclude that (n)S 00 =D (n)T00.
Case FAct Par-l means the transition S
mhp:i
 !f S 0 had the form:
S 1
mhp:i
 !f S 2 bn(mhp:i) \ fn(R) = ;
S 1 j R
mhp:i
 !f S 2 j R
Again, T must be of the form T1 j R such that S 1 =D T1, which implies by the induction
hypothesis that T1
mhp:0i
 !f T2 such that S 2 =D T2 and  =D 0. Now, we can use FAct
Par-l to derive the transition T1 j R
mhp:0i
 !f T2 j R, and since S 2 =D T2, we can conclude
that S 2 j R =D T2 j R. The other cases are similar. 
With these deﬁnitions and results in place, we are now ready to deﬁne domain bisim-
ilarity. Let us ﬁrst explain the intuitions behind it. The aim of domain bisimilarity
is to provide a coinductive characterisation of domain congruence. As such, domain
bisimilarity must only equate systems if they are equivalent under domain congruence.
We have seen that the labelled transition system is not observational, and therefore we
cannot rely on the naive matching of action labels in the deﬁnition of bisimilarity. In-
stead, for each action label, we should consider the intended domain of the observer and
equate the labels if the observer would not be able to discern any dierence between
them. More speciﬁcally, we have 4 cases:
 Internal actions  contain no provenance and therefore the way they are perceived
by the observer does not depend on its domain. Since we are interested in the
weak version of the equivalence, a  action from one system may be matched by
any number of  actions from the other.
 A free output action mhp : 1i exports an annotated value m : 1 for the observer
to consume on channel m. By listening on channel m and receiving the value,
the observer can identify the channel name of the output action. Name matching
allows the observer to discern the plain value p being sent. Finally, provenance
checking enables the observer to detect any provenance included in the views of
its principals. Therefore, the other system needs to match the output channel m,
the plain value p but not the entire provenance sequence 1. Instead, it can oer
any provenance 2 as long as it ensures the views assigned to the observer are the
same as those given by 1.
 A bound output action m(p : 1) is treated similarly to the free output action
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 An input action mhp : 1i denotes that the system may receive an annotated value
p : 1 from the observer on channel m. Since communication is asynchronous, the
observer cannot detect directly if and when the value is actually consumed by the
system. Therefore, input actions may be matched in two ways. Firstly, they can be
matched by an equivalent input action mhp : 2i. Like with output, the provenance
of the matching input action 2 can be dierent from 1 as long as it matches the
views given to principals belonging to the observer. Itis importantto note here that
the two values p : 1 and p : 2 are meant to represent values sent to the observer in
previous interactions. The observer may feed them back to the two systems under
testing and therefore it is important for the two systems to ensure their reactions
are the same, otherwise they would be divulging hidden provenance. Secondly, a
system does not have to match the input actions of another system. It can opt to
leave the message received from the observer unconsumed as long as it can match
any future actions of the other system.
Domain bisimilarity is deﬁned with respect to an equivalence environment . As we
saw, equivalence environments are used to keep track of provenance sequences sent by
the two systems. Every time an output action mhp:1i is performed by one system and a
matching one mhp:2i is performed by the other, the two provenance sequences (1;2)
are added to the environment . Every time an input action mhp:1i is performed by one
system, the other system has to be able to match it for every provenance sequence 2
such that  ` 1 =D 2. This is to account for the possibility that the observer may send
back two values it received from the two systems in a previous interaction.
In Deﬁnition 8.20, we formalise the notions of domain simulations, domain bisimula-
tions and domain bisimilarities.
Deﬁnition 8.20 (Domain bisimilarity). Let D be an environment, and let S be a relation
containing triples of the form (;S;T) where  is a D-environment and S and T are
systems. We say that S is a D-simulation if, for all (;S;T) 2 S, it holds that:
 if S

 !f S 0 then T

 !
f T0 for some T0 such that (;S 0;T0) 2 S.
 if S
mhp:1i
 !f S 0 then T
mhp:2i
=)f T0 for some 2 and T0 such that 1 =D 2 and
(:(1;2);S 0;T0) 2 S.
 if S
m(p:1)
 !f S 0 then T
m(p:2)
=)f T0 for some 2 and T0 such that 1 =D 2 and
(:(1;2);S 0;T0) 2 S.
 if S
mhp:1i
 !f S 0 then for all 2 such that  ` 1 =D 2, it holds that either:186 Chapter 8 Domain Bisimulation
– T
mhp:2i




f T0 for some T0 such that (;S 0;T0 j mhhp:2ii) 2 S.
If S is a simulation, then we use S 1 to denote its inverse, deﬁned as the relation
containing the triple (;T;S) for every triple (;S;T) 2 S. We say that S is a D-
bisimulation if both S and S 1 are D-simulations. We deﬁne D-bisimilarity, written D,
to be the largest D-bisimulation.
The following lemmas prove some properties of domain bisimilarities. Lemma 8.21
states that any domain bisimilarity is an equivalence relation. Lemma 8.22 states that
structurally congruent systems are equivalent under every domain bisimilarity. Lemmas
8.23 and 8.24 state that domain bisimilarities are preserved under restriction and parallel
composition respectively. Together these two mean domain bisimilarities are contextual.
This is stated in Lemma 8.25
Lemma 8.21. Any domain bisimilarity D is an equivalence relation.
Proof. Let D be a domain. We know that D is symmetric by deﬁnition. To show that it
is reﬂexive, consider the relation r = f(;S;S) j S is a systemg. It is easy to show that r
is a D-bisimulation by exhibiting that it satisﬁes the transfer property of Deﬁnition 8.11.
The case for transitivity is similar. 
Lemma 8.22. S f T implies S D T.
Proof. We assume that S f T and proceed by induction on the derivation of this. The
details are long but straightforward. 
Lemma 8.23.  ` S D T implies  ` (n)S D (n)T for all channel names n.
Proof. Let r0 be the relation containing all tuples of the form (;(n)S;(n)T) such that
 ` S D T, and let r be the union of D and r0. We show that r is a D-bisimulation up
to structural congruence.
Assume that (;S;T) 2 r. We need to prove that (;S;T) has the transfer property
of D-bisimulation, and since r is clearly symmetric, we only need to prove this in one
direction. We do this by induction on why (;S;T) is in r. We have two cases: either
 ` S D T, in which case we already know that the transfer property holds, or (;S;T)
is of the form (;(n)S 0;(n)T0) for some name n and systems S 0 and T0 such that
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need to ﬁnd a matching move by (n)T0 as required by Deﬁnition 8.20. There are only
two rules in the LTS of Figure 8.1 whose conclusion matches such a transition: FAct
Res and FAct Open. In the case of FAct Res, this means that the derivation was of
the form
S 0 1  !f S 00
(n)S 0 1  !f (n)S 00
n < n(1)
If 1 is not an input action, then T0 2
=)f T00 for some 2 and T00 such that 1 =D 2 and
:(1;2) ` S 00 D T00. From this, we can use FAct Res to get (n)T0 2
=)f (n)T00,
and since :(1;2) ` S 00 D T00, we can conclude that (:(1;2);(n)S 00;(n)T00) 2 r.
If 1 is an input action, i.e., of the form mhp:1i, then for all 2 such that  ` 1 =D 2,
either T0 mhp:2i
=)f T00 such that  ` S 00 D T00, or T0

 !
f T00 such that  ` S 00 D
T00 j mhhp:2ii. In the ﬁrst case, we can use FAct Res to get (n)T0 mhp:2i
=)f (n)T00, and
since  ` S 00 D T00, we conclude that (;(n)S 00;(n)T00) 2 r. In the second case,
using FAct Res we get (n)T0

 !
f (n)T00, and since  ` S 00 D T00 j mhhp:2ii,
we can infer that (;(n)S 00;(n)(T00 j mhhp:2ii)) 2 r. This is all that is needed since
(n)(T00 j mhhp:2ii) f (n)T00 j mhhp:ii. In the case of FAct Open, the derivation






Since  ` S 0 D T0, this implies that T0 mhn:2i
=)f T00 such that 1 =D 2 and :(1;2) `
S 00 D T00. Now using FAct Open, we can get (n)T0 m(n:2)
=)f T00 and since we know
that :(1;2) ` S 00 D T00, we can conclude that (:(1;2);S 00;T00) 2 r. 
Lemma 8.24.  ` S D T implies that  ` S j R D T j R for all initial D-systems R.
Proof. We need to ﬁnd a D-bisimulation that includes the triple (;S j R;T j R). To do
that, we deﬁne the relation r to be the smallest relation satisfying the following:
(;S;T) 2 r if  ` S D T
(;(n)S;(n)T) 2 r if (;S;T) 2 r
(;S j R1;T j R2) 2 r if (;S;T) 2 r and  ` R1 =D R2.
Note the last clause of the deﬁnition; this is a result of our transfer property being weaker
than what is traditionally used in the deﬁnition of bisimulation (output provenance is
only required to match up to the view of principals in D). The need for this will become
clearer when we prove the cases FAct Comm-l and FAct Close-l below. The pair
(S j R;T j R), what is actually required for closure under parallel composition, is simply
a special case of (S j R1;T j R2) in the above deﬁnition since =D is reﬂexive.188 Chapter 8 Domain Bisimulation
We need to show that r is a D-bisimulation up-to f. Again, it is clear that r is symmetric
in the last two elements and so we only need to show the transfer property in one
direction. We do this by induction on why (;S;T) is in the relation r. There are three
cases.
In the ﬁrst case,  ` S D T and therefore the transfer property holds since D is a
D-bisimulation.
In the second case, (;S;T) is of the form (;(n)S 0;(n)T0) for some S 0 and T0 such
that (;S 0;T0) 2 r. We assume that (n)S 0 performs an action 1; we then need to ﬁnd
a matching move by (n)T0 as required by the deﬁnition of bisimulation. The proof of
this is similar to that of Lemma 8.23.
In the thirdandﬁnalcase, (;S;T) is ofthe form (;S 0 j R1;T0 j R2) where (;S 0;T0) 2 r
andR1 andR2 are D-systems suchthat  ` R1 =D R2. Letus assume thatS 0 j R1 performs
an action 1; we need to ﬁnd a matching move by T0 j R2 as required by the deﬁnition of
D-bisimulation. There are 6 rules that could have been used to derive the transition of
S 0 j R1: FAct Par-l, FAct Comm-l and FAct Close-l, as well as their symmetric
counterparts.
In the case of FAct Par-l, the derivation would be of the form:
S 0 1  !f S 00 bn(1) \ fn(R1) = ;
S 0 j R1
1  !f S 00 j R1
If 1 is not an input action, then by the induction hypothesis, T0 2
=)f T00 such that
1 =D 2 and (:(1;2);S 00;T00) 2 r. Using FAct Par-l, we can derive the transition
T0 j R2
2
=)f T00 j R2. Since (:(1;2);S 00;T00) 2 r and  ` R1 =D R2, we can conclude
that (:(1;2);S 00 j R1;T00 j R2) 2 r. If 1 is an input action, that is, of the form mhp:1i,
thentheinductionhypothesisimpliesthatforall2 suchthat ` 1 =D 2, eitherT0 mhp:2i
=)f
T00 such that (;S 00;T00) 2 r, or T0

 !
f T00 such that (;S 00;T00 j mhhp:2ii) 2 r. In the
ﬁrst case, we can use FAct Par-l to get T0 j R2
mhp:1i
=)f T00 j R2 where since we know that
(;S 00;T00) 2 r and  ` R1 =D R2, we can conclude that (;S 00 j R1;T00 j R2) 2 r. In the
second case, using FAct Par-l, we can derive the transition T0 j R2

 !
f T00 j R2. Now,
from (;S 00;T00 j mhhp:1ii) 2 r we can conclude that (;S 00 j R1;T00 j mhhp:1ii j R2) 2 r,
which is what we need since T00 j mhhp:1ii j R2 f T00 j R2 j mhhp:1ii.
In the case of FAct Comm-l, the transition would take the form:
S 0 mhp:1i




S 0 j R1

 !f S 00 j R0
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From S 0 mhp:1i
 !f S 00, the induction hypothesis implies T0 mhp:2i
=)f T00 such that 1 =D 2 and
(:(1;2);S 00;T00) 2 r. In addition to this, by Lemma 8.19, R1
mhp:1i
 !f R0




2 such that :(1;2) ` R0
1 =D R0
2. Using FAct Comm-l, we are able
to derive the transition T0 j R2

 !
f T00 j R0
2. And, since we have (:(1;2);S 00;T00) 2 r
and :(1;2) ` R0
1 =D R0
2, we can conclude that (:(1;2);S 00 j R0
1;T00 j R0
2) 2 r. The
case of FAct Close-l proceeds in a similar fashion but with bound output actions.
In the case of FAct Par-r, the transition would take the following form:
R1
1  !f R0
1 bn(1) \ fn(S 0) = ;
S 0 j R1
1  !f S 0 j R0
1
Now, since R1 =D R2 (by assumption) and =D  D , we can derive the matching move
for R2 and combine it with T0 using FAct Par-r to get the required move for T0 j R2.
In the case of FAct Comm-r, the transition would take the following form:
S 0 mhp:1i




S 0 j R1

 !f S 00 j R0
1
The induction hypothesis implies that either T0 mhp:1i




f T00 such that (S 00;T00 j mhhp:1ii) 2 r. R1
mhp:1i
 !f R0




that 1 =D 2. 
Lemma 8.25. S D T implies C[S] D C[T] for all D-contexts C.
Proof. We know from Lemma 8.23 that D is preserved by restriction. By Lemma 8.24,
and a symmetric version of it, we know that D is preserved by parallel composition
with D-systems. Hence, we conclude that D is preserved by all D-contexts. 
Theorem 8.26. S D T implies S uD T.
Proof. We need to show that D satisﬁes all the deﬁning properties of uD, that is, it
is symmetric, it preserves observables, it is closed under reduction and that it is D-
contextual. From that, and the fact that uD is by deﬁnition the largest relation satisfying
those conditions, it will follow that D  uD, i.e., S D T implies S uD T.
We know that D is symmetric by deﬁnition.
To prove that D preserves observables, let us assume that S D T and S #f m. This
means that S f (n)(mhhp:1ii j S 0) and n , m. Using the rules of Figure 8.1, S can190 Chapter 8 Domain Bisimulation
make a free or bound output action depending on what p is. If p , n, then S can make
a free output action as follows S
mhp:1i
 !f (n)(0 j S 0). This implies, since S D T, that
T
mhp:2i
=)f T0 for some 2 and T0 such that 1 =D 2 and (n)(0 j S 0) D T0. Lemma 8.3
then implies that T =)f T00 for some T00 such that T00 f mhhp:2ii j T0, which means
that T +f m. If p = n, then S can make a bound output action, and the proof proceeds
in a similar fashion to the previous case but we end up with T00 f (n)(mhhn:2ii j T0),
which again means that T +f m.
To prove that D is reduction closed, let us assume that S D T and S  !f S 0. By
Lemma 8.4, this implies that S





f T0 and S 00 D T0, which by Lemma 8.2 implies that T =)f T0. Since D is an
equivalence relation and f is a subset of D by lemmas 8.21 and 8.22 respectively, we
conclude that S 0 D T0.
We already know by Lemma 8.25 that D is D-contextual. Hence, we conclude that
D  uD. 
8.4 Concluding remarks
In this chapter, we strengthened the results of the previous chapter by studying be-
havioural equivalences for the provenance calculus with ﬁlters. The contextual equiva-
lence we deﬁned, domain congruence, provided a novel way of specifying properties of
provenance disclosure policies. It enabled us to vary the privileges of the observer and
study the impact of this on the discriminating power of the equivalence. This allowed us
to provide a relative measure of the eectiveness of ﬁlters in hiding sensitive provenance
information and implementing the provenance disclosure policies of principals. Note
that we are using the term “relative measure” to refer to the ordering of ﬁlters in terms
of how much provenance they hide from principals. To see how this works, consider
that the aim of a ﬁlter is to specify which parts of a provenance sequence each principal
is allowed to see. This is done by mapping group expressions to ﬁltering expressions.
Group expressions specify sets of principals and ﬁltering expressions specify the parts
of a provenance sequence that need to be hidden from the set of principals in question.
Let us consider the following ﬁlter as an example:
 = G 7!over hidemysources ; (  G) 7!over id
This ﬁlter uses the ﬁltering expression hidemysources to hide from principals in group
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the provenance of the channels used to receive it and send it. The ﬁlter leaves the
provenance view of everyone else intact by associating the identity ﬁltering expression
id with the group expression    G. There are two ways in which the ﬁlter  could
hide more provenance; either by hiding provenance from more principals or by hiding
more provenance from the same principals. More concretely, consider the following two
ﬁlters:

0 = (G + a) 7!over hidemysources ; (   (G + a)) 7!over id

00 = G 7!over o  ; (  G) 7!over id
Filter 0 diers from  in that it associates hidemysources with group G + a instead of
G. This means that 0 hides the previous provenance of the value and the provenance of
the channels used from a larger set of principals compared to ﬁlter . Therefore, it could
be said that ﬁlter 0 hides more provenance than ﬁlter . Now consider the second ﬁlter
00, it associates the ﬁlter expression o  with the same group expression G. So in terms
of group expressions, it is similar to ﬁlter . However, 00 hides the entire provenance
sequence from principals in group G. Therefore, like 0, 00 too hides more provenance
than . Filters 0 and 00 are not as easily comparable though since they use dierent
group expressions and dierent ﬁltering expressions. This means that such comparisons
of ﬁlters should induce a partial order between ﬁlters.
Domain congruence is a simple equivalence, at least as far as its deﬁnition is concerned.
Trying to characterise it coinductively, however, is not an easy task as we saw with the
deﬁnition of domain bisimilarity. The main source of the diculty lies in the complexity
of accounting for the exact provenance that an observer is able to discern. This is a
non-trivial problem as we saw. The reason is that even when the views of provenance
that are assigned to the observer prevent it from distinguishing between two provenance
sequences, the observermay stilltellthem apartby watching forany information leakage
in its future interactions with the systems. We proved that domain bisimilarity provides
a sound proof method to show the equivalence of systems and left it as an open problem
whether a complete proof method exists. Domain bisimilarity is interesting, not only as
a tractable proof methodology for domain congruence, but also as a formal way of high-
lighting many of the subtleties underlying the interplay between provenance checking
and ﬁlters. It is this interplay that made domain bisimilarity much more complicated to
deﬁne than the bisimilarities of the plain and annotated versions of the calculus.Chapter 9
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Computer Science, being a science of the artiﬁcial, may be seen as serving two distinct
but related purposes. On the one hand, it deals with how computing systems are, how
they are built and what properties they may have. On the other hand, it is concerned with
how computing systems ought to be, how they should be built to be more ecient, more
robust and more dependable. This means that the subject matter of Computer Science
is in fact a moving target. As our body of computing knowledge grows, we are able to
build larger, more complex systems, and so far, we have never passed up the opportunity
to do so. Computer Science is in a constant race to make the increasingly complex
simpler.
Ubiquitous computing promises to bring about computer systems that are larger and far
more complex than anything we have ever built before. These systems are predicted to
be autonomous, mobile, and context-aware. They are predicted to be interconnected,
communicating large amounts of data with each other. The data these systems commu-
nicate would be constructed from data they authored themselves as well as data they
received from other systems. The heterogeneous nature of these systems would mean
they have widely varying goals, quality standards, and trust policies. When a system
depends on the data it receives from other systems, it would need to ensure this data is of
a certain quality. One way to achieve this, which we think would be particularly suitable
for such environments, is to track the provenance of data and use it to judge its quality.
We assume that principals in systems similar to those envisioned by ubiquitous com-
puting would form webs of trust. These would reﬂect the trustworthiness that each
principal ascribes to other principals it interacts with, and would naturally evolve over
time in accordance with any new information that the principal learns from its interac-
tions. For provenance to be useful as an indicator of data quality, it needs to associate
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with each value a record documenting where the value originated and the principals
that contributed to its journey to its current state. This information needs to be kept
up-to-date and needs to be made available to principals to allow them to make informed
decisions about what data they wish to consume.
Provenance reveals the actions performed by a principal as they relate to a given value,
andtherefore the principalshouldhave the ability to decide who thatinformation is made
available to, and in extreme cases to decide to withhold it from everyone, eectively
opting out of the provenance tracking activity. Principals should still be able to detect
when provenance information has been withheld from them to ensure any decisions they
make based on provenance are not ill-informed.
9.1 Review of contributions
Our aim, as described and motivated in Chapter 1, is to study provenance-based trust
in distributed systems. To that end, we presented the provenance calculus in Chapter 3.
The calculus implements an intuitive notion of provenance that is intended as an account
of all past events that led a piece of data to be in its current “state”. Given the trust
policy of a principal, the provenance of a piece of data then serves as an indicator of its
quality as perceived by this principal. Concretely, the calculus annotates or tags each
value with a sequence of events denoting its provenance. This is updated with new and
relevant information dynamically as expressed by the provenance tracking semantics
of the calculus. Principals make use of the provenance information through pattern
matching which enables them to decide if and how to use the data. The details of pattern
matching itself were orthogonal to our objectives however, and hence the calculus was
made parametric on the choice of a pattern matching language. In Section 3.3, we
presented a sample pattern language and gave several examples to illustrate the use of
the calculus. Our contributions here are threefold; a notion of provenance for distributed
systems, a run time provenance tracking method and an integrated provenance checking
mechanism. In fact, to the best of our knowledge, this is the ﬁrst work that incorporates
provenance management into a process calculus. We think this is worthwhile since
it provides a uniﬁed framework to study all the elements of provenance management.
Not only that, but it also brings a rich set of tools and techniques from the concurrency
community to the study of provenance.
In Chapter 4, we highlighted the role of provenance tracking in the calculus by compar-
ing the annotated version of the calculus to a plain one in which no provenance tracking
or checking take place. We strengthened these results further by studying behaviouralChapter 9 Conclusion 195
equivalences for the annotated version and contrasting them with their counterparts in
the plain version. We believe behavioural equivalences provide a useful and novel way
to study the properties of provenance. In particular, by analysing the extra discriminat-
ing power that a behavioural equivalence gains as a result of provenance, we are able to
better highlight the role of provenance management in the calculus.
In Chapter 5, we studied some properties of provenance. The ﬁrst property we looked at,
well-formedness, allowed us to separate semantically meaningful provenance sequences
from syntactically legal ones. We also proposed a denotational semantics for provenance
sequences in the form of formulae in a temporal logic with a past modality. We used this
to deﬁne a notion of provenance correctness and proved that the provenance tracking
semantics of the calculus preserves the correctness of provenance. These results are
important since they formalise the guarantees that we can expect from the provenance
calculus. Moreover, we believe the deﬁnition of the past logic and its use to deﬁne the
semantics of provenance sequences constitute an original approach for understanding
provenance and its meaning as a concrete record of the past. In light of this, system
transitions provide the models against which the truth of provenance may be judged.
In Chapter 6, we discussed static provenance tracking and proposed a static type and
eect system to accomplish this. The type and eect system guaranteed that principals
always receive data with provenance that matches their provenance policies without
the run time overhead incurred as a result of dynamic provenance checks. In addition
to providing an alternative method to track the provenance of values and enforce the
provenance policies of principals, the type and eect system oered an interesting view
of provenance, provenance annotations as types. Unlike traditional type systems, the
provenance type system deals with dynamic behavioural types. This, we hope, provides
interesting results from both the provenance point of view as well as the typing point of
view.
In Chapter 7, we looked at the problem of provenance security. Our primary aim was to
address the privacy and security concerns that arise from the disclosure of provenance.
Weseparatedtheproblem intotwoparts, whataspectsofprovenanceneedtobeprotected
and how to extend the calculus to achieve that. This led us to deﬁne the two notions
of weakenings and ﬁlters. For the beneﬁt of keeping our results generic, we provided a
speciﬁcation for ﬁlter languages and left the details of ﬁlters unspeciﬁed. We deﬁned a
sample ﬁlter language to illustrate our ideas however. This language employed a novel
notion of modes that allowed us to achieve full dynamic change of provenance visibility
without violating the security policies of principals.196 Chapter 9 Conclusion
Chapter 8 studied domain congruence, a behavioural equivalence that is sensitive to the
set of principals available to the observer. The aim of this was to enable us to reason
about the security guarantees oered by ﬁlters. We also proposed a sound proof method
for domain congruence based on bisimulation. The deﬁnition of this latter highlighted
many of the subtle properties of ﬁlters and their interaction with provenance checking.
It also demonstrated the usefulness of concurrency theory tools such as bisimulation in
studying provenance management and its properties.
9.2 Possibilities for future work
In this section, we propose several avenues for future work. These range from simple
extensions to the calculus to more elaborate eorts aimed at generalising our prove-
nance notion, investigating other notions as well as considering possible implementation
strategies for various aspects of the work presented in this thesis.
9.2.1 General extensions to the calculus
The main aim of these extensions is to make it easier to express certain systems that
requirefeaturesnotcurrentlyavailableinthecalculusandtoreasonabouttheirproperties.
As we already commented in Section 3.3 when presenting our sample pattern matching
language, our patterns are closer to types than they are to patterns as commonly found in
other programming contexts. Indeed, pattern matching usually allows the programmer
to deconstruct terms by binding against their subparts. In our pattern language, we did
not want to allow this as it would have introduced provenance as data which would
have overcomplicated the calculus and the provenance notion. One may wish, however,
to extend the pattern language with bindings and study the implications this has on
provenance tracking, especially in a setting where the calculus is extended with data
terms.
Suchan extension requires the deﬁnition ofpattern matching languages to be modiﬁedso
that patterns include variables which may be bound to parts of the provenance sequence
when performing pattern matching. Technically, this involves adding a function that
returns the free variables of a pattern and modifying the pattern matching relation so that
it returns a substitution when a successful pattern match takes place. The new deﬁnition
of pattern matching languages would be as follows.Chapter 9 Conclusion 197
Deﬁnition 9.1. A pattern matching language is a triple (;fv;j=) where  is a set of
patterns ranged over by ;0;:::, fv :  ! P(X) is a function that returns the free
variables in a pattern and j=  K    , called the pattern matching relation, relates
provenance sequences to patterns and substitutions.
In this new setting, the receive rule would also need to be modiﬁed to something like:
p j= (j;) j 2 I
a[i2Im(i as x):Pi] j mhhp:pii !a a[Pj0fp:a?m;p=xg]
where  is the substitution resulting from the pattern match of p to j and 0 is like 
but with the values annotated with provenance that reﬂects their origin.
In addition to this, we might also like to extend patterns to include “normal” variables
so that dynamic information such as a newly learned principal names may be used in
pattern matching.
We may also consider an extension to the calculus that allows the dynamic creation of
principal names. This might have the following syntax
newp xinP
with its semantics given by the following rule
a[newp xinP] !a (b)(b[Pf
b:a=xg])
The above rule allows a new principal name b to be created and migrates the process P
to it. Note the restriction of the newly created name to denote that it is a fresh name and
the substitution of b : a for the occurrences of x to denote that the new identity b was
created by a. This ensures that any principal that receives data from this new principal
does so knowing that b, having been created by a, is simply an alias of a and therefore
should be assigned the same trustworthiness level as a. This guarantees that principals
cannot cheat and fool other principals into accepting data from them by creating new
identities. To keep it consistent with principal name creation, channel name creation
might also be modiﬁed to use the syntax
newc xinP
and the semantics
a[newc xinP] !a (m)(a[Pf
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which creates a new channel name m that is private to principal a. Here too, the substitu-
tion of m : a for x is used to denote that the channel name m was created by a.
9.2.2 Other provenance notions
The notion of provenance to employ in a particular setting depends on both the subject
of provenance and its purpose. Here, the subject of provenance refers to the entity about
which provenance information is recorded, which in our case for example happens to
be messages exchanged between principals. The subject of provenance determines what
type of information is available and meaningful to keep. On the other hand, the purpose
of provenance tracking determines how much information exactly one needs to record.
In our case, provenance is kept to allow principals to use their local beliefs about the
trustworthiness of other principals to decide which data to consume. This meant that
information about the role each principal played in getting a piece of data to its current
state was crucial. Implied in this was also the order and the number of times a particular
principal aected a value. Our representation of provenance as a sequence of events
does indeed reﬂect this fact.
It would be interesting to investigate other notions of provenance, starting with those in
line with the motivations and setting of this work, and later moving to consider other
settings that might be of interest such as that of higher order calculi for example. In this
latter, one could envisage recording information about both the role dierent principals
played in aecting the migration of a process as well as its execution history at dierent
sites. Considering our notion of provenance, we may see it as deﬁned by three elements:
the order of events, their multiplicity and what actions are considered to aect a value.
A change to any of these would lead to a dierent, albeit related, provenance notion.
For example, one could consider a provenance notion where order and multiplicity
are unimportant and where only the identities of principals are recorded and not the
provenance of the channels used. A straightforward representation of provenance for
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modifying the send and receive rules as follows:
ARed Snd
a[m:m hp:pi] !a mhhp:p [ fagii
ARed Rcv
p j= j j 2 I
a[i2Im:m (i as x):Pi] j mhhp:pii !a a[Pjfp:p=xg]
where the pattern match p j= j is simply the set inclusion test p  j.
One could generate many provenance notions by including or excluding order and multi-
plicity and varying the deﬁnition of what actions (and what parts of those actions) aect
a value. In the calculus of Chapter 3, we considered send and receive actions to be
important as they are what determines where a value is going to end up. From those, we
only recorded the identities of principals involved and ignored the names of the channels
used. Our justiﬁcation there was that trust is a relation between principals and hence
the name of the channel used for communication is not important. One could argue
however that channel names need to be recorded as they tell a principal why a value was
transmitted along the path it did. Moreover, if one considers name matching, as in the
following example:
a[if m:m = n:n then lhvi else lhv
0i ] j b[l(x):P]
one sees that the value principal b ends up with depends the outcome of the equality test.
Hence, the “if-action” (together with the values tested and their provenances) should be
recorded in the provenance of the value sent by a (v0 in this case since the two names
tested are not equal). A similar argument may be raised regarding input preﬁxes as their
successful execution determines whether any message in the continuation gets sent or
not.
The dierent provenance notions induced by these changes are related and some of them
are contained in others. That is, the information recorded in a particular provenance
notion may be completely contained in that of another provenance notion. Such is
the case between the set based notion we described above and our sequence based
provenance notion for example.200 Chapter 9 Conclusion
9.2.3 Implementation concerns
There are a number of implementation concerns worth investigating. The ﬁrst has to do
with the implementability of our provenance notion itself which requires strong integrity
and non-repudiation guarantees (formulated as the provenance correctness property in
Chapter 5). Such a guarantee could be fairly easily provided by a trusted middleware
layer. However, in the absence of such an environment, ensuring the integrity and non-
repudiation of provenance information seems to be more dicult. A simpler provenance
notion than ours, one where only the identities of principals along the path of a value are
kept, could be implemented using a digital signing scheme. The notion of provenance
described in this work, however, also requires the provenance of channels (and the
type of action) to be recorded which makes a simple application of digital signatures
impossible. Furthermore, the security requirements demanded by ﬁlters mean that any
implementation strategy is not going to be straightforward.
9.3 Summary and concluding remarks
This thesis introduced an extension of the asynchronous -calculus aimed at study-
ing provenance-based trust in data quality. The extension consisted of annotating all
exchangeable data terms with metadata denoting their provenance. In the standard se-
mantics of the calculus, the provenance information was automatically updated as the
system evolved and the trust policies of principals were checked and enforced dynam-
ically. Behavioural equivalences for both the plain and the annotated versions of the
calculus were studied, highlighting the dierences between the two versions and making
clear the role of provenance tracking in the calculus. Two properties of provenance, well-
formedness and correctness were deﬁned and studied. In addition to this, an alternative
semantics relying on a static type and eect inference system was also proposed. This
latter ensured that principals would always receive data with provenance that complies
with their policies without the run time overhead of dynamic provenance tracking and
checking. To address the security ramiﬁcations of provenance tracking, an extension of
the calculus with ﬁlters was proposed. This enabled principals to control the disclosure
of provenance information to other principals. Notions of behavioural equivalence were
deﬁnedforthis extendedcalculus andusedto study the security properties ofprovenance.
Finally, the contributions of the thesis were reviewed and avenues for future work were
proposed.Appendix A
Labelled Transition System Semantics
for the Provenance Calculus
A.1 Plain version
A.1.1 Asynchronous bisimilarity
The deﬁnition of reduction barbed congruence involves a universal quantiﬁcation over
contexts, which renders it unsuitable for proving the equivalence of systems in general.
To obtain a tractable proof method, we deﬁne asynchronous bisimilarity. The deﬁnition
of this latter relies on the labelled transition system of Figure A.1, which provides an
alternative formulation of the semantics of the plain version of the calculus.
The labelled semantics is given in terms of a family of binary relations on plain systems
of the form

 !p, where  ranges over actions. We have four kinds of actions as follows:
1. mhvi: which denotes the output of the free value v on channel m.
2. m(n): which denotes the output of the bound name n on channel m.
3. mhvi: which denotes the input of the free value v on channel m.
4. : which denotes the unobservable (internal) action.
As indicated above, the name n in action m(n) is bound; all other occurrences of names
in actions are free. We use bn() and fn() for the sets of bound names and free names
in action  respectively. We denote the union of these two by n().
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Deﬁnition A.1. The family of plain transition relations

 !p, where  ranges over
actions, is deﬁned by the rules of Figure A.1.












































 !p S 0 bn() \ fn(T) = ;
S j T



















 !p (n)(S 0 j T0)
The labelledtransition system provides an alternative formulation ofthe semantics ofthe
plain version, and hence we expect it to coincide with the reduction semantics deﬁned
in Section 3.1.2. This is shown formally in Corollary A.6. To prove this latter as well as
other results below, we need to ﬁrst prove a number of lemmas concerning the labelled
transition system and its relation to the reduction semantics. We do this below.
Lemma A.2. S p T and S

 !p S 0 implies that T

 !p T0 for some T0 such that
S 0 p T0.
Lemma A.3. S

 !p S 0 implies that S !p S 0.
Lemma A.4. The labelled semantics satisﬁes the following properties:
 S
mhvi
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 S
m(v)
 !p S 0 implies that S p (n)(mhhvii j S 0).
Lemma A.5. S !p S 0 implies that S

 !p S 00 for some S 00 such that S 0 p S 00.
Corollary A.6. S !p S 0 if and only if S

 !p S 00 and S 00 p S 0.
Proof. Follows from Lemma A.3 and Lemma A.5. 
Deﬁnition A.7 (Asynchronous bisimilarity). (Plain, weak) asynchronous bisimilarity,
p, is the largest symmetric binary relation on systems such that whenever S p T,
it holds that if S

 !p S 0 and bn() are fresh, then T

 !p T0 for some T0 such that
S 0 p T0.
Lemma A.8. S p T implies S p T.
Theorem A.9. S p T implies S up T.
Proof. We need to show that p satisﬁes the three deﬁning criteria of up, that is, preser-
vation of barbs, closure under reduction and contextuality. From that, and the fact that
up is by deﬁnition the largest relation satisfying those three conditions, it will follow
that p  up, i.e., S p T implies S up T. 
Theorem A.10. S up T implies S p T.
Corollary A.11. up and p coincide.
Proof. The proof follows directly from Theorem A.9 and Theorem A.10. 
A.2 Annotated version
A.2.1 Asynchronous bisimilarity
Deﬁnition A.12. The family of annotated transition relations

 !a, where  ranges over
actions, is deﬁned by the rules of Figure A.3.
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 !a (n)(S 0 j T0)
Lemma A.13. S a T and S

 !a S 0 implies that T

 !a T0 for some T0 such that
S 0 a T0.
Lemma A.14. S

 !a S 0 implies that S !a S 0.
Lemma A.15. The labelled semantics satisﬁes the following properties:
 S
mhvi
 !a S 0 implies that S a mhhvii j S 0.
 S
m(v)
 !a S 0 implies that S a (n)(mhhvii j S 0).
Lemma A.16. S !a S 0 implies that S

 !a S 00 for some S 00 such that S 0 a S 00.
Corollary A.17. S !a S 0 if and only if S

 !a S 00 and S 00 a S 0.
Proof. Follows from Lemma A.14 and Lemma A.16. 
Proof. The proof for each direction of the double implication proceeds by rule induction.
The details of the proof are standard and hence are omitted. Appendix A Labelled Transition System Semantics for the Provenance Calculus 205
Deﬁnition A.18 (Asynchronous bisimilarity). (Annotated, weak) asynchronous bisimi-
larity, a, is the largest symmetric binary relation on systems such that whenever S a T,
it holds that if S

 !a S 0 then T

 !a T0 for some T0 such that S 0 a T0.
Lemma A.19. S a T implies S a T.
Theorem A.20. S a T implies S ua T.
Proof. We need to show that a satisﬁes the three deﬁning criteria of ua, that is, preser-
vation of barbs, closure under reduction and contextuality. From that, and the fact that
ua is by deﬁnition the largest relation satisfying those three conditions, it will follow
that a  ua, i.e., S a T implies S ua T. 
Theorem A.21. S ua T implies S a T.
Corollary A.22. ua and a coincide.
Proof. The proof follows directly from Theorem A.20 and Theorem A.21. Appendix B
The Provenance Calculus with Filters
Chapter 7 extended the provenance calculus with ﬁlters. It only described how this
extension diers from the original calculus. The aim of this appendix is to provide a
reference containing the full deﬁnitions of the syntax and semantics of the provenance
calculus extended with ﬁlters.
B.1 Syntax
The syntax of the calculus diers from that of the annotated version in the output con-
struct (which now takes a ﬁlter as a second argument) and in provenance sequences
(which now include a new form to denote the application of a ﬁlter to a provenance
sequence). The full syntax is summarised in Figure B.1.
Figure B.1. Syntax of the provenance calculus with ﬁlters
; ;::: 2  ﬁlters
P ::= process terms
whwati Filtered output
i2Iw(i as x):Pi input-guarded choice
if w = w0 then P else Q equality test of w and w0
(n)P private channel n with scope P
P j Q parallel composition of P and Q
P replication of P
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 ::= provenance sequences
 empty provenance
e single event
 ;  sequential composition
 .  ﬁltered sequence
B.2 Semantics
We give a quick review of the complete deﬁnitions of both the structural congruence and
reduction relations here. These are given below in ﬁgures B.2 and B.3 respectively.
The structural congruence relation is exactly the same as the one for the original calculus.
We name the rules dierently to avoid confusion.
Figure B.2. Filtered semantics: structural congruence
(FStr Par Nil) S j 0 f S
(FStr Par Comm) S j T f T j S
(FStr Par Assoc) (R j S) j T f R j (S j T)
(FStr Res Nil) (n)0 f 0
(FStr Res Res) (n)(m)S f (m)(n)S
(FStr Res Par) ((n)S) j T f (n)(S j T) if n < fn(T)
(FStr Sys Rep) a[P] f a[P j P]
(FStr Sys Nil) a[0] f 0
(FStr Sys Par) a[P j Q] f a[P] j a[Q]
(FStr Sys Res) a[(n)P] f (n)(a[P])
(FStr Par SRef) S f S
(FStr Par SSym) S f T ) T f S
(FStr Par STran) R f S ^ S f T ) R f T
(FStr Par SCon) S f T ) C[S] f C[T]
Below we give the complete deﬁnition of reduction for the ﬁltered calculus. The two
main rules, and the only two that dier from the original calculus are FRed Snd and
FRed Rcv which we already described in the previous chapter. The other rules stay
unchanged.Appendix B The Provenance Calculus with Filters 209
Figure B.3. Filtered semantics: provenance tracking reduction
FRed Snd
a[m:m hp:p ati]  !f mhhp: . a!m ; pii
FRed Rcv
j 2 I view(a;p)  j
a[i2Im:m (i as x):Pi] j mhhp:pii  !f a[Pjfp:a?m;p=xg]
FRed Ift
a[if m: = m:0 then P else Q ]  !f a[P]
FRed If f
m , n
a[if m: = n:0 then P else Q ]  !f a[Q]
FRed Res
S  !f S 0
(n)S  !f (n)S 0
FRed Par
S  !f S 0
S j T  !f S 0 j T
FRed Str
S a T T  !f T0 T0 a S 0
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